US embassy cable - 96NAIROBI6573

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 006573 
 
FROM EMBASSY KHARTOUM OFFICE 
LONDON FOR YOUNG, PARIS FOR MORAN, BRUSSELS FOR JOHNSON 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  05/14/06 
TAGS:  PREL, PTER, PINS, PINR, EAID, UN, SU 
SUBJECT:  SUDAN:  FOREIGN MINISTER ON CIVIL WAR, TERRORISM 
 
1.  CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR TO SUDAN TIMOTHY CARNEY. 
REASON 1.5(D). 
 
2.  (S)  SUMMARY AND COMMENT.  THE SUDANESE FOREIGN 
MINISTER REAFFIRMED TO ME MAY 10 THAT KHARTOUM HAS MADE 
A DECISION THAT TERRORIST GROUPS MUST GO AND IS WORKING 
TO COMPILE MEMBERSHIP LISTS.  HE BELIEVES RENEGADE 
SAUDI TERROR FINANCIER USAMA BIN LADEN NEEDS TO START 
TALKING TO WESTERN DIPLOMATS.  I REBUFFED HIS ATTEMPT 
TO INVOLVE THE U.S. IN RESTORING SUDAN'S RELATIONS WITH 
ETHIOPIA AND UGANDA. 
 
3.  (C)  THE MINISTER ASKED THAT THE U.S. CONVEY TO THE 
SUDANESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT (SPLM) LEADER 
THAT KHARTOUM IS OPEN TO SPLM IDEAS TO SOLVE THE CIVIL 
WAR; THAT THE GOS IS PROCEEDING WITH NO HIDDEN AGENDA, 
AND IS OPEN TO VENUE AND PLAYERS TO GET TALKS STARTED. 
MY REPLY WAS THAT KHARTOUM MUST MAKE CONCRETE GESTURES 
TO BUILD TRUST AND I SUGGESTED SOME WHICH MIGHT BE 
TIMED TO THE 20 MAY UNESCO/UNDP MEET ON SUDANESE 
HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS IN THE NETHERLANDS.. 
 
4.  (C)  THE GOS IS ONLY SLOWLY PROCEEDING TO ACT ON 
THEIR HIGH-LEVEL STATEMENTS OF INTENT TO ANSWER U.S. 
CONCERNS ON SUDANESE HAVEN AND SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM. 
I SUGGESTED THEY HAVE A WINDOW OF 45-90 DAYS TO PROVE 
GOOD FAITH, NOW THAT THEIR NEW CABINET IS IN PLACE. 
THE KHARTOUM EFFORT TO START PEACE TALKS WITH THE SOUTH 
LOOKS SERIOUS.  UNSCR 1054 HAS GOTTEN ATTENTION 
THROUGHOUT THE SUDANESE CAPITAL.   BUT, IF THE FOREIGN 
MINISTER'S COMMENTS REFLECT THE REALITY, KHARTOUM DOES 
NOT/NOT GRASP HOW COMPLETELY IT IS UP TO THEM TO CUT A 
DEAL WITH THE ETHIOPIANS IF SUDAN HAS, AS SEEMS LIKELY, 
SPIRITED THE THREE MUBARAK PLOT TERRORISTS OUT OF 
SUDAN.  END SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
 
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CIVIL WAR 
--------- 
 
5.  (C)  FOREIGN MINISTER ALI OSMAN MOHAMMED TAHA MET 
ME AFTER PRAYERS ON RETURNING FROM THE HAJ VIA MALAYSIA 
FRIDAY, 10 MAY, TO TALK ABOUT PEACE EFFORTS WITH THE 
SOUTH AND, ON DISMISSING NOTETAKERS, TO MAKE POINTS ON 
THE GOS EFFORTS TO RESPOND TO AMERICAN CONCERNS ON 
TERRORISM (SEPTEL-NOTAL).  AFTER ASSURING HIMSELF THAT 
I RECEIVED HIS FAX REPLY TO MY LETTER DETAILING SPLM 
REACTION TO THE FIRST MESSAGE FROM KHARTOUM (NAIROBI 
4836-NOTAL), TAHA SAID THAT KHARTOUM IS COMMITTED TO 
DEMONSTRATING ITS SINCERITY IN REACHING A COMPREHENSIVE 
PEACE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.  HE SAW SCOPE IN SOME SPLM 
REMARKS IN THE WAKE OF THE 10 APRIL "PEACE CHARTER," 
SIGNED WITH THE SPLINTER SOUTH SUDAN INDEPENDENCE 
MOVEMENT (SSIM), TO INDUCE THE MAJOR INSURGENT MOVEMENT 
TO JOIN IN.  HE SAID THAT THE KEY ISSUES ARE IN THE 10 
APRIL ACCORD, WHICH AIMED TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE TO 
GET SERIOUS TALKS STARTED.  HE WAS ASTONISHED WHEN I 
SAID THAT ALL SOUTHERN INTERLOCUTORS EXCEPT LAWYER AND 
FORMER SUDANESE VICE-PRESIDENT ABEL ALIER HAD VIEWED 
THE PEACE CHARTER AS A "TAKE-IT-OR LEAVE IT" DOCUMENT. 
A LAWYER HIMSELF, TAHA AGREED WITH THE CHARACTERIZATION 
OF HIS CHIEF OF PROTOCOL WHO HAD EARLIER DESCRIBED THE 
EFFORT AS ONE OF "IGNITION." 
 
