US embassy cable - 96STATE214855

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 214855 
 
 
LONDON FOR TUELLER,  PARIS FOR RAVELING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/06 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SA, AF, RS 
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN:  ENGAGING THE SAUDIS ON THE TALIBAN 
 
ROME FOR DEMPSEY; MOSCOW PLS PASS TO INR A/S GATI 
 
REFS:  A)   STATE 204146 (NOTAL)  B) STATE 204251  (NOTAL) 
C)  STATE 203329 (NOTAL)   D. ISLAMABAD 8520  (NOTAL) 
E)  RIYADH 4122 
 
1.   (U) CLASSIFIED BY ROBIN L. RAPHEL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
OF STATE FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS,   DOS.   REASON: 1.5(D). 
 
2.   (C) GID DIRECTOR PRINCE TURKI RECENTLY HELD MEETINGS IN 
WASHINGTON WITH THE NSC AND CIA AT WHICH HE DISCUSSED, 
AMONG OTHER SUBJECTS, THE TALIBAN PHENOMENON, AND EXCHANGED 
ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENTS ABOUT THE MOVEMENT.     THE DEPARTMENT 
IS VERY INTERESTED IN ENGAGING REGULARLY WITH THE SAUDIS ON 
THEIR POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN. 
 
3.   (C) EMBASSY RIYADH IS REQUESTED TO INITIATE PERIODIC 
HIGH-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SAUDIS SO WE CAN GET A 
BETTER ASSESS THEIR VIEWS AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE 
SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND OF THEIR CONTACTS OR INFLUENCE 
WITH THE TALIBAN.  WE WANT TO ASK THE SAUDIS TO ENGAGE WITH 
THE TALIBAN CONSTRUCTIVELY ON ISSUES OF CONCERN TO US SUCH 
AS TERRORISM--CLOSING THE MILITANT TRAINING CAMPS AND 
EXPELLING OSAMA BIN LADEN. 
 
4.   (C) WE ALSO WISH TO ENCOURAGE THE SAUDIS TO USE 
WHATEVER INFLUENCE THEY MAY HAVE WITH THE TALIBAN TO PRESS 
THEM TO STOP THE FIGHTING IN THE NORTH AND TO REACH A 
POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION WITH MASOOD AND DOSTAM TOWARDS 
BUILDING A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. 
CONTINUING THE FIGHTING IS DESTABLIZING TO THE REGION AND 
RISKS AN ETHNIC DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY.   THE RUSSIANS AND 
THE CENTRAL ASIANS HAVE ALL REACTED STRONGLY TO THE 
PERCEIVED TALIBAN THREAT.   POST SHOULD INQUIRE AS TO SAUDI 
PLANS TO ENGAGE WITH THE TALIBAN AUTHORITIES IN KABUL. 
POST MAY WISH TO DRAW ON GENERAL TALKING POINTS TO BE SENT 
BY SEPTEL,  PREVIOUS GUIDANCE IN REFS A AND B AND THEN FOCUS 
ON THE SUGGESTED POINTS BELOW. 
 
5.   (C)  SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS: 
 
 
RUSSIAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN CONCERNS 
 
--   THE RUSSIANS AND THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES HAVE ALL 
CONVEYED TO US THEIR CONCERNS OVER THE TAKEOVER OF KABUL BY 
THE TALIBAN AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF TALIBAN RULE IN 
AFGHANISTAN FOR REGIONAL STABILITY. 
 
--   THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE MOVES NORTHWARD, 
PARTICULARLY TOWARD THE TAJIK BORDER.   IN RESPONSE, 
PRESIDENT YELTSIN CALLED A SUMMIT OF THE CIS STATES THAT 
WAS HELD IN ALMATY OCTOBER 4-5. 
 
--   THE SUMMIT CALLED ON THE AFGHAN RIVAL PARTIES TO STOP 
THE FIGHTING AND TO NEGOTIATE.   THE CIS LEADERS WARNED 
THAT THEY WILL TAKE MEASURES TO REINFORCE THEIR BORDERS, 
AND THEY RESERVED THE RIGHT TO "TAKE ADEQUATE MEASURES" 
SHOULD AFGHANISTAN'S HOSTILITIES SPILL OVER THE BORDER. 
 
