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| Identifier: | 96ISLAMABAD8053 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 96ISLAMABAD8053 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Islamabad |
| Created: | 1996-09-19 12:41:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV MOPS PREL AF IR |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
O 191241Z SEP 96 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2057 INFO AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY AMEMBASSY RIYADH USIA WASHDC 5806 AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY ROME AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY LONDON DIA WASHDC AMEMBASSY BONN AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT AMEMBASSY ALMATY AMEMBASSY BISHKEK AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY TASHKENT USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 008053 DEPT FOR SA/PAB, NEA/NGA, AND EUR/CEN; USIA FOR NEA; LONDON FOR POL - TUELLER; PARIS FOR POL - ALLEGRONE; ROME FOR POL - NDEMPSEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/19/06 TAGS: PGOV, MOPS, PREL, AF, IR SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: TALIBAN REPORTEDLY CONSIDERING OPTIONS FOR SOROBI AND HAS CONCERNS ABOUT IRAN REFS: (A) ISLAMABAD 8005; (B) ISLAMABAD 7971 1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR TOM PRICE. REASON: 1.5 (D). SUMMARY ------- 2. (C) MULLAH ABDUL JALIL, THE TALIBAN'S DEPUTY FOREIGN AFFAIR'S ADVISER, TOLD POLOFF AND AARMA THAT VARIOUS OPTIONS ARE BEING REVIEWED FOR THE TALIBAN'S ATTACK ON SOROBI. ACCORDING TO JALIL, RELATIONS WITH DOSTAM ARE "WARM," BUT IRAN IS TRYING TO STIR UP TROUBLE. JALIL ASSERTED THAT FORMER KING ZAHIR SHAH IS NOT WELCOME IN KANDAHAR. HE WARNED THE UN SPECIAL MISSION THAT IT SHOULD NOT SET UP ITS MAIN OFFICE IN KABUL. END SUMMARY. ------------------ OPTIONS FOR SOROBI ------------------ 3. (C) POLOFF AND AARMA MET WITH MULLAH ABDUL JALIL, THE TALIBAN'S DEPUTY FOREIGN AFFAIR'S ADVISER, AND COMMANDER HAJI BASHIR, A MEMBER OF THE TALIBAN'S GREATER SHURA, ON SEPTEMBER 18. MULLAH JALIL BEGAN THE CONVERSATION BY STATING THAT THE TALIBAN ARE CONSIDERING VARIOUS OPTIONS ON HOW TO ATTACK SOROBI. SOROBI IS NOW UNDER SIEGE FROM THE EAST AND THE SOUTH, HE CONTINUED, AND WILL BE UNDER SIEGE FROM THE WEST SOON. HOWEVER, THE TALIBAN ARE CAUTIOUS BECAUSE THEY KNOW THAT THE KABUL REGIME HAS FORTIFIED THE SOROBI AREA HEAVILY WITH TANKS AND ARTILLERY, HE SAID. THUS, THE TALIBAN ARE TAKING THEIR TIME TO DECIDE ON THEIR BATTLE PLANS. JALIL NOTED THAT THE KEY TALIBAN DECISION-MAKERS WHO WILL DECIDE NEXT STEPS ARE MILITARY COMMANDER BORJAN, AND POLITICAL LEADERS MULLAH MOHAMMED RABBANI AND MULLAH ABDUL RAZAK. 