US embassy cable - 03SANAA1190

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001190 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2013 
TAGS: ETRD, KCRM, PGOV, PREL, SNAR, IR, YE 
SUBJECT: IRAN'S PRESIDENT KHATAMI VISITS YEMEN: NO 
NOTICEABLE EXCITEMENT 
 
REF: SANAA 1188 
 
Classified By: DCM ALAN MISENHEIMER FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (E) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. C) Iranian President Mohammed Khatami's May 15/18 visit to 
Yemen was low-key, almost pro forma, with little public 
exposure and no overtures to Yemen's large Shi'a community. 
Although six cooperative agreements were signed, in areas 
from security to shipping, the accords broke little new 
ground. The joint statement released on his departure was 
anodyne, calling for "foreign troops to end their occupation 
of Iraq."  Relations have improved in recent years and 
Khatami showed a friendly face.  But the visit does not seem 
to signal great advances in mutual confidence. End Summary 
 
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LOW-KEY FORMALITY 
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2. (C)  Iran's President Mohammed Khatami, returning ROYG 
President Salih's 2002 visit to Tehran, was welcomed with all 
presidential courtesies in Sanaa on May 15. His schedule was 
formal, with few public events. All proper protocol was 
observed, including joint arrival statements with television 
coverage. The two presidents were photographed beaming 
cordially across the interpreter; in a rare departure from 
his usual formal habits, President Salih wore Yemeni native 
dress, with the traditional jambiah dagger in his belt. 
 
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PHOTO OPS 
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3. (C)  Khatami's official meetings were appropriately 
scheduled with the highest ranking local notables, including 
Speaker of Parliament, Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar, Shura 
Council head, Abdul Aziz Abdul Ghani, and Prime Minister 
Abdul Qadir Ba Jammal. Katemi also had an unusual private 
meeting with Ahmad Ali Abdullah Saleh, the president's 33 
year old son who commands the Republican Guard, but no 
substantive military contacts. The opening greetings at all 
these meetings were duly photographed for television and 
newspapers, but the conversations were merely summarized as 
"friendly exchanges of views." 
 
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WHAT DIDN'T HAPPEN 
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4. (C) Khatami did not address any public gatherings during 
his visit, such as university students or parliamentary 
groups, did not meet with any local Shi'a clerics, and gave 
no interviews to the local media. He  visited Sanaa's famous 
Grand Mosque (which dates from the seventh century founding 
of Islam) but as a tourist rather than a worshiper.  Local 
television covered President Salih attendance at Friday 
prayers at the same mosque, escorted by his usual retainers 
but without his Iranian visitors. 
 
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THE AGREEMENTS 
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5. (C) The two sides signed agreements in six areas, 
including  security, trade, development and economic 
cooperation, banking, education and culture and shipping. 
According to one Yemeni contact in the Ministery of 
Development and International Cooperation, the two agreements 
signed in his office were "fill in the blanks" documents with 
few specific references to Yemeni conditions.  Press accounts 
of the security accord refer to increased cooperation on 
fighting drug trafficing and organized crime. (Other details 
about security cooperation are reported reftel.) 
 
6.(C) The more specific agreements focused on trade, 
education, and shipping.  Bilateral trade has grown tenfold 
since 1990 and Iranian goods are increasingly found in local 
markets, including machine tools, pharmaceuticals, and small 
buses. (These products often beat European, Asian and 
American products on price, FOB Aden, and are considered good 
quality by local merchants.) Iranian companies have completed 
several projects here, including the Socotra airport strip, 
improvements to Hodeidah's oil port anchorage, and road 
paving works. In education, Iran offered a number of 
scholarships and exchange programs as well as a schedule for 
increased "cultural functions." The shipping agreement 
reflects Yemen's need to increase traffic through the port of 
Aden; more Iranian cargo and tanker ships would be most 
welcome, whether to transship goods, or merely for bunkering 
stops. 
 
 
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THE JOINT STATEMENT 
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7. (C) The anodyne joint statement signed by Salih and 
Khatemi may also have been a cut and paste exercise: there is 
little to distinguish Yemen's document from other stops on 
Khatami's Arab Tour 2003.  Predictably, both leaders praised 
brotherly relations, called for immediate withdrawal of 
foreign troops from Iraq, stressed the pivotal role of the UN 
and renewed their dedication to the legitimate rights of the 
Palestinian people, including Jerusalem as their capital. 
They did strongly denounce and condemn terrorism, but drew a 
distinction between it and "legitimate national resistance" 
movements. 
 
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COMMENT 
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8.(C)  Khatami's recent tour focused on Arab countries with 
large Shi'a communities embedded among Sunnis.  But, in Yemen 
at least, pastoral or leadership pretensions were not 
apparent.  He seemed to go out of his way to be 
non-threatening to his Yemeni hosts, who had viewed past 
Iranian leaders with deep suspicion.  The visit had some 
practical benefits: ROYG President Salih enjoys the prestige 
of international visitors, growing commercial ties make 
economic sense, and poor Yemeni students, especially those 
majoring in religious and legal training, will gratefully 
accept scholarships to Iran. However, as one MFA contact 
commented, the visit did little to strengthen ties between 
Yemen and Iran, because no one expects Khatami to hold power 
much longer "between you Americans and the Mullahs." 
HULL