US embassy cable - 03ANKARA3509

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003509 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY: CHP TAKES A TACTICAL VIEW OF REFORM 
 
(U) Classified by PolCouns John Kunstadter.  Reason: 1.5 
(b,d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: Opposition CHP has publicly, and privately in 
meetings with us, endorsed the AK government's EU reform 
package but has rejected AK proposals to sell state-owned 
forestry lands and to allow local administrations more 
control over health and education services.  The CHP stance 
reflects in large part a tactical political interest in 
weakening AK in the months leading up to the next nation-wide 
local elections.  End Summary. 
 
 
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Principled Opposition? 
---------------------- 
 
 
2. (C) CHP officials at all levels have spoken publicly in 
favor of AK's efforts to push through an ambitious sixth EU 
reform package.  Senior CHP M.P. Bulent Tanla recently 
confirmed to us privately that CHP will support the AK 
package unconditionally. 
 
 
3. (C) However, on other key reform proposals, including some 
that are crucial to promoting better governance and 
democratization, CHP has balked for tactical political 
reasons. 
 
 
4. (C) In recent meetings, senior CHP deputies have argued 
with limited conviction that AK's proposals to decentralize 
the Turkish state system by giving more power to elected 
local authorities, and to sell lands still classified as 
forest although have since developed without title, are 
deeply flawed.  These measures require constitutional 
amendments.  In separate meetings recently, the CHP M.P.s -- 
High Administrative Board members Hakki Akalin and Fuat Cay 
and senior party economist Kemal Kilicdaroglu -- alleged that 
AK is trying to engineer these proposals only to benefit AK 
supporters. 
 
 
-- On local administrative reform, both Akalin and Cay argued 
that CHP opposes AK's proposals on the grounds that the GOT 
should first tackle parliamentary immunity -- a major CHP 
campaign theme in the Nov. 2002 elections.  Akalin and Cay 
admitted that local reform figures prominently in CHP's 
election program, yet Akalin weakly dismissed AK's efforts, 
saying, "You need to read the proposed legislation for 
yourself to understand our objections." 
 
 
-- Kemal Kilicdaroglu May 27 offered a more typically Statist 
(and tenuous) criticism of AK's proposed legislation. 
Kilicdaroglu explained that AK's proposal will give "too much 
power" to the mayors of large towns.  This would only foster 
open disagreement between the elected mayors and governors, 
who are assigned by the State.  Kilicdaroglu also alleged 
that smaller provinces will have a hard time collecting 
enough revenue to support themselves, while larger provinces 
like Istanbul will have more than enough funds.  When asked 
if there were other means available to address the potential 
imbalance while promoting local control, he demurred. 
 
 
-- Akalin claimed that some forestry land in Istanbul 
province is clearly being earmarked for an unnamed AK 
supporter.  Cay averred that AK "has no clear plan as to what 
will be done with the land after it is sold."  However, both 
sheepishly acknowledged once again that selling the same land 
parcels is part of CHP's own party program.  Moreover, 
neither could articulate an alternative to AK's proposals. 
 
 
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Baykal's Permanent Campaign 
--------------------------- 
 
 
5. (C) Some CHP contacts acknowledge to us privately that 
party leader Baykal is pursuing this strategy not for any 
principled reason but simply to exploit divisions within AK's 
parliamentary group and use it as a platform to hammer AK on 
the parliamentary immunity issue.  Former CHP M.P. Erol 
Cevikce -- once very close to Baykal -- explained to us May 
16 that the CHP leader believes ultimately AK will split: "in 
fact, he's counting on it."  CHP's current opposition to some 
of AK's reform efforts, Cevikce noted, is due in part to 
CHP's inability to garner more public support as a result of 
its anti-war, anti-USG policy in the run-up to Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. 
 
 
6. (C) Cevikce added that everything CHP is doing right now 
is meant to increase CHP's chances in the local elections, 
which must be held by April 2004 but which AK could advance 
to autumn 2003.  Success in the local elections would help 
position Baykal and CHP for the next national elections and 
another shot at the prime ministership.  "Baykal has seen the 
likes of Yilmaz, Ciller and even Erbakan become Prime 
Minister," he said, "so why not him?"  Former CHP deputy 
Sabri Ergul subsequently echoed Cevikce's comments, noting 
that Baykal sees local elections as a big test to determine 
whether he has solidified his place as CHP leader -- and as a 
national leader.  Ergul averred that CHP will choose local 
candidates who have the best chance of winning regardless of 
political background -- a strategy subsequently confirmed by 
Kilicdaroglu. 
 
 
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Politics as Usual 
----------------- 
 
 
7. (C) Many in CHP genuinely recognize the need for reform 
along EU lines, especially given overwhelming public support 
for change -- although it is worth keeping mind that as the 
Party of Ataturk, CHP has traditionally indexed its policy to 
the Establishment view.  On other essential reforms, however, 
CHP's stance is that generally adopted by Turkish opposition 
parties -- to reject whatever the government puts forward. 
As such, it's not surprising that our CHP interlocutors 
cannot elucidate alternatives to AK policies, and instead 
fall back on the shop-worn Turkish political truism we hear 
routinely from M.P.s and others: "we're in the opposition; 
what do you expect?"  In this context, the idea that Baykal 
and his cronies are acting less out of principle and more for 
tactical reasons conforms to well set patterns. 
 
 
8. (C) From CHP's perspective, playing on AK's divisions 
offers probably the only chance the party has to make inroads 
in the local elections.  For example, CHP prospects in Ankara 
revolve around whether the conservative vote will split 
between current mayor Gokcek -- a former Refah and Fazilet 
member who has had run-ins with P.M. Erdogan -- and a new AK 
candidate.  (Note: there are signs Erdogan and Gokcek are 
aware of this and are trying to mend fences.  End note.) 
Likewise, CHP may be hoping that the most ardent opposition 
to AK right now, Motorola deadbeat Cem Uzan's Genc Party, 
will hive off a significant share of AK votes. 
PEARSON