US embassy cable - 03COLOMBO939

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In reaction to latest Tiger letter, GSL proposes "clear the air" meeting with group

Identifier: 03COLOMBO939
Wikileaks: View 03COLOMBO939 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Colombo
Created: 2003-06-02 11:13:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PTER EAID CE NO JA LTTE
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000939 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, EUR/NB, EAP/J 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958:   DECL:  06/02/13 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, EAID, CE, NO, JA, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT:  In reaction to latest Tiger letter, GSL 
proposes "clear the air" meeting with group 
 
Refs:  (A) Colombo-SA/INS 06/02/03 fax 
 
-      (B) Colombo-SA/INS 05/30/03 unclass e-mail 
-      (C) Tokyo 3490 (Notal) 
-      (D) Colombo 910, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills. 
Reasons:  1.5 (b, d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The GSL is proposing to hold a "clear 
the air" meeting with the Tamil Tigers.  The 
government's proposal is in response to the Tiger's 
stark rejection of the latest GSL plan re control of 
assistance to the north/east.  It is by no means clear 
whether the Tigers will take the bait and agree to a 
meeting.  It is also not clear where all of this leaves 
the group's earlier decision not to attend the Tokyo 
donors conference.  END SUMMARY. 
 
==================== 
GSL proposes Meeting 
==================== 
 
2.  (C) The GSL is proposing to hold a "clear the air" 
meeting with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE).  In a June 2 discussion, Ambassador Bernard 
Goonetilleke, the chief of the government's Peace 
Secretariat, told us that the offer was contained in a 
 
SIPDIS 
letter dated June 1.  Goonetilleke said the government's 
letter had been provided directly to the Norwegian 
government facilitators late June 1 and had, as far as 
he knew, already been passed to the LTTE.  (Note:  Late 
June 2, Mission received a text of the GSL's June 1 
letter referred to by Ambassador Goonetillke.  This 
text is being e-mailed to SA/INS.) 
 
3.  (C) When queried, Goonetilleke said the government's 
letter made clear that the GSL wanted to use the 
proposed meeting to work out all outstanding problems 
with the LTTE.  The meeting would be useful, for 
example, in reviewing the LTTE's concerns expressed in 
its May 30 letter rejecting the GSL's latest proposal re 
assistance delivery to the north and east (see below). 
Part of the GSL's letter, Goonetilleke noted, reviewed 
these LTTE's concerns, seeking to provide the group 
further assurances that the proposal was fair and would 
involve the LTTE in all key decisions made in regard to 
assistance for the north/east.  Regarding the possible 
timeframe for the proposed meeting, Goonetilleke said 
the GSL basically wanted it to take place as soon as 
possible and even before the June 9-10 Tokyo donors 
conference if that could be arranged.  (Note: 
Goonetilleke was not clear on whether the GSL's letter 
mentioned the Tokyo conference, which the Tigers have 
said they will not attend -- See Para 9 for more on this 
issue.) 
 
4.  (C) Goonetilleke said he was not optimistic or 
pessimistic about whether the LTTE would take the GSL up 
on its offer for a meeting.  He said he thought the 
group would do so if "it was sincerely interested in 
getting to the roots of the problems affecting the peace 
process," however. 
 
============================== 
Latest Letter from Balasingham 
============================== 
 
5.   (U) The government's request for a face-to-face 
meeting came in response to the Tiger's stark rejection 
of the latest GSL proposal re assistance to the 
north/east.  (Note:  The LTTE's letter to the GSL 
rejecting its latest proposal was posted on a pro-LTTE 
website late May 30.  The text of this letter was passed 
to SA/INS in Ref B.  The GSL's latest proposal, which is 
sketched out in Refs A and D, was passed to the LTTE by 
the Norwegian facilitators on May 28.  End Note.)  In 
his tightly-worded letter addressed to Prime Minister 
Wickremesinghe, the Tiger' London-based spokesman Anton 
Balasingham made clear that the government's proposal 
did not go nearly far enough in giving the Tigers 
effective administrative control in the north and east. 
On this point, Balasingham -- making clear that the 
Tigers wanted to control an interim structure with 
responsibility for political aspects, as well as those 
assistance-related -- said the following: 
 