4. (C) HAJI BASHIR, WHO HAD RECENTLY RETURNED FROM JALALABAD, SAID THAT THE TALIBAN HAD SEIZED AN IMMENSE AMOUNT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES IN THEIR TAKEOVER OF NANGARHAR PROVINCE. HE CLAIMED THAT THE TALIBAN HAD CAPTURED OVER 150 TANKS AND ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS. ACCORDING TO HAJI BASHIR, THE SEIZURE OF THESE ITEMS, AND LARGE AMOUNTS OF AMMUNITION, MEANT THAT TALIBAN SUPPLY LINES HAD BEEN SHORTENED, AND THEY DID NOT NOW HAVE TO SEND FOR EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES FROM KANDAHAR. HE ADDED THAT JALALABAD AIRPORT IS IN GOOD CONDITION; AN AN-32 FROM KANDAHAR ARRIVED THERE ON SEPTEMBER 17. (NOTE: AS REPORTED SEPTEL, JALIL AND HAJI BASHIR ALSO SAID TERRORIST TRAINING BASES IN PAKTIA PROVINCE HAD BEEN CAPTURED, ALTHOUGH THE "ARAB" OCCUPANTS OF THE CAMPS HAD FLED. THEY HAD NO IDEA OF THE WHEREABOUTS OF SAUDI FINANCIER OSAMA BIN LADEN. END NOTE.) ----------------------------- RELATIONS WITH DOSTAM WARM... ----------------------------- 5. (C) ASKED ABOUT PAKISTANI PRESS REPORTS THAT GENERAL DOSTAM PLANS TO SEND 2,000 SOLDIERS TO KABUL TO DEFEND IT AGAINST THE TALIBAN (REF B), JALIL WAS DISMISSIVE, AND EMPHATIC THAT RELATIONS WITH DOSTAM ARE "WARM." HE SAID HE DOUBTED THAT DOSTAM WOULD EVER ENTER INTO ANY RELATIONSHIP WITH COMMANDER MASOOD, WHOM HE DOES NOT TRUST. JALIL ALLOWED THAT THE TALIBAN WERE CLOSELY SCRUTINIZING DOSTAM'S ACTIVITIES, BUT WERE CONVINCED AS OF THIS POINT THAT HE HAD NO DESIRE TO TAKE ANY "AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS" AGAINST THE TALIBAN. ---------------------------------------- BUT THE IRANIANS ARE STIRRING UP TROUBLE ---------------------------------------- 6. (C) HOWEVER, JALIL EVINCED DEEP CONCERN THAT THE IRANIANS WERE TRYING TO PUSH DOSTAM TOWARD AN ANTI-TALIBAN ALLIANCE WITH THE KABUL REGIME. EXPANDING ON THIS POINT, JALIL SAID THE TALIBAN KNEW THAT IRANIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ALLAHUDDIN BORUJERDI IS CURRENTLY IN MAZAR-I-SHARIF ADVOCATING SUCH AN INITIATIVE (REF A). HE DOUBTED THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL IN THIS ENDEAVOUR, BUT THOUGHT THAT THEY WOULD KEEP TRYING. 7. (C) HAJI BASHIR RELATED THAT THE TALIBAN HAVE HAD BORDER FLARE-UPS WITH THE IRANIANS IN THE LAST MONTH. TWICE, HE ASSERTED, IRANIAN SOLDIERS HAVE ENTERED AFGHAN TERRITORY AND PROCEEDED TO THE AFGHAN BORDER TOWN OF ISLAM QALA, WHERE THEY ENCOUNTERED TALIBAN RESISTANCE. IN ONE INCIDENT, HE RECOUNTED, SIX UNIFORMED IRANIAN SOLDIERS WERE CAPTURED WITHIN THE BORDERS OF AFGHANISTAN. HAJI BASHIR SAID THE IRANIANS WERE LATER RELEASED WHEN THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AGREED TO PREVENT SUCH INCIDENTS FROM HAPPENING IN THE FUTURE. NONETHELESS, JALIL NOTED, TEHERAN RADIO'S PASHTU AND DARI SERVICES CONTINUED TO PRESS AN ANTI-TALIBAN MESSAGE, WHICH INCLUDED ALLEGATIONS THAT THE TALIBAN ARE WORKING FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. ------------------------- ZAHIR SHAH IS NOT WELCOME ------------------------- 8. (C) JALIL SAID THAT THE TALIBAN DID NOT TAKE THE SEPTEMBER 12 STATEMENT OF FORMER KING ZAHIR SHAH THAT HE WAS WILLING TO RETURN TO AFGHANISTAN VERY SERIOUSLY. FOR ONE THING, HE SAID THE FORMER KING IS JUST TOO OLD. IN ADDITION, NONE OF THE FACTIONS REALLY