US embassy cable - 03ANKARA3416

S E C R E T ANKARA 003416 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SE, NEA/NGA, PMAT; OSD FOR ISA AND ISP; JCS 
FOR J5; EUCOM FOR J5, POLAD; CENTCOM FOR J5 AND POLAD 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2013 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: THE TURKS AND THE STABILIZATION FORCE IN IRAQ 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 2538 
     B. ANKARA 2553 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador W. Robert Pearson.  Reasons: 
1.5 (B and D). 
 
 
1. (C) The GOT continues to express an interest in 
participating in the stabilization force in Iraq.  The Turks 
understand the political sensitivity of a neighboring state 
putting troops in Iraq.  According to MFA DDG for NATO 
Affairs Sanivar Kizildeli, Turkey is not looking to use NATO 
as a "back door" to get into the force.  Rather, Iraq is such 
a key national interest for Turkey that the GOT wants to 
ensure that a reputable and reliable institution like NATO is 
responsible for Iraq's security over the long term.  While 
Turkey initially made missteps initially regarding financial 
aid and the London Conference, there are good reasons for a 
Turkish role in the force. 
 
 
2. (C) It appears that the Poles may have generated adequate 
forces for its division for now.  But looking down the road, 
our experience in Afghanistan tells us that few countries 
have the resources or the public support for extended 
operations far from home.  Allowing the Turks the maximum 
possible role now could spare us from encountering Turkish 
recalcitrance later when we are looking for countries to 
contribute troops.  Embassy Ankara advocates this approach 
because it serves US long-term interests in Iraqi transition. 
 
 
3. (C) Per Ref B, Turkey has offered a gamut of capabilities 
from a division-level headquarters to a humanitarian 
assistance brigade, psyops unit, and air traffic control. 
The USG may best be able to exploit these capabilities 
without unnecessarily offending sensitivities in Iraq by 
accepting non-combat assets such as a medical unit, mobile 
surgical hospital, humanitarian assistance unit, firefighting 
units, air traffic controllers, ground illumination units, 
etc. 
 
 
4. (C) We understand that Washington is considering offering 
Turkey some advisor slots for the Polish division.  This type 
of minimal role is a good start, but as we look longer term, 
we should consider a broader role for Turkey in the short- to 
medium-term in order to keep open our options in the future. 
PEARSON