US embassy cable - 03ISTANBUL760

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000760 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, TU, Istanbul 
SUBJECT: LEADERSHIP IN THE ORTHODOX WORLD: THE ECUMENICAL 
PATRIARCH AND RUSSIAN COMPETITION 
 
Classified By: Consul General David L. Arnett for reasons 1.5 (b) 
and ( d). 
 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Though divided among many national churches, 
all Orthodox leaders except the Russian Orthodox recognize 
the Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul, Bartholomew II, as 
first among equals.  Located in "The Second Rome," the 
Ecumenical Patriarch traces a line of succession back to St. 
Andrew and, later, the conversion of Emperor Constantine. 
However, Alexei II, Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, 
may be making a play for preeminence within Orthodoxy.  In a 
recent conversation, Metropolitan Meliton confirmed the 
competitive atmosphere and the Ecumenical Patriarchate's 
animosity toward more recent Russian machinations.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
 
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How Many Romes Are There? 
------------------------- 
 
 
2. (C) Being a student of Orthodox power politics is a little 
bit like watching a prize fight in slow-motion.  Jabs and 
swings come only rarely, and there are plenty of breaks.  The 
prize in question in this case is not a summit of religious 
authority, as with the Pope in Roman Catholicism, but a nod 
of pre-eminence from other Orthodox leaders.  With this nod 
comes a certain ability to set the tone of discussions 
between Orthodoxy and the outside world, especially Western 
Christianity.  However, changes come only slowly, and church 
concerns revolve around events in the distant future. 
 
 
3. (C) One of the central pillars of support to the 
Ecumenical Patriarch's claim to ecumenical status is 
location.  As "Patriarch of Constantinople and New Rome," he 
can trace authority back to the Apostle Andrew and leadership 
of the city where Christianity first became legalized within 
the Roman Empire under Constantine, and later the state 
religion.  Demography and Turkish law are working against the 
Ecumenical Patriarch's status in "The Second Rome," however. 
The Greek Orthodox citizens of Turkey (from whom a new 
Patriarch must be chosen) now number only 3,000.  For the 
Patriarchate to continue beyond one or two more patriarchs 
after Bartholomew II, Turkish law regarding Lausanne Treaty 
minorities will have to change, allowing leadership by 
non-Turkish citizens.  This seems unlikely to happen. 
 
 
4. (C) There is a Third Rome, though.  Moscow claims that, 
prior to the collapse of the Byzantine Empire, the torch was 
passed to it to take up leadership within Orthodoxy, when the 
tsar was given the Cap of Monomakh.  Tenuous though the claim 
 
SIPDIS 
may be, it allowed the Romanov tsars to claim the title of 
"Protector of the Orthodox Faith," a position which played 
into Russia's involvement in the First World War, and the 
Romanov dynasty's demise. 
 
 
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Don't Write to My Bishop! 
------------------------- 
 
 
5. (C) The most recent round of maneuvering began with a 
letter from Russian Patriarch Alexei II to several Orthodox 
leaders in Western Europe.  Under Orthodox canon law, a 
Patriarchof a national church is confined to communicating 
directly on 
 with bishops and priests under his on 
authority.  The Ecumenical Patriarchate provided poloff with 
a letter from Alexei to, among others, "His Grace, the Right 
Reverend Gabriel, Bishop of Komansk, Locum Tenens of the 
Archdiocese of Russian Orthodox Parishes in Western Europe," 
and four other church leaders the Ecumenical Patriarch claims 
as his own. 
 
 
6. (C) In the letter, Alexei lays out the reasons that he 
does not consider the Russian Orthodox Church in Western 
Europe to be subordinate to Constantinople.  He cites a 1931 
letter from Photius, then Ecumenical Patriarch, who he argues 
foresaw only temporary subordination of the Russian Exarchate 
in Western Europe to Constantinople "until, God willing, 
unity and the unbroken image of the Holy Sister Russian 
Church are restored."  Alexei now argues that that time has 
come. 
7. (C) Moreover, Alexei's letter lays out a new proposal for 
a single Metropolitan for the Russian Church in Western 
Europe.  Unlike the current Orthodox leaders in Western 
Europe, who are appointed by the Ecumenical Patriarch, he 
argues that local leaders should be elected from among local 
clergy, and confirmed by Moscow.  Thus, Alexei holds out the 
prospect of greater autonomy, tied to his own authority. 
 
 
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More Churches, Please 
--------------------- 
 
 
8. (C) On a recent trip to Moscow, Metropolitan Meliton of 
Philadelphia (Chief Secretary of the Holy Synod) said the 
Russians made a further request: four churches in Istanbul. 
Currently, the Russian Orthodox Church provides priests to 
serve in a church owned by the Ecumenical Patriarchate. 
However, they argue, their need has grown, and more churches 
are required.  Rather than just working as guests on 
Ecumenical Patriarchate property, they have requested that 
ownership be transferred to them.  Meliton said he denied 
their request, but offered to expand the number of Russian 
Orthodox priests allowed to serve the flock in Istanbul. 
 
 
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"Political, Not Spiritual" 
-------------------------- 
 
 
9. (C) Meliton said that in the wake of the collapse of 
communism, the Russian Orthodox Church was badly discredited, 
not least among their Orthodox co-religionists.  While he 
recalls in the past working with Russian prelates who were 
focused on spiritual concerns, he feels that picture has 
changed.  Now, he says, "Alexei and his bishops are all 
former KGB informants, who still work closely with the FSB 
and are far more political than spiritual in nature." 
Meliton says he and the Patriarchate view Russian Orthodoxy 
with great suspicion, and believe that it is deeply entangled 
in the political needs of the Russian state. 
 
 
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COMMENT 
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10. (C) Although not unheard of, it is rare for Turkish 
political analysts or commentators to grasp that GOT 
acceptance of the ecumenical nature of the Patriarchate in 
Istanbul and facilitation of the Patriarchate's ability to 
continue would accrue foreign policy benefits to Turkey.  In 
this regard we will continue to pay close attention to the 
attitude toward the Patriarchate of Turkish "Eurasianists" -- 
i.e., those in the military, MFA, think tanks and business 
world who advocate closer ties to Russia as an alternative to 
Turkey's U.S/EU orientation. 
ARNETT