US embassy cable - 03ABUJA997

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000997 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2008 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MOPS, MASS, LI, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: PRESIDENT OBASANJO BELIEVES TAYLOR MUST GO 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER.  REASONS: 1.5 (B & D). 
 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: During a May 15 meeting, President 
Obasanjo told Ambassador Jeter he was prepared to 
abandon his heretofore avuncular approach with 
Liberian President Charles Taylor.  Taylor was 
irredeemable and Liberia's future could no longer be 
tied to Taylor's leadership, Obasanjo had concluded. 
Ambassador Jeter replied that President Obasanjo's 
tougher stance was a welcome one that accorded with 
our own.  The Ambassador stressed that Taylor's 
rapacity and ambition were the font of much of the 
sub-region's instability.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
2. (C) Jeter began by saying that despite Liberia's 
modest size, Taylor aspired to sub-regional leadership 
and was willing to sacrifice the well-being of West 
Africa to achieve his personal objective.  Taylor's 
master scheme was to control the resources of Liberia 
and its immediate neighbors in order to amass a war 
chest that would catapult him to ascendance in a 
region of relatively conservative and non-adventurous 
leaders Taylor viewed himself as an irredentist leader 
with no immediate rivals and few deterrents.   Thus, 
he ravaged in Sierra Leone to gain access to its 
lucrative diamond fields.  Guinea's iron ore and 
diamonds had also whetted Taylor's unbounded appetite. 
The Liberian leader also saw in the maelstrom of Cote 
d' Ivoire an opportunistic chance to extend his 
influence. 
 
 
3. (C) However, Ambassador Jeter added that Taylor's 
masterplan seemed to be imploding.  International 
sanctions and Sierra Leone's gradual recuperation had 
derived the Liberian of funds to keep his war machine 
at full throttle.  Taylor's forces were disintegrating 
while Liberia's rebel forces, LURD and MODEL, were 
growing relatively stronger and inching closer to 
Monrovia.  Moreover, Taylor had also run out of 
friends in the region, most notably Burkina Faso's 
Campoare.  Taylor was isolated and his situation now 
was more precarious than it has been since his 
becoming President. 
 
 
4. President Obasanjo endorsed this assessment of 
Taylor and the Liberian situation, adding that West 
African leaders had tired of Taylor's antics because 
of the extreme distress he had caused the sub-region. 
Obasanjo temporarily mused whether Libya's Qadhafi 
would come to Taylor's aid, but quickly dismissed this 
notion, stating that Qadhafi wanted to settle the PAN 
AM 103 case and would not risk irritating the USG by 
supporting the reckless and ungrateful Taylor. 
Obasanjo said Taylor had sought a delay in holding the 
presidential election because of the security 
situation caused by rebel advances.  The President 
correctly saw this as a subterfuge by Taylor to hold 
to power in hope that passage of time would reverse 
the diminution of his fortunes, for instance, serious 
illness stalked Guinea's Conte; the ensuing 
instability and uncertainty in Guinea should Conte 
quickly pass from the scene could provide Taylor some 
breathing space and access to lucrative material 
sources.  Moreover, Conte's demise also could diminish 
Guinea's assistance to the rebels, thus alleviating 
pressure on Taylor. 
 
 
5. (C) Ambassador Jeter stated that time was of the 
essence.  The security and humanitarian situation in 
Liberia was increasingly dire.  While the LURD and 
MODEL served to pressure Taylor, they were not the 
answer; ultimately, they were malignant factors, 
probably no better than Taylor.  Already, ethnic 
violence was tumescent.  Should these forces enter 
Monrovia, the costs in lives and human suffering would 
reach civil war proportions.  Obasanjo agreed.  The 
Nigerian President stressed it was important that the 
international community speak to Taylor with one voice 
and that voice must tell him to leave.  Taylor must be 
told that his reelection would simply be greeted by 
ostracism and perhaps additional sanctions.  Obasanjo 
foresaw the establishment of an interim national 
government, comprised of the major opposition leaders, 
with the mandate of conducting elections six months 
after Taylor's exit. 
 
 
6. (C) Both Obasanjo and Jeter thought Taylor could be 
convinced to make his exit if assured that he would 
not face a war crimes tribunal.  President Obasanjo 
said Taylor was deathly afraid of being placed in the 
dock.  Jeter agreed.  A deal protecting him from 
prosecution might be attractive.  Obasanjo said 
Nigeria would be willing to offer Taylor asylum but 
speculated that Taylor would not accept the offer. 
Concerned that Taylor might use one of 
Liberia's neighbor as a road for his return, Obasanjo 
thought no other country in the sub-region would be 
acceptable as a place of asylum.  Obasanjo mention 
Morocco as a possible haven. 
 
 
7. (C) Comment: President Obasanjo's position on 
Liberia has made a one hundred and eighty degree turn. 
Obasanjo no longer wants to be Taylor's doting uncle. 
He is prepared to see Taylor go, and quickly.  As 
such, Obasanjo has moved much closer to our position. 
During this meeting, he clearly indicated a desire to 
resume a close dialogue with the United States toward 
a final resolution of the Liberian crisis.  This is an 
offer we should take.  With Taylor weak and on the 
ropes, a concerted international and sub-regional 
push, led by the United States and Nigeria, 
respectively, might be the right move to close the 
book on Taylor's depraved leadership, opening Liberia 
to a more hopeful future.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
JETER