US embassy cable - 03ABUJA989

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

NIGERIA: STATUS OF ARTICLE 98 EFFORTS

Identifier: 03ABUJA989
Wikileaks: View 03ABUJA989 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Abuja
Created: 2003-06-05 14:26:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS KTIA NI KICC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000989 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, MOPS, KTIA, NI, KICC 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: STATUS OF ARTICLE 98 EFFORTS 
 
 
REF: A. STATE 144906 
     B. STATE 139892 
     C. ABUJA 905 
     D. ABUJA 552 
     E. ABUJA 342 
     F. 02 ABUJA 2978 
     G. 02 ABUJA 2972 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASONS 1.5 (B) 
AND (D). 
 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: Since October 2002, Post has actively 
engaged the GON in hopes of concluding an Article 98 
agreement before July 1, 2003.  President Obasanjo has 
indicated a willingness to conclude an agreement; however 
key figures such as the Foreign Affairs and Justice 
Ministers have opposed an agreement.  Minister of Defense 
Danjuma, an important Obasanjo insider, has been 
ambivalent.  With the end of the first Obasanjo 
Administration in May, many of our senior interlocutors are 
no longer in office.  Filling their vacant positions might 
take more time than we can afford at this point.  Thus our 
strategy will be to raise this issue again with President 
Obasanjo, reiterating the consequences to our military 
assistance package if there is no Article 98 agreement. 
This time we will raise the issue in writing, in stark 
terms, pointing out the consequences if the July 1 deadline 
is not met.  Post will also seek to press the Permanent 
Secretaries in the crucial Ministries about the need to 
 
SIPDIS 
conclude the agreement before July.  In the meantime, Post 
will continue to work with the GON to commit security 
assistance funds prior to July 1.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
2.  (C) Post began approaching senior GON officials about 
Article 98 last year.  Since then, we have raised the issue 
on multiple occasions with President Obasanjo, Vice 
President Atiku, Minister of Defense Danjuma, Minister of 
Justice Agabi, National Security Advisor Mohammed and other 
senior members of the Obasanjo government.  In February, 
President Obasanjo told Ambassador Jeter he would form an 
inter-ministerial committee under the direction of then 
Foreign Minister Sule Lamido to examine the issue (REF E). 
(COMMENT: In his discussion with us, Lamido voiced strong 
opposition to Article 98.  We are unaware of the findings 
of this "inter-ministerial committee" or if it ever met. 
END COMMENT.) 
 
 
3.  (C) During a May 12 meeting with Ambassador Jeter, 
Minister for Defense Danjuma expressed serious doubts about 
the prospects for Nigeria signing an Article 98 agreement. 
Danjuma commented that he did not think Nigeria would sign 
an Article 98 agreement because it "usually follows South 
Africa on such matters" and noted the measure would surely 
be opposed by Foreign Minister Lamido.  Danjuma expressed 
philosophical misgivings about Article 98, however, in 
apparent recognition of the benefit it would provide 
Nigerian soldiers and not wanting our security assistance 
program to be truncated due to this issue, he said he would 
try to persuade President Obasanjo to sign the agreement. 
 
 
4.  (C) During two meetings last month, Obasanjo told 
Ambassador Jeter that he wanted an Article 98 agreement and 
that an interagency ministerial would consider the issue 
prior to his May 29 inaugural.  The President's Special 
Advisor on International Affairs told us the meeting took 
place but he was not informed of its decision. 
 
 
5.  (C) Concluding an Article 98 agreement before July 1 
will be further complicated by the ministerial vacancies 
created by the termination of the first Obasanjo 
administration.  Until the President fills the vacant 
appointments, the ministries will be headed by Permanent 
Secretaries.  The PermSecs are aware of the deadline, but 
 
SIPDIS 
they may be reluctant to show any initiative on this 
sensitive issue. 
 
 
6.  (C) DAO received instructions on June 4 from USEUCOM to 
deliver a letter to Chief of Defense Staff ADM Ogohi from 
EUCOM Deputy Commander GEN Wald asking for the Ogohi's 
assistance in garnering an Article 98 agreement. 
 
 
7.  (C) Given the time constraints and the current senior 
level vacancies in the GON, our strategy can only be a 
streamlined, two-step approach.  First, we will raise the 
issue again with President Obasanjo in a letter as well as 
seeking an audience with him, clearly detailing the 
ramifications of not concluding an agreement in time. 
Second, we also will press the key PermSecs (Defense and 
MFA) to see if we can get them to move the process forward. 
(NOTE: We appreciate the EUCOM letter to ADM Ogohi. 
However, ADM Ogohi has just submitted his letter of 
resignation.  Instead, we will deliver the letter to the 
Acting Chief of Defense Staff LTG Ogumudia.  END NOTE.) 
 
 
8.  (U) In the meantime, Post will continue to work with 
the GON in order to commit the $5.6 million in remaining in 
Foreign Military Finance (FMF) before July 1.  Due to Sec 
557 sanctions, Nigeria's FMF credits can only be used on 
existing Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs.  Upon 
review of Nigeria's FMS program we propose the following 
allocations to obligate $2.9 million in FMF: 
      a. Extend the MPRI Simulation Center program for an 
      additional 12 months.  The ODC has allocated FMF 
      funds to support a three-year contract with MPRI to 
      train and manage the Nigerian JCATS Simulation 
      Center in Jaji ($1.6 mil). 
 
 
      b. Fully fund the C-130 training case ($500k). 
 
 
      c. Reactivate the expired LOA for the C-130 
      publications case ($75k). 
 
 
      d. Receive and sign the LOA for the transfer of the 
      USCG Sassafras, ($800k). 
 
 
9.  (C) On Monday June 2 ODC briefed Ministry of Defense 
Director of Joint Services B.O. Willams on the proposed 
course of action and asked the MOD to quickly execute the 
necessary documents to apportion and commit these funds. 
ODC has yet to receive any LORs or other requested memos. 
Joint Services had promised to transmit the necessary 
documentation to us by June 9.  Consequently, we will have 
to work very quickly to generate, process, and sign the 
LOAs needed to commit these funds by July 1.  It is 
possible that we will not be able to complete them all. 
 
 
10.  (C) COMMENT: Post has made an active, sustained effort 
to urge the GON to sign an Article 98 agreement.  We have 
raised this several times with President Obasanjo and all 
relevant Ministers.  We will approach Obasanjo as well the 
Ministries again.  While Obasanjo has expressed a positive 
inclination, there is noticeable opposition within the 
Nigerian bureaucracy.  At this point, we cannot say whether 
Nigeria will even sign, much less sign in time.  These are 
open questions.  We will do the best we can but ultimately 
the buck stops at Obasanjo's desk.  We will remind him once 
again, in stark terms, of the consequences of a failure to 
conclude an Article 98 agreement.  The Department may also 
want to consider a letter from Secretary Powell to 
President Obasanjo urging that Nigeria execute the Article 
98 agreement.  END COMMENT. 
JETER 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04