6.  (C)  I RECALLED THE MINISTER'S OWN RECOGNITION OF 
THE MISTRUST AND SUSPICION THAT CAUSED TAHA TO SEEK 
INTERMEDIARIES TO GET A PEACE PROCESS STARTED.  THE GOS 
NEEDS TO BUILD TRUST AND A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE MEASURES 
APART FROM THE EARLIER SUGGESTION OF A PRISONER 
EXCHANGE MIGHT BE CONSIDERED.  SUCH STEPS DIVIDE IN TWO 
CATEGORIES, THOSE DIRECTLY IMPACTING SPLM CIVILIAN AND 
MILITARY FIGURES; AND THOSE WHICH AFFECT POPULATIONS IN 
THE SPLM-CONTROLLED AREAS AND ALSO IMPACT IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.  NOTING THAT BRAINSTORMING 
WITH THE PAO HAD ADDED ELEMENTS, I CITED NOTIONS OF: 
 
-- KHARTOUM MEDIA ACCESS FOR SPLM/A LEADER GARANG TO 
MAKE HIS CASE; 
-- OFFERING SUDANESE PASSPORTS TO MAJOR SPLM FIGURES IN 
NAIROBI, CAIRO, LONDON; 
--  A PUBLIC STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT BASHIR RECOGNIZING 
THE DAMAGE DONE, ESPECIALLY IN THE SOUTH, BY THE CIVIL 
WAR AND THAT SOUTHERN GRIEVANCES ARE REAL AND MUST BE 
SATISFIED. 
 
THE SECOND CATEGORY MAINLY FOCUSES ON RELIEF EFFORTS BY 
THE UN OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN (UN/OLS).  KHARTOUM 
COULD: 
 
-- LIFT PROHIBITIONS ON FLIGHT TO 16 DESTINATIONS BY 
OLS AND TO 12 DESTINATIONS BY ICRC; 
 
-- PERMIT OPERATION OVER SUDAN OF THE BELGIAN AIR 
FORCE-PROVIDED C-130, PROHIBITED FROM SUDANESE AIRSPACE 
SINCE MID-1995; 
 
-- OPEN THE CONTROVERSIAL NUBA MOUNTAIN AREA TO OLS 
OPERATIONS, STARTING WITH AN ASSESSMENT MISSION AS 
EARLY AS THE END OF MAY; 
 
-- CREATE, SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION WITH THE UN, A MIXED 
GOS/SSIM/SPLA SECURITY ELEMENT FOR UN BARGE CONVOYS TO 
PREVENT ANY LOOTING AS WELL AS TO ENSURE ONLY FOOD AND 
RELIEF ITEMS ARE DELIVERED TO DESTINATIONS ALONG THE 
NILE. 
 
TAHA TOOK THE AMBASSADOR'S LIST OF POSSIBLE GESTURES, 
SAYING THAT HE WOULD LOOK AT THE IDEAS WITH MILITARY 
AND SECURITY STAFF, BUT SOME SEEM IMMEDIATELY 
ACCEPTABLE. 
 
7.  (C)  CONCLUDING THIS ASPECT OF THE DISCUSSION, THE 
MINISTER ASKED THAT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE BE CONVEYED 
TO THE SPLM.  ANY SPLM IDEAS ON PEACE ARE WELCOME.  THE 
SPLA MUST BE PART OF ANY PROCESS FOR COMPREHENSIVE 
PEACE.  THE GOS HAS NO/NO HIDDEN AGENDA AND IS NOT/NOT 
TRYING TO PLAY INSURGENT FACTIONS OFF AGAINST EACH 
OTHER.  TAHA BELIEVES THAT IF GARANG COMES IN, PEACE 
WILL MATERIALIZE.  THE GOS IS OPEN TO VENUE FOR TALKS 
AND TO WHO WOULD BE PLAYERS IN ANY TALKS.  I SAID I HAD 
ASKED THE SPLM TO ARRANGE A MEETING WITH GARANG ON MY 
RETURN TO NAIROBI AND WOULD CONVEY TAHA'S MESSAGE, 
STRESSING THAT KHARTOUM SHOULD MAKE GESTURES SOON, 
PERHAPS TIMING SOME TO THE OPENING OF THE 20 MAY 
NETHERLANDS CONFERENCE ON HUMANITARIAN MATTERS WHICH IS 
A FOLLOW-ON TO LAST SEPTEMBER'S BARCELONA GATHERING 
UNDER THE UNESCO "CULTURE OF PEACE" RUBRIC. 
 
