US embassy cable - 03COLOMBO960

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000960 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, EUR/NB, EAP/J; NSC FOR 
E. MILLARD 
 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958:   DECL:  06-04-13 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, EAID, CE, NO, JA, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT:  In response to PM's latest letter, Tigers do 
not budge from their demand for an interim structure 
 
Refs:  (A) Colombo-Ops Center 06/04/03 telecon 
 
-      (B) Colombo-SA/INS 06/04/03 class e-mail 
-      (C) Tokyo 3490 (Notal) 
-      (D) Colombo 949, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of 
Mission.  Reasons:  1.5 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  In their June 4 reply to the prime 
minister's latest letter, the Tigers have not budged 
from their demand that an interim administration be 
created for the north/east.  The group says it is 
willing to discuss the issue, but only if the GSL takes 
steps toward meeting this demand first.  While the Tiger 
reply did not explicitly mention the upcoming Tokyo 
donors conference, it seems that the group does not plan 
to reconsider its prior decision not/not to attend.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (SBU) TIGER RESPONSE:  The Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have responded to Sri Lankan Prime 
Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's June 1 letter to the 
group.  (Note:  In his June 1 letter, the PM reviewed 
the GSL's latest proposal regarding assistance delivery 
to the north/east, inviting the group to hold a "clear 
the air"-type of meeting on the subject.  The PM's 
letter, and that of the Tigers' today, is part of a long 
skein of communications focused on ways to get the 
Tigers to return to the peace talks and to attend the 
June 9-10 Tokyo donors conference -- See Reftels.)  In 
their response, which was posted on the pro-LTTE website 
"TamilNet" on June 4, LTTE chief negotiator Anton 
Balasingham told the PM that the Tigers had no intention 
of backing down from their demand for the creation of a 
Tiger-controlled interim administration in the 
north/east.  (Note:  Ref B contains the text of 
Balasingham's letter to the PM.  The text did not 
mention the Tokyo conference -- See Para 8.)  The 
London-based Balasingham said the group was willing to 
discuss these matters, but only if the GSL took steps 
toward meeting the LTTE's demands first. 
 
3.  (U) Explaining the LTTE's stance, Balasingham hit 
out hard against the government's recent proposal 
regarding assistance delivery, essentially telling the 
government that it was missing the point.  Making clear 
that the LTTE wants an interim arrangement with 
political responsibilities (not only involving 
assistance), Balasingham states: 
 
"At the outset, we wish to point out that we seriously 
differ in perception with what the LTTE leadership 
proposes and what your government offers.  While our 
leadership has proposed an interim administrative 
framework, a politico-administrative structure for the 
northeast with wider participation of the LTTE, your 
government has offered a council with a structure and 
mechanism for development of the region." 
 
4.  (U) Regarding the details of the GSL's proposal, 
Balasingham criticizes it as being overly complex, 
stating: 
 
"This is not the end of this strange evolutionary 
history of your government's committees and structures. 
You are now suggesting a new and comprehensive and 
substantial dialogue to clarify and expand the new 
structure and to specify and situate the role of the 
LTTE in the envisaged model.  We could only speculate as 
to how many rounds of negotiations the parties would 
have to undergo to arrive at a final formulation of this 
new bureaucratic institution."  (Note:  Observers have 
also commented on the almost absurd complexity of the 
GSL's proposal, which involves an "apex body," a 
"special commissioner," and a "management board," among 
many other wedding cake layers.) 
 
5.  (U) Balasingham goes on to get in a solid lick at 
the expense of the international community (Read:  the 
U.S., India, etc.), asserting that even if the GSL 
proposal is agreed to by the LTTE, it is quite possible 
it would be blocked.  He states:  "The new structure 
would require the endorsement of the international 
community in order to mobilize adequate resources for 
the reconstruction of the northeast.  This endorsement 
may not be forthcoming since some of the powerful 
international and regional players are prejudiced 
against us and continue to deny our hard-earned status 
as the true representatives of the people." 
 
6.  (U) Wrapping up, Balasingham starkly underscores 
that the government's proposals are "unsatisfactory and 
therefore unacceptable."  Balasingham stresses that the 
only way forward is to form an interim structure in the 
north/east with heavy LTTE involvement, given the fact 
that the government is not strong enough in the south to 
bring about a final political settlement at this time. 
He closes: 
 
"In conclusion, we wish to assure you that we are 
prepared to resume negotiations if you reconsider your 
position and offer us, for our consideration, a draft 
framework for an interim administrative structure along 
the lines proposed by our leadership.  We hope that you 
will consider our suggestion favorably." 
 
7.  (C) REACTION:  Because the Tiger letter just came 
out, there has been precious little local reaction to it 
as of yet.  (Note:  Visiting Deputy USAID administrator 
Frederick W. Schieck and Ambassador Wills are meeting 
with PM Wickremesinghe late June 4 afternoon.  If the PM 
has any comments on the situation in the aftermath of 
Balasingham's letter, we will pass them on to the 
Department.)  Before the letter was posted on the web, 
however, there were widespread rumblings that the Tigers 
were not going to sign on to the government's assistance 
proposal re the north/east, nor agree to a "clear the 
air" meeting.  Joseph Pararajasingham, a pro-LTTE Tamil 
National Alliance MP, told us early June 4 (before the 
letter came out) that the LTTE remained very angry 
because the government did not seem to be taking the 
LTTE's proposal for an interim structure in the 
north/east "very seriously."  Under the circumstances, 
Pararajasingham said he did not think the group was in 
the mood to be cooperative and meet with the GSL. 
Polchief stressed to Pararajasingham that the LTTE's 
current approach was not helpful, and if the group had 
real substantive concerns it made much more sense to 
discuss them face-to-face with the government. 
 
8.  (C) NO MENTION OF TOKYO:  As with the LTTE's most 
recent communications, Balasingham's letter did not 
mention the Tokyo donors conference in any way, shape, 
or form.  Again, before the letter came out, 
Pararajasingham told polchief that he saw "little 
chance" that the LTTE would be represented in Tokyo.  In 
a conversation also held before the Tiger letter came 
out, Ambassador Bernard Goonetilleke of the Peace 
Secretariat told us that he doubted that it was 
 
SIPDIS 
"programmatically possible" for the LTTE to attend at 
this point.  While the GSL hoped the Tigers changed 
their minds, Goonetilleke said it seemed that the LTTE 
was letting the timeframe "slip away" when practical 
arrangements could be made for sending a delegation to 
Tokyo. 
 
9.  (C) COMMENT:  Balasingham's letter was not rude per 
se, but it was pointed and he certainly made clear where 
the LTTE stands, i.e., progress must be made on the 
LTTE's demands before the group will cooperate.  Given 
the hard-line edginess of the LTTE at this point, it 
makes it tough for the GSL to respond favorably, even 
though the government does not reject eventual formation 
of an interim structure in the north/east per se. 
Whatever happens, the whole issue almost certainly needs 
weeks/months to work out and not mere days, as the 
Tigers appear to think. 
 
10.  (C) All that said, it is interesting that there was 
no mention of Tokyo.  The letter gave no/no hint that 
the LTTE will reconsider its plan not/not to attend, 
however, and there really does not seem to be a silver 
lining in the fact that Tokyo went unmentioned.  After 
weeks of feverish GSL, Norwegian, and Japanese efforts 
to get the Tigers to Tokyo, it appears that the string 
is running out -- per the LTTE's choice.  END COMMENT. 
11.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS