US embassy cable - 03COLOMBO909

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000909 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/P, IO, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. 
MILLARD 
 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  05-29-13 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, CE, UN, External Relations 
SUBJECT:  Sri Lanka's foreign policy:  Prime Minister 
tilts toward U.S., but faces resistance 
 
Refs:  Colombo 873, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills. 
Reasons:  1.5 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Since coming to power, PM Wickremesinghe 
has taken steps to steer Sri Lankan foreign policy 
closer to the U.S.  In doing this, he has had successes, 
including the signing of an ICC waiver with the U.S. and 
in regard to Iraq where the GSL steered a constructive 
course.  Moreover, one of his key ministers recently 
proposed that the GSL take the lead in forming some sort 
of counterweight to NAM.  That said, the PM's initiative 
has faced stiff resistance from MFA bureaucrats.  In 
addition, the president and Opposition, backed by much 
of the press and the intelligentsia, have cut into his 
room for maneuver via their generally anti-U.S. biases. 
 
2.  (C) In the post-Iraq war environment, we think the 
GSL will continue to want to draw closer to the U.S. 
With the PM facing a precarious cohabitation situation, 
however, additional steps toward the USG will have to be 
carefully plotted out.  Nonetheless, with Sri Lanka 
facing a difficult peace process and needing help to 
constrain the Tamil Tigers, we think the larger trend in 
the country provides ballast for the PM's pro-U.S. 
proclivities.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------- 
PM tilts toward U.S. 
-------------------- 
 
3. (C) Since coming to power in late 2001, Prime 
Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe has taken steps to steer 
Sri Lankan foreign policy closer to the U.S. 
Wickremesinghe's pro-U.S. views have been long-standing 
and are in part a function of family connections.  His 
uncle, J.R. Jayewardene, for example, was Sri Lanka's 
president from the late 1970s through the late 1980s, 
and maintained very close links with the U.S. 
(Note:  In fact, Jayewardene was called "Yankee Dickey" 
by leftists for years.)  Moreover, Wickremesinghe, who 
comes from a very wealthy business family, is a strong 
advocate of free enterprise and strongly opposed to the 
disastrous socialist policies of former governments. 
Wickremesinghe is also surprisingly knowledgeable about 
U.S. history and politics; he is an avid reader about 
the American Civil War, U.S. military history, and U.S. 
legislation.  The prime minister's pro-U.S. views also 
emerge out of his political calculus that Sri Lanka 
needs the support of the international community, 
especially the U.S., to constrain the Tamil Tigers. 
With the peace process his government's number one 
priority bar none, the prime minister has worked hard to 
secure U.S. support for his efforts in this area from 
very early on in his tenure. 
 
4.  (C) In pursuing this pro-U.S. course, Wickremesinghe 
has been supported by two dynamic advisers, Minister of 
Constitutional Affairs G.L. Peiris and Minister of 
Economic Reform Milinda Moragoda.  (Note:  Beyond their 
official titles, both Peiris and Moragoda play key roles 
as peace process negotiators and policy formulators for 
the GSL.)  In general, the Oxford-educated Peiris' focus 
has been more on cultivating ties with former colonial 
power Britain and other Commonwealth countries, but he 
is very pro-U.S. and often visits Washington.  More than 
Peiris', Moragoda's direct focus has been on cultivating 
relations with the U.S. and with India.  Re the U.S., 
the intelligent, articulate Moragoda is a perfect fit. 
Born in Washington, D.C, he is a dual national Amcit 
(please protect) married to an American, with plenty of 
Washington connections, many from his days as a visiting 
fellow at the Heritage Foundation and at Harvard.  A 
"big picture" person, Moragoda is also highly aware that 
the U.S. is the most powerful country in the world, and 
he feels that it is better that Sri Lanka recognize that 
fact and work within it. 
 
5.  (C) (((Note:  Of late, the duo of Peiris and 
Moragoda have been joined by a new pro-U.S. player:  In 
just several months on the job, Ambassador Devinda 
Subasinghe, a U.S.-educated financier and close friend 
of the PM, has already made a mark in Washington.))) 
 
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Pro-U.S. Policy reaps some Successes 
------------------------------------ 
 
6.  (C) In moving forward on a pro-U.S. agenda, the PM 
has had some notable successes.  Last November, for 
example, he overruled the recalcitrant Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (see more below re the MFA) and had the 
GSL sign an Article 98 waiver to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) agreement with the U.S.  While this 
agreement did not receive much local publicity, the move 
placed Sri Lanka squarely in the U.S. camp on an issue 
of high importance to us.  In another sign of a pro-U.S. 
tilt, the PM directed the MFA to take a relatively 
moderate posture regarding Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
despite strong anti-U.S., anti-war currents in Sri 
Lanka's polity, including from the large Muslim 
population (see Reftels).  Although the government's 
statement was not all we would have wanted, it was 
relatively constructive, with the prime minister going 
so far as to ask us for comments re the draft. 
 
7.  (C) More recently, Minister Moragoda made a 
startling proposal to U.S. officials.  In discussions in 
Washington, Moragoda stated that the GSL was interested 
in forming some sort of group that would counter the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) block of countries.  Moragoda 
was a bit vague about his idea.  He indicated, however, 
that the GSL -- although a charter member of the group 
since its formation decades ago -- felt that the NAM was 
too strident and too anti-U.S., and that greater 
practicality was now called for.  The way forward is 
still being worked on, but once the idea is fleshed out 
further, the current thinking is that PM Wickremesinghe 
might announce some sort of formal proposal re a new 
grouping at the UN General Assembly this September. 
 
8.  (C) (((Note:  Aside from the ICC, Iraq, and 
Moragoda's proposal, the government has also made an 
effort to draw closer to the U.S. in economic/commercial 
and defense-related areas.  The GSL, for example, inked 
a Trade and Investment Agreement, "TIFA," with the U.S. 
last year.  On the defense side, the government has 
consistently supported U.S. military operations with 
blanket overflight and landing clearances as well as 
access to ports.  As the peace process continues, the 
military has also begun to look toward increasing 
participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations 
and accepting a larger role in assisting the U.S. in the 
global war on terror.  Most recently, the government 
even has begun to explore ways of possibly assisting in 
Iraqi reconstruction efforts.  End Note.))) 
 
------------------------------------- 
Resistance from MFA, Opposition, etc. 
------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) The PM's tilt toward the U.S. has faced stiff 
resistance from bureaucrats in the MFA, who are wedded 
to NAM, "G-77"-type thinking.  As mentioned above, for 
example, the MFA fought tooth-and-nail against the 
proposed ICC waiver.  Because of resistance at the 
working level, signing of the agreement was delayed for 
several weeks, as MFA bureaucrats made various changes 
meant to weaken the text.  Mission, collaborating 
closely with Moragoda and others at the political-level, 
fended off these attempts and the accord was eventually 
signed.  Re the government's statement re Iraq, it was 
also clear to Mission that elements in the MFA wanted to 
take a line that hewed much more closely to the French- 
German-Russian anti-U.S., pro-Saddam Hussein position. 
(Note:  The MFA's deadening hand is also noticeable in 
UN voting.  Despite strong USG efforts, for example, the 
GSL only abstained on the recent UNCHR vote re the 
Castro regime's atrocious human rights record.) 
 
10.  (C) (((Note:  Foreign Minister Tyronne Fernando is 
actually quite friendly to the U.S.  In fact, Fernando 
has been one of those in the government who have told us 
that Sri Lanka should separate itself more from NAM. 
Fernando's effectiveness in communicating these views to 
his ministry are hampered by the fact that he has been 
ill with a serious heart condition and does not seem to 
be a hands-on manager in any case.  Moreover, while he 
has not announced it officially, Fernando also makes no 
bones about the fact that he wants to be the next UN 
Secretary General after Kofi Annan's term is up.  Due to 
 
SIPDIS 
this latter factor, Fernando seems to go out of his way 
at times not to rock the boat and challenge the "UN 
consensus."  End Note.))) 
 
11.  (C) In addition to the entrenched bureaucracy in 
the MFA, Wickremesinghe's tilt toward the U.S. has also 
encountered sharp resistance from the president, her 
People's Alliance (PA) party, and the radical Janantha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party.  While she is not anti- 
U.S. per se, President Kumaratunga -- who shares a very 
tense cohabitation relationship with the PM -- is not 
particularly friendly to our international positions on 
issues as diverse as Iraq, climate change, the ICC, 
general North/South affairs, etc.  Kumaratunga's stance 
seems to be strongly influenced by the fact that her 
parents, who were both prime ministers, were advocates 
of NAM-type thinking on the international stage.  The 
president's Sorbonne education also appears to have 
affected her and she is quite pro-French.  As could be 
expected, the president's PA party basically mirrors her 
perspectives.  As for the leftist JVP, the party has 
always been strongly anti-U.S., accusing us routinely in 
public of being the "arch-imperialist.  Given that an 
alliance between a large section of the PA with the JVP 
is set to be announced soon, there is little indication 
that Opposition views of the U.S. will improve in the 
near-term. 
 
12.  (C) It is also the case that much of the 
intelligentsia in Sri Lanka and much of the press share 
a general anti-U.S. bias.  Intellectuals, such as they 
are in Sri Lanka, are mostly influenced by Marxism to a 
large extent with a fair amount having studied in the 
former Soviet Union, and they routinely chatter against 
U.S. "hegemony" and "world empire."  In the meantime, 
Sri Lanka's press -- both the English and vernacular -- 
contains a large amount of anti-U.S. commentary, 
including the ritual condemnations of our policy on Iraq 
and alleged excesses in the war on terrorism.  The 
government, including PM Wickremesinghe and especially 
Moragoda, also come under considerable heat for 
allegedly wanting to make Sri Lanka a U.S. "lackey." 
(Note:  While the newspapers have their decided biases, 
TV and radio in Sri Lanka are generally apolitical on 
international issues -- but not on domestic issues where 
they tend to take sides.) 
 
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COMMENT 
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13.  (C) In the post-Iraq war environment, we think the 
Sri Lankan government will continue to want to draw 
closer to the U.S.  The prime minister faces a very 
precarious cohabitation situation, however, with his 
party holding control of Parliament by only several 
seats.  Given this situation, the PM will have to 
consider carefully how additional steps toward us might 
affect his domestic political standing.  Too sharp a 
tilt toward the U.S. could potentially subject him to 
harsh criticism from the Opposition, which will 
reverberate to the prime minister's disadvantage in 
press channels and among the leftist intellectual set. 
 
14.  (C) Nonetheless, with Sri Lanka facing a difficult 
peace process and needing help to constrain the 
unpredictable Tamil Tigers, we think the larger trend in 
the country provides sizable ballast for the PM's pro- 
U.S. proclivities.  (Note:  In general, polls show that 
Sri Lankans of all ethnic groups view the U.S. in a very 
friendly way.)  One key test of the prime minister's 
chosen course is whether he uses UNGA to take on NAM and 
propose some sort of new grouping.  If he does that, he 
would have consummated a dramatic shift in his country's 
foreign policy orientation.  END COMMENT. 
 
15.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS