US embassy cable - 03KUWAIT2276

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 002276 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KISL, SOCI, IZ, KU, IR 
SUBJECT: IRAQ'S SHIA HEARTLAND: PROMINENT SHIA SHARES 
CONCERNS AND PROMISES SUGGESTIONS FOR WINNING HEARTS AND 
STABILITY 
 
REF: KUWAIT 01417 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for reason 1.5 (d) 
 
1. (S) Summary:  One week after returning to Iraq, noted Shia 
leader Mohammed Bahr al-Uloum and his party are encountering 
an Iraqi populace disillusioned with the lack of security and 
disgruntled at the fact that Ba'ath Party members still hold 
positions of power, according to Kuwaiti Shia businessman 
Abdul Ilah Marafie, who is helping to sponsor Bahr al-Uloum 
and speaks with his party on a regular basis.  Marafie 
relayed Bahr al-Uloum's concerns and told Poloff he would 
soon obtain concrete suggestions from Bahr al-Uloum as to how 
coalition forces might court Iraqi Shi'is and counter the 
destabilizing effects of possible Iranian and Saudi 
influences.  End Summary. 
 
2. (S) In a followup to reftel meeting, Poloff met with 
Kuwaiti businessman and Director of the Marafie Foundation, 
Abdul Ilah Marafie on May 25 to discuss developments in 
southern Iraq from a Shia perspective.  Marafie said that 
noted exiled Iraqi cleric Sayed Mohammed Bahr al-Uloum had 
entered Iraq a week earlier with two of his sons and a number 
of family members.  The group traveled first to Basra, then 
Samawa, before visiting Baghdad. Using Thuraya phones 
provided by Marafie, they have been communicating with him on 
an almost daily basis.  Marafie said the party has 
encountered a populace in Iraq who are extremely 
disillusioned that coalition forces have not forcibly removed 
all Ba'athists and their sympathizers from power.  Although 
they give civil administrator L. Paul Bremer high marks for 
his recent intitiative to purge Ba'athists from power (this 
has "had a big effect"), they stress that this policy must be 
continued and enforced throughout all of Iraq.  Calling the 
removal of Ba'athists a "major issue," Marafie emphasized 
that undertaking such action would be a visible sign for 
Iraqis that the Saddam era is over, and would clearly 
demonstrate the intent of coalition forces to establish and 
maintain law and order. 
 
3. (S) Marafie also relayed Bahr al-Uloum's concerns about 
the general level of instability in Iraq, noting that it is 
fueling unhappiness and a large amount of conspiracy theories 
about the true intent of the coalition.  Unable to understand 
what the composition of an Iraqi Interim Authority might look 
like, worried that it might not represent all Iraqis, and 
frustrated by a real or perceived lack of input, many Iraqis 
hypothesize that the U.S. struck a deal with Saddam Hussein. 
 
4. (S) Marafie said that securing Najaf, in particular, will 
be vital to stabilizing the Shia population, and through the 
Shia, the whole of Iraq.  He said Bahr al-Uloum had met with 
the "frontline" clerics of Najaf, Sayed Mohammed Ali 
al-Sistani and Sayed Mohammed Said Hakim and told them it was 
their duty to play a more political role in the conflict and 
"lead people to stability."   But the clerics have thus far 
opted for a less prominent and more apolitical role, largely 
due to the fact there is "no feeling of law and order" in 
Iraq.  Marafie said the coalition should act quickly to 
establish a local police force in Najaf. 
 
5. (S) A lack of local leadership is also creating problems 
in Iraq.  In Najaf, Marafie claimed, the appointed head of 
the local government is a Sunni, ex-Ba'athist from Basra. 
(Note: When asked, Marafie could not say who appointed him. 
End Note.) The coalition should focus on installing people 
"whose hearts burn for their country, not power." 
 
6. (S) Asked about possible Iranian attempts to sabotage 
efforts to restore stability in Iraq, Marafie, said there is 
"definitely" Iranian influence at work there, and offered his 
assessment that Saudi Arabia might also be undermining 
stability.  Marafie said that Iran is afraid that Qom will 
lose its influence as a Shia center of learning as Najaf 
regains its former glory, and the Saudis are concerned that 
moderate voices (who they "are against") may gain a foothold 
in Iraq. (Note: Marafie downplayed the suggestion that SCIRI 
leader Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim was being directly influenced 
by Iran, purposefully stating he was not/not the source of 
"Iranian presssure" being exerted in the two holy cities. 
End Note.) 
 
7. (S) Marafie was unable to offer recommendations from Bahr 
al-Uloum as to what specific actions coalition forces might 
take to further stabilize Najaf at this time (i.e. how to go 
about establishing a police force, urging moderates to speak 
out, etc.) without inflaming the already tense political 
environment, but promised Poloff he would solicit them.  Post 
will continue to meet with Marafie in an effort to monitor 
the situation in Najaf and other religiously significant 
Shi'a cities from Bahr al-Uloum's vantage point. 
 
8. (S) Comment:  While many of Bahr al-Uloum's reported 
concerns are being addressed by the recent actions of the 
Civil Administrator, it is clear that the Shi'a community is 
still very uneasy about the future.  Special focus on the 
restoration of stability and services in the holy cities of 
Najaf and Karbala may be one way to quickly make friends with 
Iraq's Shi'a majority. 
JONES