US embassy cable - 03ZAGREB1298

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ZAGREB 001298 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/B (LINO) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PARM, MARR, HR, KICC, War Crimes, Regional Issues, Political Parties/Elections 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AMB. LINO'S VISIT TO CROATIA JUNE 
11-12 
 
REF: A. ZAGREB 1296 
 
     B. STATE 153958 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Lawrence G. Rossin for Reasons 1.5 (B, D) 
 
Overview 
-------- 
 
1.  (C) With its application for membership in the EU's 
"in-box" and parliamentary elections around the corner, it is 
extremely unlikely that the Croatian government will move any 
closer to signing an Article 98 Agreement during your visit, 
or even discuss texts.  We expect their entire focus will be 
to argue for a waiver.  This will be one in a series of GoC 
policy choices which have damaged our bilateral relationship 
(ref A).  Your visit represents the USG's "extra mile" effort 
to prevent this outcome.  We look forward to your visit and 
to welcoming you to Zagreb. 
 
The Environment 
--------------- 
 
2.  (C) Croatia submitted its formal application for EU 
membership in December 2002.  Since then, every single GoC 
policy decision has been taken with a view towards how the 
Racan Government believes it will be perceived by the 
European Union.  In the case of Iraq, that meant not only 
declining our request to join the coalition of the willing, 
but publicly crowing about it.  On deciding whether to engage 
toward signing an Article 98 Agreement, that meant taking the 
Patten/Papandreou letter urging candidate countries' 
adherence to EU guidelines as if it were Holy Writ and as if 
Croatia was actually under active consideration for 
membership in the near term. 
3.  (C) Croatia's coalition government came to power in 
January 2000, bringing to an end the corrupt, nationalist 
regime of Tudjman's HDZ.  Apart from ejecting the HDZ, 
however, the coalition parties had few major goals in common. 
 The Racan Government has managed to hang on through most of 
its four-year mandate, but it has been a rocky ride, 
including countless threats of resignations, several cabinet 
reshuffles and one genuine government crisis.  Although there 
has been no formal announcement, the next parliamentary 
election is widely expected to take place late this autumn. 
All of Croatia's politicians believe the best way to get more 
votes is to show that they are more pro-EU than their 
competition. 
 
The Arguments 
------------- 
 
4.  (C) The USG has been pushing Croatia hard, both in 
Washington and in Zagreb, to move forward on an Article 98 
agreement.  Although the GoC continues to tell both us and 
the public that it has not made a formal decision, we 
understand that the Racan Cabinet has already decided not to 
sign.  The excuses they will present in their meetings with 
your delegation are by this time very familiar, as are the 
reasons they believe Croatia's "special circumstances" make 
it a good candidate for a national interest waiver. 
 
-- EU Accession.  While the GoC downplays this argument in 
its discussions with us (since they know it carries little 
weight), it takes the admonition in the Patten/Papandreou 
letter very seriously and will not step outside the lines set 
out in the EU Common Positions.  Despite all indications that 
the EU's bark is worse than its bite, the GoC has not 
responded to our urging that it explore what the true, 
limited repercussions of signing an Article 98 agreement 
would be for its application for EU membership. 
 
-- ICTY/ICC Linkage.  Croatia's leaders have done nothing to 
explain the differences between ICTY and the ICC to the 
public.  (They acknowledge the distinction to us in private.) 
 As a result, they not only presume, self-servingly, but also 
make it more probable that voters would punish them for 
allowing the U.S. to exempt its servicemembers while sending 
Croatia's "heroes" to the Hague. 
 
-- Regional Stability.  The GoC believes that the U.S. should 
understand that Croatia is irreplaceable as we seek to build 
stability in the region.  Cutting U.S. military assistance 
would not only slow Croatia's progress toward NATO 
membership, but would also impede its effort to increase the 
security of its borders. 
 
-- U.S. - Croatia Relations.  The GoC believes that bilateral 
military ties are the strongest part of our overall 
relationship.  IMET training in particular has been a solid 
investment of good will and good intentions which is at risk 
if the U.S. does not grant Croatia a national interest waiver. 
 
 
-- Domestic Political Fallout.  GOC leaders say that voters 
will punish coalition parties if the GoC signs an Article 98 
agreement.  Since the opposition HDZ is still largely 
undemocratic and supports policies which oppose our goals for 
regional stability, the U.S. cannot afford to risk a return 
to power of the right-wing nationalists.  (This argument 
holds little water since the HDZ has already called publicly 
for the Croatia to sign an agreement.) 
 
Likely Outcome 
-------------- 
 
5.  (C) While it is all but certain that the GoC will not 
agree to sign an Article 98 agreement during your visit, it 
will present its engagement with your delegation to the 
Croatian public as a good faith effort to find common ground 
and to make Croatia's case for a national interest waiver. 
It also will likely seek to use the visit with us as evidence 
of its serious effort to reach common ground -- i.e., for us 
to grant a waiver. 
 
Managing the Message 
-------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Croatia's foreign ministry has already approached us 
seeking to orchestrate a joint press conference and statement 
with a view toward minimizing differences and papering over 
the serious cracks in our bilateral relationship.  That also 
would mainly be for domestic consumption.  We turned them 
down and have instead organized a private interview for you 
with a very solid journalist from Croatia's least 
sensationalist daily newspaper where you will be able to lay 
out the facts about ICC and Article 98 and have them reported 
faithfully. 
ROSSIN 
NNNN