 
URGE AN END TO THE FIGHTING 
 
--   WE RECENTLY SPOKE WITH A TALIBAN REPRESENTATIVE IN 
ISLAMABAD.   WE URGED THE TALIBAN IMMEDIATELY TO REACH A 
POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION WITH BOTH DOSTAM AND MASOOD. 
 
--   WE ARGUED THAT AN EXPANSION OF THE FIGHTING INTO 
NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN WOULD COMPOUND THE ANXIETIES OF 
AFGHANISTAN'S NORTHERN NEIGHBORS WHO ALREADY PERCEIVE THE 
TALIBAN TO BE A THREAT TO THEIR STABILITY AND WAY OF LIFE. 
 
--   WE ALSO WARNED THAT CONTINUED FIGHTING COULD 
PRECIPITATE AN UNWANTED INTERVENTION BY RUSSIA,  IRAN, OR 
SOME OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES.   SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD 
NOT BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF EITHER THE TALIBAN OR 
AFGHANISTAN AS A WHOLE. 
 
--   THE TALIBAN REPRESENTATIVE'S RESPONSE WAS THAT THE 
TALL BAN HAVE "NO PROBLEM" WITH EITHER DOS TAM OR THE AFGHAN 
TAJIKS.   HOWEVER, THEY DO NOT TRUST MASOOD AND INSISTED HE 
WOULD HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH.   DOSTAM WOULD NEED TO DISARM 
HIS FORCES AS PART OF A DEAL WITH THE TALIBAN.   AT THE 
PRESENT TIME, THE TALIBAN ARE NOT PLANNING TO PUT ?RESSURE 
ON THE HAZARA SHIAS. 
 
--   THIS RESPONSE IS LESS THAN REASSURING TO US AND OTHERS 
WHO FEAR THE SPREAD OF GREATER INSTABILITY IN THE REGION 
AND WHO BELIEVE THAT A MILITARY SOLUTION IS NOT A LONG TERM 
SOLUTION FOR AFGHANISTAN. 
 
--   WE ASK THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT USE WHATEVER INFLUENCE IT 
HAS WITH THE TALL BAN TO STRESS THAT CONTINUED FIGHTING 
INVITES GREATER INSTABILITY,  POSSIBLE ACTIVE INTERVENTION 
BY FOREIGN POWERS AND RISKS AN ETHNIC DIVISION OF THE 
COUNTRY. 
 
 
TERRORISM 
 
--   WE ALSO SEEK YOUR GOVERNMENT'S ASSISTANCE IN 
ENCOURAGING THE TALIBAN TO CLOSE TERRORIST/MILITANT 
TRAINING CAMPS IN TERRITORY THEY CONTROL AND TO EXPEL NON- 
AFGHANS INVOLVED IN SUCH ACTIVITIES. 
 
--   WE HAVE HEARD CONFLICTING REPORTS ON THE WHEREABOUTS OF 
OSAMA BIN LADEN.   HE MIGHT STILL BE IN TALIBAN-CONTROLLED 
TERRITORY.   WE HAVE CONVEYED TO THE TALIBAN AND OTHER 
AFGHAN LEADERS THAT THE PRESENCE OF OSAMA BIN LADEN IS NOT 
HELPFUL TO AFGHANISTAN. 
 
 
FORMER KING ZAHIR SHAH 
 
--   ON ONE FINAL MATTER REGARDING FORMER KING ZAHIR SHAH, 
WE WISH TO CLARIFY OUR POSITION ON HIS POSSIBLE RETURN TO 
AFGHANISTAN.   WE DO NOT OPPOSE HIS DESIRE TO RETURN TO 
AFGHANISTAN TO HELP REUNIFY THE COUNTRY. 
 
-- IN FACT, WE WOULD NOT OPPOSE THE EFFORTS OF ANY 
INDIVIDUAL WHO COULD BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL AFGHANISTAN 
UNDER A STABLE, REPRESENTATIVE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. 
 
 
TALBOTT