"Having studied the contents of (the GSL's) proposals, 
we are surprised, and at the same time dismayed that 
your government did not address the critical issue of 
setting up an interim administrative structure for the 
northeast as suggested by the LTTE leadership.  Instead, 
you have proposed a development-oriented structure with 
extremely limited powers in which the participatory role 
of the LTTE is not clearly defined, or rather, left 
deliberately ambiguous." 
 
6.  (U) Balasingham's letter went on to criticize the 
government's (very complex) proposal in some detail.  He 
stated that the GSL plans to form a joint GSL-LTTE 
"apex" body for supervision of assistance implementation 
was not acceptable because the body "had no 
administrative powers, but is only an advisory council." 
In addition, the "failure to define the participatory 
role of the LTTE in the apex body is a major flaw in the 
entire project."  Balasingham also asserted that other 
key functions provided for in the government's plan, 
including those involving a "special commissioner" and a 
"management board," did not include clear references to 
LTTE participation in their deliberations. 
 
7.  (U) In other passages of note: 
 
-- Balasingham states that the Tigers were very 
disappointed that the GSL had allowed "international and 
regional players...to treat the LTTE shabbily as a 
proscribed entity with the `terrorist' label to be 
excluded from international forums."  (Note:  This is a 
reference, at least in part, to the fact that the LTTE 
could not attend the Washington seminar in April, as it 
is on our Foreign Terrorist Organizations, "FTO," list.) 
 
-- Still on international issues, Balasingham again 
takes the government to task, asserting that the GSL is 
trying to set up "a grand international `safety net' to 
bring undue pressure on the freedom of our people to 
determine their political status and destiny." 
 
-- The letter hits out at President Kumaratunga, the 
PM's partner in a stressful cohabitation arrangement, 
stating:  "We can certainly understand the fragile 
position of your government caught up with an enraged 
president seeking revenge and an entrenched constitution 
that allows no space for maneuver." 
 
--  Balasingham also categorically rejects a reference 
in the government's proposal to the effect that the GSL 
and the provincial government have "responsibility" for 
administration in the north/east.  Balasingham states: 
"You have conveniently ignored the stark reality that 
the LTTE runs a de facto administration of its own in 
vast tracks under its control in the northeast." 
 
======= 
COMMENT 
======= 
 
8.  (C) The idea for a "clear the air" meeting is 
certainly a good one.  (Note:  At the risk of falling 
victim to the post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy, we 
should point out that this is exactly what we proposed 
to the PM and Minister Moragoda on three occasions in 
May.)  If the Tigers really want to get the peace 
process unstuck quickly, one would think the group would 
jump at the opportunity for such a meeting.  It is by no 
means clear whether the Tigers will do that, however. 
The group has been quite truculent of late and it is not 
clear whether it wants a quick solution to the problems 
it sees, or whether it prefers to keep bashing the GSL 
for its alleged failings. 
 
9.  (C) It is also not clear whether all of this might 
lead the Tigers to reconsider their earlier decision not 
to attend the Tokyo donors conference.  It is 
interesting that in their long letter dated May 30 the 
Tigers never mentioned Tokyo even once.  Some observers 
take this as a hint that the group may not have finally 
foreclosed on being represented at the key conference at 
some level.  One idea that might be in the GSL's and the 
Norwegian facilitators' minds might be to try to hold 
the proposed face-to-face meeting in Tokyo before or 
after the conference.  This would be a fine idea, too, 
but it all hinges on the Tigers, who have not been very 
cooperative of late.  END COMMENT. 
 
10.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS 

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