SUPPORTED THE FORMER KING, ALTHOUGH SOME--LIKE DOSTAM--CLAIMED THAT THEY DID. THE BASIC POINT, JALIL CONTINUED, IS THAT AS FAR AS THE TALIBAN ARE CONCERNED THEY ALREADY HAVE A LEADER, AMIR MOHAMMED OMAR, AND DO NOT NEED ANOTHER ONE. ------------------------------- UN SPECIAL MISSION SEEN AS WEAK ------------------------------- 9. (C) JALIL WAS ALSO DISMISSIVE WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE UN SPECIAL MISSION ON AFGHANISTAN (UNSMA). HE SAID THE NEW SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, DR, NORBERT HOLL, "KEPT PROMISING SOLUTIONS TO THE AFGHAN CONFLICT BUT FAILED TO PRODUCE ANYTHING." JALIL WAS ADAMANT THAT THE TALIBAN "WANT TO WORK WITH THE UNITED NATIONS," BUT SAID THEY SUSPECT THE UN IS "PRO-KABUL" AND ANTI-TALIBAN. JALIL INVITED UNSMA TO SET UP SHOP IN JALALABAD AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED, NOTING THAT THE SITUATION WAS "SAFE" THERE. HE WARNED UNSMA IN THE STRONGEST TERMS NOT TO SET UP ITS AFGHAN HEADQUARTERS IN KABUL IF IT WANTS TO MAINTAIN "A SPIRIT OF COOPERATION" WITH THE TALIBAN. POLOFF AND AARMA TOLD JALIL THAT IT WAS IN THE TALIBAN'S OWN BEST INTEREST TO ENGAGE UNSMA IN A "COOPERATIVE SPIRIT" SINCE IT WAS WORKING FOR PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN. (COMMENT: RECENTLY STEPHEN EVANS (PROTECT), ONE OF DR. HOLL'S ADVISERS, OPINED TO POLOFF THAT KABUL WOULD BE THE ONLY LOGICAL PLACE FOR UNSMA TO SET UP SHOP--"JALALABAD IS NO LONGER NEUTRAL, SO ONLY THE CAPITAL REMAINS." END COMMENT.) -------------------------------- RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES -------------------------------- 10. (C) JALIL CONCLUDED THE MEETING BY STATING THAT THE TALIBAN HAD GREAT RESPECT FOR THE UNITED STATES BASED ON ITS ASSISTANCE TO THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE DURING THE WAR AGAINST THE SOVIETS. HE ADDED THAT THE TWO ALSO SHARED A COMMON INTEREST IN HALTING IRANIAN "AGGRESSION," AND HE URGED USG SUPPORT FOR THE TALIBAN NOW THAT THEY CONTROL TWO-THIRDS OF AFGHANISTAN. POLOFF RESPONDED THAT THE USG DOES NOT SUPPORT ANY OF THE FACTIONS, BUT RATHER SUPPORTS THE FORMATION OF A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT. IN THIS SPIRIT, THE USG WANTS TO CONTINUE TO ENGAGE THE TALIBAN WHENEVER POSSIBLE, POLOFF NOTED. ------- COMMENT ------- 11. (C) JALIL PROVIDED NO HINT THAT THE TALIBAN INTEND TO WORK CLOSELY WITH UNSMA IN THE NEAR FUTURE. IN ADDITION, JALIL APPEARED QUITE CERTAIN THAT THE TALIBAN WOULD REJECT THE FORMER KING'S OFFER TO RETURN TO AFGHANISTAN. THIS LEAVES ONLY A CONTINUATION OF WAR--AT LEAST IN THE SHORT TERM, AND JALIL PROVIDED EVERY SIGNAL THAT THE TALIBAN ARE AIMING FOR A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE AFGHAN CONFLICT. 12. (C) IN THE WAKE OF THE TALIBAN'S MILITARY SUCCESSES, JALIL'S REMARKS ALSO INDICATE GROWING TENSION BETWEEN KANDAHAR AND TEHRAN. IF THE TALIBAN CARRY THEIR OFFENSIVE CLOSER TO KABUL, THIS TENSION COULD GROW. SIMONS
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