US embassy cable - 03ANKARA3732

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 003732 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S OPPOSITION CHP DEVELOPS "NUANCES" ON EU 
POLICY IN WAKE OF MAY 28 NSC MEETING 
 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 3509 
     B. ANKARA 3618 
 
 
(U) Classified by Acting Political Counselor Nicholas S. 
Kass.  Reason: 1.5 (b)(d). 
 
 
1. (C) Ref A noted main opposition CHP's general support for 
the AK government's sixth EU reform package, which could be 
brought to Parliament perhaps as early as this week. 
However, in light of the May 28 NSC meeting and the 
well-publicized opposition to the reform process among 
hardliners in the military leadership (ref B), there are 
signs that CHP is beginning to shift its stance on AK 
EU-related efforts. 
 
 
2. (C) Several CHP M.P.s -- including Bulent Tanla and 
Foreign Affairs Committee member Hasim Oral -- have asserted 
to us privately that the party will continue to support the 
government's effort "fully and unconditionally." 
Nevertheless, other, senior CHP M.P.s -- Deputy Group 
Chairman Haluk Koc and Central Administrative Board member 
Fuat Cay -- offered to us June 9 a more nuanced version of 
the party's approach on the issues. 
 
 
3. (C) While professing CHP's commitment to the EU, Koc and 
Cay listed their objections to the current reform package: 
 
 
-- Both claimed that allowing foreign observers to monitor 
Turkish elections, as currently envisioned in the AK 
government's draft, is unacceptable.  Turkey already allows 
OSCE observers, they argued.  "We are not Armenia or 
Azerbaijan," said Koc.  "We aren't a third world democracy, 
are we?" 
 
 
-- Koc noted that CHP does not want state-owned TRT 
television to be involved in any way in Kurdish broadcasting 
-- another key, and controversial, provision in the AK 
government's plan.  Koc worried that "if Kurdish is allowed 
to run on TRT, then legally State television will have to 
give voice to all Turkish minorities," even the Circassians, 
(who have long been integrated into the "Turkish" ethnic body 
politic). 
 
 
-- Cay strongly objected to the inclusion of a measure that 
would allow the establishment of places of worship in 
apartment buildings.  "This has nothing to do with the EU. 
We already have more mosques -- 80,000 -- than schools -- 
60,000." 
 
 
-- While both endorsed AK's efforts to abolish article 8 of 
the anti-terror law, Cay volunteered that "other mechanisms 
exist, like article 312 of the penal code" (note: under which 
PM Erdogan was jailed in 1999.  End note) to protect the 
interests and equities of the Turkish State. 
 
 
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COMMENT 
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4. (C) June 9 mainstream press reports indicate that AK is 
shelving the provision on places of worship.  Nevertheless, 
this is precisely the kind of issue that routinely raises the 
hackles of -- and provides ammunition to -- the "Party of 
Ataturk" and the Kemalist secularist elites, whom CHP 
represents.  The party's subtle shift almost certainly 
reflects attempts by Chairman Baykal -- known for aggressive 
tactics of limited effectiveness -- to curry favor both with 
the voters and military hard-liners.  The comments of Cay and 
Koc, particularly with respect to Article 8 issues, appear to 
reflect such considerations.  CHP's tactics could complicate 
the reform package's prospects -- particularly if AK bucks 
long-held Turkish State shibboleths and submits the package 
to Parliament as promised before the NSC's meeting at the end 
of June. 
PEARSON