Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.
| Identifier: | 03RANGOON675 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03RANGOON675 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Rangoon |
| Created: | 2003-06-09 11:01:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV PHUM BM ASSK |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000675 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV USPACOM FOR FPA USUN FOR AMBASSADOR TWINING E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2012 TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, BM, ASSK SUBJECT: SE RAZALI TO MEET WITH ASSK REF: RANGOON 665 Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ FOR REASON 1.5(D). 1. (C) Summary: UN Special Envoy Razali gave COM a private read-out of his meeting this morning, June 9, with Vice Senior General Maung Aye. Maung Aye told Razali that "as a special consideration" to the UN and Razali's efforts, the SPDC had reversed a previous decision to not allow anyone access to Aung San Suu Kyi, and Razali could see her June 10 at 10:00 in the morning at an undisclosed location. The only conditions on the visit were that Razali cannot divulge where the meeting takes place and he must be brief in speaking with her. When Razali asked when ASSK would be released, Maung Aye responded, "As soon as it is possible." Razali is briefing the diplomatic corps on these developments just prior to his visit to ASSK on June 10, and then leaving on a flight to Singapore at noon at the request of the SPDC. He said he would not provide this information to any other members of the diplomatic corps except the Japanese Ambassador until the morning briefing. COM said she would alert Washington but otherwise keep the information close-hold. End Summary. 2. (C) Special Envoy Razali briefed COM privately this afternoon (June 9) on his meeting earlier this morning with SPDC Vice Senior General Maung Aye. This was Razali's first substantive meeting with the SPDC number two and he said it went quite well. Razali said it was interesting to see the dynamics in the meeting, with Maung Aye relaxed and clearly in charge. Maung Aye told Razali he was aware of the situation, Razali's efforts, and (interestingly) PM Mahathir's concerns. He told Razali that "as a special consideration" to the UN and to Razali's efforts, the request to grant him access to ASSK had been reviewed by "the organization" and it was decided to reverse a previous decision to bar all access to her. (Note: Neither Razali nor post has ever heard of "the organization" before. Razali said he plans to follow-up with the Foreign Minister to get a better understanding of what it refers to. This could be a term for an SPDC policy council or a smaller subset of key decision-makers. End Note.) Maung Aye said Khin Nyunt would provide Razali with the details of the meeting and began to excuse himself. In an effort to get a commitment for future meetings with Maung Aye, Razali noted how useful it had been to talk to him and said he hoped to meet with him in the future; he said Maung Aye just smiled. Finally, Razali asked Maung Aye when ASSK would be released. Maung Aye gave the enigmatic reply, "As soon as it is possible." 3. (C) Khin Nyunt then took Maung Aye's chair and brought out a book with handwritten details on how the visit to ASSK would be handled. He told Razali that he would be taken to a military headquarters where he would meet Brigadier General Than Tun (the military intelligence officer normally assigned as a liaison to ASSK). The two of them would go together to another location to meet her. Khin Nyunt told Razali that the two conditions for the meeting would be that Razali could not divulge the location of the meeting to anyone and that he had to keep the meeting brief. Khin Nyunt added that Razali "should not be concerned by the location where they meet" because ASSK would be brought there for the meeting from another location. Finally, Khin Nyunt asked Razali how long he planned to remain in Rangoon. When Razali said he was flexible depending how things were progressing, Khin Nyunt suggested that he leave on the 12:15 P.M. Silkair flight to Singapore right after his meeting with ASSK. Razali said he was a little taken aback by this, but he agreed. (Note: Razali said he would provide Poloff with information on the ASSK meeting at the airport, if possible. End Note.) 4. (C) COM asked if Razali had brought up the condition of U Tin Oo or other NLD members and supporters that have been detained and reportedly injured. Razali said he had not raised this, preferring to focus on ASSK first and foremost. He said he would be meeting with the Foreign Minister later in the day and planned to discuss access to other detainees, the steps necessary to get national reconciliation back on track, and the decision-making process of the junta. Razali said it was fascinating to see how relaxed and confident Maung Aye was and how Khin Nyunt was clearly in a subservient role in Maung Aye's presence. Most significantly, he felt, was that there was no mention of Senior General Than Shwe during the meeting. Razali said it was clear to him that he will need to engage with Maung Aye to a greater degree in order to move forward with his mission. Martinez
Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04