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| Identifier: | 03ZAGREB1266 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03ZAGREB1266 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Zagreb |
| Created: | 2003-06-05 09:00:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | MARR PARM PREL MOPS HR IQ |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ZAGREB 001266 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR (BOGUE) DEFENSE FOR OSD/DASD-EURASIA (RICARDEL) E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2013 TAGS: MARR, PARM, PREL, MOPS, HR, IQ SUBJECT: CROATIA CONSIDERING OFFERING TROOPS TO IRAQ Classified By: Poloff A.F.Godfrey for reasons 1.5 (b,d) Summary ------- 1. (C) Croatia is actively considering contributing forces to support Phase IV operations in Iraq. The idea of contributing a small number of military police to deploy as part of a multi-national unit has been broached with the Embassy informally several times, including with the Ambassador by Foreign Minister Picula, but a formal offer has not yet been made. GoC officials seek a wide range of details in order to budget and plan for a possible deployment so they can brief the Cabinet and Parliament on the political and financial costs of a commitment of forces. On June 4, we informed the GoC that, before the USG will engage in initial military-to-military discussions, PM Racan's cabinet must make a formal political commitment of its intent to join the coalition. Before we can enter a more detailed discussion of operational plans, Croatia's parliament must approve the deployment of forces to Iraq, whereby Croatia would join the Coalition. GoC officials expressed some frustration at having to make a commitment to deploy forces without details about cost and without assurances that Croatia's offer would be accepted, but were confident they could secure a Cabinet commitment solid enough to begin initial discussions. End Summary. 2. (C) In the run-up to military operations to liberate Iraq, Croatia's political leaders were sharply and publicly negative in their response to U.S. requests to join the coalition. While this approach may have won mild praise from some EU members at the time, senior GoC officials hope that offering to deploy troops to Iraq will help repair the damage they caused to the U.S.-Croatia bilateral relationship. The GoC is exploring the possibility of deploying a small number of military police to Iraq as part of a multinational unit. While there has been no formal GoC decision to deploy, the idea of a Croatian contribution has been floated publicly and privately at all levels, including in the press on May 30 by PM Racan and by FM Picula on May 29 with the Ambassador. 3. (C) Croatian Defense Ministry policymakers and planners have engaged with us to try to determine what the modalities and costs of Croatia's so-far hypothetical deployment would be. But until the GoC has made a more formal commitment to deploy forces to Iraq and thereby join the coalition, Croatia will not have access to detailed operational plans. After consultations between DATT and experts at CENTCOM and USEUCOM, we prepared for the GoC a sequence of events which Croatia must follow as it prepares to deploy troops to Iraq. 4. (C) On June 4, Defense Attache and Poloff met first with Assistant Minister of Defense (Policy) Jelena Grcic Polic and then with MFA North America Department Head Miroslav Kovacic to explain how Croatia should proceed as it prepares to offer a contingent of troops to deploy in Iraq. We made clear that until there has been a formal political commitment by the GoC, the USG will not fully engage with military planners. Assistant DefMin Grcic Polic said that this put her planners in a tough spot; until they had precise information, they would not have the projected cost details needed to draft the decision for the Cabinet to approve. We explained that the initial policy decision by the Cabinet need not be a detailed document intended for approval by the parliament, but rather a formal declaration by Croatia's political leaders that Croatia seeks to deploy troops to Iraq to support Coalition efforts. Grcic Polic was relieved, and speculated that a Cabinet "Determination" (rather than a formal "Decision") should be relatively easy to push through the Croatian bureaucracy. 5. (C) We explained that once the GoC makes the initial political decision to deploy, the U.S. could authorize military-to-military technical discussions, including a meeting at CENTCOM Headquarters with Croatian planners. These initial discussions should produce enough information about whether Croatia's offering meets the needs of the coalition and about the details and projected costs of a deployment for the GoC to take a more formal "Decision" to deploy and then forward that decision to Parliament for approval (required by Croatian law before troops can deploy abroad). Once the Croatian Parliament approve the decision, Croatia would be considered a member of the Coalition and would therefore receive access to operational plans. Then, detailed discussions about modalities and timing of deployment would begin, followed by, eventually, deployment of Croatia's troops to Iraq. 6. (C) At the MFA, Kovacic asked whether, before the GoC exposes itself to the political risk of making an offer of troops for Iraq, we could give assurances that Croatia's offer of military police would be accepted. We replied that we could make no such assurances, but expressed our hope that we could soon count Croatia as a member of the coalition. Comment ------- 7. (C) The GoC leadership seems genuinely eager to make this deployment a reality, but we will insist on a firm political commitment before engaging in serious discussions. Such a political commitment to deploy should not be difficult to get through the Cabinet, and a formal decision should, if properly managed, pass the parliament. Once this political commitment is made, however, we are not certain that the unit Croatia will propose will offers will measure up in military terms. We do not underestimate how difficult a task it is for the GoC to deploy troops overseas; this is only the second time they have done it (the first time was to ISAF in January 2003), and the first time was a bureaucratic disaster. The financial burden of even the small deployment of MP's to ISAF was difficult for the MoD budget to swallow. Given the decline in the bilateral relationship due to a number of GoC actions, the decision to deploy a small unit to Iraq should not be taken as more than it is: an effort at self-serving damage control. ROSSIN NNNN
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