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POLICY ON TERRORISM 
------------------- 
 
8.  (C)  TAHA DISMISSED NOTETAKERS TO TALK ABOUT THE 
PROCESS HE INITIATED DURING A 6 FEBRUARY MEETING WITH 
THEN AF/E DIRECTOR SHINN AND MYSELF JUST BEFORE THE 
U.S. DIPLOMATIC STAFF WITHDREW OFFSHORE.  I TOLD HIM 
WASHINGTON CONTINUES SKEPTICAL, ALL THE MORE SO GIVEN 
THE FAILURE OF KHARTOUM TO TAKE VERIFIABLE STEPS ON THE 
ISSUE OF ITS HAVEN AND SUPPORT TO TERRORISTS.  CITING 
THE PRESIDENT'S 30 APRIL CREDENTIALS PRESENTATION 
REMARKS TO THE NEW SUDANESE AMBASSADOR, I UNDERSCORED 
THAT ACTIONS ARE NOW MORE IMPORTANT THAN DIALOGUE, 
SAYING THAT A 45-90 DAY WINDOW IN TIME IS NOW OPEN 
WITHIN WHICH THE GOS CAN DEMONSTRATE THAT ITS 
INTENTIONS ARE REAL. 
 
9.  (S)  TAHA REPLIED THAT A DECISION TO FORCE 
(TERRORIST) ORGANIZATIONS TO GO IS IN PROCESS.  HE 
REFERRED TO SPECIFICS CONCERNING EGYPTIAN TERRORISTS, 
SEEMING TO CONFIRM DIPLOMATIC SOURCES WHO TOLD ME THAT 
A LIST OF 39 EGYPTIANS HAVE GONE AT SUDANESE REQUEST. 
I STRESSED THE NEED TO VERIFY SUCH MATTERS WITH 
INFORMATION ON PASSPORTS AND DESTINATIONS. 
 
10.  (C)  IN DISCUSSING SPECIFICS, TAHA RAISED THE CASE 
OF RENEGADE SAUDI FINANCIER USAMA BIN LADEN.  AN MFA 
CONTACT HAD EARLIER TOLD ME THAT THE MFA WAS 
INSTRUMENTAL IN GETTING BIN LADEN TO ACCEPT A TIME 
MAGAZINE INTERVIEW (PUBLISHED IN THE 6 MAY EDITION). 
TAHA MUSED ABOUT GETTING THE VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND 
INDIVIDUALS TO ENTER INTO CONTACTS WITH THE WEST AS 
PART OF BRINGING THEM TO SEE MATTERS IN A DIFFERENT 
WAY.  HE RECALLED THE CASE OF THE FOUNDER OF THE MUSLIM 
BROTHERHOOD WHO HAD ENTERED INTO CONTACT WITH A BRITISH 
GOVERNMENT ARABIST IN EGYPT IN THE 1940S.  NASSER HAD 
CITED THE CONTACT TO DISCREDIT THE BROTHERHOOD IN HIS 
1954 CONFLICT WITH THE ORGANIZATION, TAHA SAID, NOTING 
THAT THE HISTORY ECHOES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ISLAMIST 
ORGANIZATIONS TO THIS DAY.  HE MOOTED PUTTING USAMA BIN 
LADEN IN CONTACT WITH WESTERN EMBASSIES.  COMMENT: 
WHILE I TOSSED MY BRITISH COLLEAGUE, A FINE ARABIST, 
OUT OF THE TROIKA, I BELIEVE WE WOULD DO BETTER TO WORK 
ON GETTING BIN LADEN INTO SAUDI HANDS THAN COUNTING ON 
HIM TO CHANGE HIS STRIPES THROUGH DIALOGUE WITH 
WESTERNERS. END COMMENT 
 
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REGION AND THE UNSCR 
-------------------- 
 
11.  (C)  CLEARLY UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE INCREASINGLY 
VOCIFEROUS NEW PARLIAMENT, TAHA BEGAN MORE OR LESS 
THINKING OUT LOUD ON HOW TO DEAL WITH UNSCR 1054 AND 
THE POOR STATE OF RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS ETHIOPIA AND 
UGANDA.  HE ARGUED THAT NOW IS NOT THE MOMENT FOR SUDAN 
TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THEM AS SUCH AN EFFORT WAS 
UNLIKELY TO BE WELL-RECEIVED.  HE ASKED IF THE U.S. 
COULD SOUND OUT POSSIBILITIES.  I REBUFFED THE NOTION, 
TELLING TAHA THAT SUDAN HAS THE RESPONSIBILITY TO DO 
SO, AND THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES, NOTABLY THE TERRORISM 
DIMENSION, MEAN THAT KHARTOUM MUST WORK DIRECTLY WITH 
ADDIS, PRIMARILY, ALL THE MORE SO AS IT APPEARS GAMES 
HAVE BEEN PLAYED WITH THE THREE SUSPECTS, NOW SEEMINGLY 
OUT OF SUDAN. 
 
ASMARA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED 
 
 
BRAZEAL