US embassy cable - 03ANKARA3412

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003412 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, CY, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S CYPRUS POLICY:  WHAT NOW? 
 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 901 
     B. ANKARA 2155 
     C. ANKARA 2431 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador W.R. Pearson.  Reason:1.5(b)(d) 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: Assessments of how Turkey should move on 
Cyprus vary in both the GOT and Turkish State.  Some (e.g., 
FonMin Gul) are working to overcome what they recognize as 
pressure on Turkey's interests following the failure of the 
UN-sponsored Cyprus talks and the EU's decision to accept a 
divided Cyprus as a member.  However, while promoting the 
recent series of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot 
confidence-building initiatives, others in the MFA 
bureaucracy and elsewhere remain reluctant to take bold steps 
toward a comprehensive solution, even though they recognize 
that such moves would help improve Turkish-EU and 
U.S.-Turkish relations.  These holdouts continue to reject 
the UNSYG plan (Annan III) as the basis for further 
negotiations.  End Summary. 
 
 
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Pyrrhic Victory for the Establishment? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
2. (C) Turkey (both GOT and elements of the State) put itself 
in a bind by insisting it could not handle Iraq and Cyprus 
simultaneously, and then failing to take clear and beneficial 
decisions on both. 
 
 
3. (C) On Cyprus policy, The ability of the pro-status-quo 
camp in Ankara to prevent Erdogan from embracing Annan III 
appeared at first to be a victory for an Establishment that 
fears the AK Party and P.M. Erdogan as existential threats to 
its dominance. 
 
 
-- TGS J5 Lt. Gen Turgut told visiting DAS Pascoe May 22 that 
the key to a successful resolution of the Cyprus problem was 
ensuring that the Turkish and Cypriot communities live on the 
island as equal partners.  Turgut said that if Turkey had 
accepted the Annan III plan, in ten years time, there would 
not be any Turkish residing on the island.  All of the "rich" 
would buy all of the land the "poor" would be left with 
nothing, forced to leave.  Turgut predicated that in the end, 
"you would have another Palestine."  He added that Turkish 
Cypriots who demonstrated against Denktas and the status quo 
are "communists." 
 
 
-- Erdogan initially strongly criticized Denktas and the 
GOT's business-as-usual approach on Cyprus, but ultimately 
succumbed to Establishment pressure and backed off. 
Erdogan's May 9 visit to Cyprus reflected this retreat as he 
called simultaneously for both Annan III and a "sovereign 
TRNC" in an attempt to placate both hard liners and those 
looking for a new opening.  Now, however, the Erdogan 
government, with FonMin Gul taking the lead, is once again 
looking for room to maneuver. 
 
 
-- At the same time, as the draftsman of Turkey's Cyprus 
diplomacy, the MFA, though charged with damage control and 
responding to a barrage of international criticism, is 
ultimately hewing to its Establishment line, one that FonMin 
Gul criticized as a "non-solution solution" in the beginning 
of his short tenure as P.M.  MFA officials are trying to 
shift blame for the failure of the talks from Turkey and 
Denktas, and toward the UN and EU for seeking too high a 
price from Ankara.  They argue that progress on Cyprus 
requires keeping the door open to an Annan Plan -- even as 
they reject the plan itself as a basis for negotiations (ref 
C). 
 
 
4. (C) Trying a different tack on May 22, MFA U/S Ziyal 
asserted to Ambassador and DAS Pascoe that the principal 
reason Turkey ultimately rejected the Annan Plan was its 
"unacceptable" requirement that "100 thousand Turkish 
Cypriots" -- 50% of the population, according to Ziyal -- 
would eventually have to leave home.  Ambassador Pearson 
replied that the figure cited by Ziyal does not coincide with 
our understanding, and that Turkish and U.S. diplomats in 
Ankara should be willing to conduct a review of the numbers 
-- and what was or was not called for under the plan.  Cyprus 
DG Apakan later reiterated Ziyal's point, adding that it is 
also "too much" to expect that Turkey and the "TRNC" would 
simultaneously accept the return of "85-90 thousand" Greek 
Cypriots to the north. 
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GOT Taking Steps -- or Walking in Place? 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 
5. (C) According to Apakan, Turkey is evaluating its Cyprus 
policy in the wake of the failed talks on three "fronts": the 
UN, the EU, and the "realities on the ground" on the island. 
The GOT is trying to change the environment on Cyprus 
through measures that "do not substitute, but will 
facilitate" and reinvigorate efforts to find a comprehensive 
settlement, he said.  Denktas, he stated, has taken the 
initiative in recent weeks by opening the "TRNC" border to 
Greek Cypriot tourists, allowing them to visit their former 
homes for the first time since 1974 and generating good will 
on the island.  DAS Pascoe responded that the evident good 
will on both sides gives the lie to the arguments that Greek- 
and Turkish-Cypriots could never get along -- and 
demonstrates instead the desire on both sides to cut a deal. 
Apakan demurred.  Apakan also noted the GOT's decision, 
announced by Erdogan May 16, to allow Greek Cypriots to 
travel to Turkey. 
 
 
6. (C) The next step, Apakan argued, should be taken by the 
other side -- to end the de facto embargo of the north. 
"There is neither an EU nor UN decision imposing a formal 
embargo on the 'TRNC,'" he said.  An axiom of the methodology 
of conflict resolution holds that settlements are reached 
between equal sides, Apakan asserted.  To redress the 
imbalance and as a prerequisite for a solution on Cyprus, the 
"TRNC" should be allowed direct access to the wider world. 
"End the embargo and the Cyprus problem will be settled," he 
opined. 
 
 
------------ 
Implications 
------------ 
 
 
7. (C) At a political level the GOT recognizes it is in a 
bind over Cyprus.  At the same time, the MFA's impulse is 
directed primarily toward damage control, not by any sense 
that Turkish policies are a dead end.  Opening the "TRNC" 
border and allowing Greek Cypriots to travel to Turkey, 
though laudable, do not signal a sea-change in Turkey's 
approach to Cyprus.  In fact, the rigidity of the TGS and MFA 
approach to Cyprus policy is a manifestation of a wider, 
systemic problem of State Establishment (vice civilian 
government) dominance of government policymaking, and of the 
alignment of political players in Turkey's rough-and-tumble 
domestic political theater.  Those without strong emotional, 
political, or pecuniary ties to Denktas and the current 
GOT-"TRNC" machinery, e.g., Erdogan and Gul, have 
demonstrated that they want to make a breakthrough.  At the 
same time, those who rigidly adhere to traditional Turkish 
State policy -- and those who recognize the tactical problems 
associated with appearing opposed to change but continue 
nevertheless to hew to the Establishment line -- have the 
upper hand, discouraging the kind of comprehensive 
risk-taking that might pave the way for a solution on Cyprus. 
 Consequently, Turkish flexibility on Cyprus may only be 
possible as an outcome of AK's ongoing effort to crack the 
Establishment's policymaking dominance. 
PEARSON