US embassy cable - 03RANGOON675

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SE RAZALI TO MEET WITH ASSK

Identifier: 03RANGOON675
Wikileaks: View 03RANGOON675 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2003-06-09 11:01:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PHUM BM ASSK
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000675 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR TWINING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2012 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, BM, ASSK 
SUBJECT: SE RAZALI TO MEET WITH ASSK 
 
REF: RANGOON 665 
 
Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ FOR REASON 1.5(D). 
 
1. (C)  Summary:  UN Special Envoy Razali gave COM a private 
read-out of his meeting this morning, June 9, with Vice 
Senior General Maung Aye.  Maung Aye told Razali that "as a 
special consideration" to the UN and Razali's efforts, the 
SPDC had reversed a previous decision to not allow anyone 
access to Aung San Suu Kyi, and Razali could see her June 10 
at 10:00 in the morning at an undisclosed location.  The only 
conditions on the visit were that Razali cannot divulge where 
the meeting takes place and he must be brief in speaking with 
her.  When Razali asked when ASSK would be released, Maung 
Aye responded, "As soon as it is possible."  Razali is 
briefing the diplomatic corps on these developments just 
prior to his visit to ASSK on June 10, and then leaving on a 
flight to Singapore at noon at the request of the SPDC.  He 
said he would not provide this information to any other 
members of the diplomatic corps except the Japanese 
Ambassador until the morning briefing.  COM said she would 
alert Washington but otherwise keep the information 
close-hold. End Summary. 
 
2. (C)  Special Envoy Razali briefed COM privately this 
afternoon (June 9) on his meeting earlier this morning with 
SPDC Vice Senior General Maung Aye.  This was Razali's first 
substantive meeting with the SPDC number two and he said it 
went quite well.  Razali said it was interesting to see the 
dynamics in the meeting, with Maung Aye relaxed and clearly 
in charge.  Maung Aye told Razali he was aware of the 
situation, Razali's efforts, and (interestingly) PM 
Mahathir's concerns.  He told Razali that "as a special 
consideration" to the UN and to Razali's efforts, the request 
to grant him access to ASSK had been reviewed by "the 
organization" and it was decided to reverse a previous 
decision to bar all access to her.  (Note:  Neither Razali 
nor post has ever heard of "the organization" before.  Razali 
said he plans to follow-up with the Foreign Minister to get a 
better understanding of what it refers to.  This could be a 
term for an SPDC policy council or a smaller subset of key 
decision-makers.  End Note.)  Maung Aye said Khin Nyunt would 
provide Razali with the details of the meeting and began to 
excuse himself.  In an effort to get a commitment for future 
meetings with Maung Aye, Razali noted how useful it had been 
to talk to him and said he hoped to meet with him in the 
future; he said Maung Aye just smiled.  Finally, Razali asked 
Maung Aye when ASSK would be released.  Maung Aye gave the 
enigmatic reply, "As soon as it is possible." 
 
3. (C)  Khin Nyunt then took Maung Aye's chair and brought 
out a book with handwritten details on how the visit to ASSK 
would be handled.  He told Razali that he would be taken to a 
military headquarters where he would meet Brigadier General 
Than Tun (the military intelligence officer normally assigned 
as a liaison to ASSK).  The two of them would go together to 
another location to meet her.  Khin Nyunt told Razali that 
the two conditions for the meeting would be that Razali could 
not divulge the location of the meeting to anyone and that he 
had to keep the meeting brief.  Khin Nyunt added that Razali 
"should not be concerned by the location where they meet" 
because ASSK would be brought there for the meeting from 
another location.  Finally, Khin Nyunt asked Razali how long 
he planned to remain in Rangoon.  When Razali said he was 
flexible depending how things were progressing, Khin Nyunt 
suggested that he leave on the 12:15 P.M. Silkair flight to 
Singapore right after his meeting with ASSK.  Razali said he 
was a little taken aback by this, but he agreed.  (Note: 
Razali said he would provide Poloff with information on the 
ASSK meeting at the airport, if possible.  End Note.) 
 
4. (C)  COM asked if Razali had brought up the condition of U 
Tin Oo or other NLD members and supporters that have been 
detained and reportedly injured.  Razali said he had not 
raised this, preferring to focus on ASSK first and foremost. 
He said he would be meeting with the Foreign Minister later 
in the day and planned to discuss access to other detainees, 
the steps necessary to get national reconciliation back on 
track, and the decision-making process of the junta.  Razali 
said it was fascinating to see how relaxed and confident 
Maung Aye was and how Khin Nyunt was clearly in a subservient 
role in Maung Aye's presence.  Most significantly, he felt, 
was that there was no mention of Senior General Than Shwe 
during the meeting.  Razali said it was clear to him that he 
will need to engage with Maung Aye to a greater degree in 
order to move forward with his mission. 
Martinez 

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