US embassy cable - 03RANGOON653

C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 000653 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
CDR USPACOM FOR FPA 
USMISSION NEW YORK FOR AMBASSADOR TWINING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, MY, BM 
SUBJECT: RAZALI VISIT TO RANGOON 
 
REF: A. STATE 15026 
     B. KUALA LUMPUR 03417 
     C. KUALA LUMPUR 03382 
 
Classified By: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Post continues in its conviction that 
Special Envoy (SE) Razali should not come to Rangoon absent 
firm assurances that he will be allowed a meeting with Aung 
San Suu Kyi.  However, we understand that the SE is still 
undecided.  If Razali chooses to come without guarantees of 
any kind (the regime has said quite publicly "it is up to 
him"), then he needs to know that he is expected to stand up 
to Than Shwe and not fold as he did last time.  It is time 
for tough talk, not soft words and ASEAN-style diplomacy. 
This needs to be conveyed to the Special Envoy in a very 
clear and forthright manner.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Post continues in its conviction (in line with 
Department, Ref A) that Special Envoy (SE) Razali should not 
come to Rangoon absent firm assurances that he will be 
allowed a meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi.  However, we 
understand that the SE is still undecided (Ref B) as to his 
course of action and may be considering the scenario outlined 
in para 2, Ref C - coming to Rangoon even if the regime holds 
firm on no ASSK contact.  In this hypothetical scenario 
Razali would arrive June 6 and present a formal request to 
see ASSK.  If the SPDC refuses his request, Razali would 
leave Rangoon immediately, making public the reasons for his 
early departure.  Granted, this might allow the SE more 
options and keep the regime from claiming that Razali, not 
the GOB, had scuttled the visit. 
 
3. (C) The question mark in this hypothetical scenario is 
Razali's resolve in the face of senior general Than Shwe's 
intransigent dictatorial style.  It should be remembered that 
on Razali's last visit in November 2002, he complied with 
Than Shwe's demands that the SE not go to Shan State to meet 
with ASSK on one of her political trips.  It should also be 
recalled that Than Shwe gave the SE a paltry 10-15 minutes of 
his time on the last visit, and there is no indication that 
there will be a more substantive meeting, or any meeting at 
all, this time. 
 
4. (C) In addition, Razali's mentor Prime Minister Mahatir 
steps down in October 2003 and Razali's influence will wane 
in proportion (I posited this idea to the Malaysian 
Ambassador in a meeting with other ASEAN and EU ambassador's 
- he agreed that Razali's clout is tied to his mentor's 
status as Prime Minister).  As Razali has maintained his 
business ties to the regime (his company has the contract for 
the new Burmese passports), and Mahatir's clout will be 
waning with the regime, Razali will be wary of really 
confronting Than Shwe and leaving in a manner that would burn 
his bridges behind him. 
 
5. (C) Comment:  If Razali chooses to come without guarantees 
of any kind (the regime has said quite publicly "it is up to 
him"), then he needs to know that he is expected to stand up 
to Than Shwe and not fold as he did last time (and as PM 
Mahatir did in August of 2002 when he cancelled his visit to 
ASSK because he "wanted to be a good guest").  The 
discouraging developments of the past week have changed the 
focus of the Special Envoy's role from that of facilitating a 
political dialogue to making Than Shwe give tangible proof of 
the regime's oft-stated commitment to national 
reconciliation.  It is time for tough talk, not soft words 
and ASEAN-style diplomacy.  This needs to be conveyed to the 
Special Envoy in a very clear and forthright manner.  End 
Comment. 
Martinez