US embassy cable - 03ABUJA945

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000945 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O.12958: DECL: 1.6x1 
TAGS: CASC, ASEC, PREL, PTER, EPET, NI 
SUBJECT:  Evaluating the Terrorist Threat to U.S. Oil 
Workers in Nigeria 
 
Ref: TD 315/21866-03 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter.  Reason: 
1.5(c) 
 
 
1.  (SBU) The Mission understands that consideration 
is being given to issuing a revised travel warning for 
Nigeria to make specific mention of a possible 
terrorist threat to U.S. oil facilities in Nigeria. 
Given the dated and speculative nature of the possible 
threat, the Mission strongly urges the Department to 
consider carefully and fully the implications of 
taking such an action. 
 
 
2.  (SBU) The Mission's two EACs (Embassy Abuja and 
Consulate General Lagos) met during the week of May 
19, and concluded that the information contained in 
the referenced report did not warrant issuance of a 
warden message or revision of the existing travel 
warning for Nigeria to make specific mention of a 
possible terrorist threat to oil facilities.  U.S. oil 
companies operating in Nigeria and American citizens 
living here are acutely aware of security issues, and 
possible threat emanating from within and outside 
Nigeria.  The possibility of an attack similar to 
those perpetrated against the U.S.S. Cole and the 
French tanker is clear to U.S. oil company managers, 
and they ensure security awareness of their personnel 
through in-house newsletters, emails, and other media. 
 
 
3.  (SBU) The oil-producing Niger Delta is a rough 
neighborhood.  Security incidents involving aggrieved 
Nigerian employees or disaffected local inhabitants 
are not unusual.  U.S. and other companies operating 
in the area maintain a constant state of vigilance. 
While a terrorist attack would be qualitatively 
different from an extortion attempt, many of the 
measures a company would take to deter the former are 
the same as those that would be taken to reduce the 
chances of the latter.  And, again, the companies are 
aware that their facilities could be the target of a 
terrorist attack. 
 
 
4.  (S/NF) Let us be clear about the quality and 
timeliness of the information contained in the 
referenced intelligence.  The source is someone whose 
reliability is unknown and who might have reason to 
confuse or misdirect us.  Moreover, the source 
"recently recalled" a conversation from the year 2000 
that the source had with a senior Al-Qaida figure, in 
which the senior Al-Qaida figure said he had sent 
someone to Nigeria for an unspecified purpose that 
might have been surveillance of oil installations. 
The source does not know that the Al-Qaida envoy 
conducted any surveillance in Nigeria, much less that 
the target of the surveillance (if there was any) was 
oil installations.  All the source really knows (if 
the source is reliable, and, of course, we do not know 
that) is that the journey took 45 days. 
 
 
5.  (SBU) The crucial question we need to ask is: 
"What do we know as a result of this new information 
that we did not know before?"  We in the Mission do 
not believe we know anything more of substance.  The 
follow-on question would be:  "What can we say to the 
oil companies that would help them be better prepared 
than they already are for a possible attack?"  We in 
the Mission believe they are already as prepared as 
the state of our current knowledge would warrant; we 
should not unnerve them with speculation cloaked in 
the guise of actionable intelligence, especially 
intelligence that gathered nearly three year ago. 
 
 
6.  (C) In an email dated 24 May 2003, DS/ITA said it 
"strongly feels that updating the travel warning 
solely / solely on this one threat report would not / 
not be sound.  Not appropriate.  ...it was confirmed 
that the threat information was outdated and very 
speculative in nature.  However, DS/ITA does feel 
(stating the obvious) that U.S. oil companies / 
offshore oil rigs in Nigeria will always be "high 
profile" targets.  As noted in previous emails, U.S. 
oil companies completely understand the security 
environment in which they operate." 
 
 
7.  (S/NF) The Mission agrees.  Were we to issue a 
warning about a possible threat to oil installations, 
we would have to provide context, i.e., that the 
information is three years old and of questionable 
reliability.  If we did that, the U.S. oil companies 
would wonder why we bothered.  Being less specific 
(e.g., the original tearline for the referenced TD: 
"As of early May 2003, Al-Qaida may have been 
considering attacks against U.S.-flagged oil tankers 
and U.S. oil companies in Nigeria") risks leading our 
fellow citizens and U.S. oil companies to conclude 
that we have something new or "hot."   Risk-averse 
shipping and insurance companies would also wonder 
what we know.  We could see tankers refuse to call at 
Nigerian ports and/or sharp rises in insurance rates 
for tankers and rigs.  U.S. economic interests and the 
employment prospects of some AmCits in the industry 
could be at risk.  Do we want to run those risks on 
the basis of "outdated and speculative" information? 
We think not. 
 
 
8.  (C) In conclusion, the Mission agrees with DS/ITA. 
Unless we have something more than the referenced TD 
and the recent worldwide caution -- something current 
and specific to Nigeria, we believe U.S. oil companies 
in Nigeria are sufficiently concerned about and most 
of their AmCit employees adequately aware of the 
global terrorist threat to U.S. oil interests. 
Because their security-consciousness is so high, any 
warning other than one that makes clear how dated and 
speculative the information is risks being confusing 
and misleading rather than enlightening.  If the 
Department has information that would tend to confirm 
the referenced TD, the Mission would like to receive 
it, so that the EACs might consider it. 
 
 
9.  (SBU) The Mission is in the process of updating 
the Travel Warning for Nigeria.  We would like to 
defer submission of a new text until after June 4.  By 
then a week will have elapsed since the Presidential 
inauguration, and we will have a better idea of the 
overall security climate. 
JETER