US embassy cable - 03ANKARA3410

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 003410 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, TU 
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION FROM TURKEY'S NSC SHARPENS CONFLICT 
OVER EU-RELATED REFORM 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 2909 
     B. ANKARA 2998 
     C. ANKARA 1624 
     D. ANKARA 1636 
     E. ANKARA 1303 
     F. ANKARA 1423 
     G. ANKARA 728 
     H. 02 ANKARA 8564 
     I. ANKARA 2521 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador W.R. Pearson; reasons 1.5 (b and 
d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: GOT leaders continue to support passage of a 
series of reform packages to harmonize Turkey's practices 
with EU membership criteria.  TGS chief Ozkok and his deputy 
Buyukanit also formally support Turkey's EU candidacy.  At 
the same time the military-dominated National Security 
Council (NSC) is striving to dilute the GOT's latest 
EU-related reform package, which the NSC asserts could 
undermine security.  The debate reflects the larger struggle 
between the generally pro-reform elected civilian leadership, 
and retrograde elements of the military and bureaucracy who 
see human rights reform and EU membership as a threat to the 
unity and "secular" nature of the State -- and above all to 
their dominance over the Turkish State system.  As the 
conflict sharpens, even our most cautious contacts are 
beginning to openly discuss the sensitive issue of internal 
resistance to reform.  The ruling AK party's handling of this 
conflict will determine whether the GOT can satisfy Turkey 
skeptics in the EU who question its ability to implement the 
legislative reforms required for EU membership.  End summary. 
 
 
--------------------------- 
NSC-GOT Tangle Over Package 
--------------------------- 
 
 
2. (C) Public debate about the GOT's latest EU-related draft 
reform package (reftel A) has intensified with press reports 
of efforts by four-star NSC Secretary General Kilinc to have 
key elements of the package withdrawn or revised.  Kilinc 
reportedly sent a letter to GOT officials objecting to 
proposed reforms that would: 1) abolish Article 8 of the 
Anti-Terror Law; 2) allow foreign observers during Turkish 
elections; and 3) allow Kurdish-language broadcasting on 
private TV and radio stations.  Justice Minister Cicek and 
ruling AK Party deputy chairman for policy Firat took the 
rare step of publicly criticizing a senior military figure 
and lambasted Kilinc; Cicek rejected Kilinc's argument that 
the reforms would threaten security, while Firat asserted 
that Kilinc "has no authority" to issue such warnings.  The 
owner-CEO of a major media conglomerate put it more bluntly 
in a private meeting with us: Kilinc, he observed, is 
mounting an all-out effort to sabotage the package and the 
wider reform effort, which most of the Turkish General Staff 
(TGS) fears will eventually end its dominance over the 
Turkish State and society.  In a May 21 meeting with 
Ambassador, Cicek said the GOT would continue to support 
Kurdish language reforms.  Differences over the package will 
likely be debated at the May 28 NSC meeting before the 
legislation is introduced in Parliament. 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Package Dispute Part of Larger Conflict 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 
3. (C) The dispute over the new package reflects a broader 
GOT conflict (ref A) between supporters and opponents of 
human rights reform and EU membership.  EU membership has 
long been championed by pro-reform diplomats serving in the 
MFA Human Rights and EU departments as well as in the EU 
Secretariat, a separate GOT agency established to support the 
 
SIPDIS 
EU membership drive.  Our contacts in these offices say they 
have prepared extensive reform legislation designed to meet 
all EU membership criteria.  They say they pull together 
elements of these drafts to create reform packages when they 
sense the political will to adopt certain reforms.  The 
reform process got a boost when AK came to power in the 
November 2002 elections and focused on EU membership as its 
immediate priority.  Asligul Ugdul, EU Secretariat director 
for political affairs, told us the two reform packages 
adopted by Parliament in January comprised measures the 
previous GOT was not willing to support.  At that time, Ugdul 
and other EU-membership advocates were optimistic, figuring 
AK would use its parliamentary majority to quickly advance 
reform. 
 
 
4. (C) In the face of support for EU-related reforms by AK's 
leaders, and the formal support for EU candidacy by TGS chief 
Ozkok and his deputy Buyukanit (whom we expect to deliver a 
pro-EU membership speech at a TGS-sponsored globalization 
conference the week of May 26 in Istanbul) hard-line elements 
in the military, judiciary, and offices dealing with 
religion, broadcasting, and education continue to try to 
undermine the content and implementation of reform packages. 
At the same time, opponents of EU-related reforms generally 
keep a low profile, unwilling to openly oppose changes that 
are overwhelmingly backed by the public.  As a staff advisor 
to the parliamentary Human Rights Committee put it to us, 
"When your enemy faces you, you can fight him, but it's 
difficult to fight an enemy that pretends to be on your 
side." 
 
 
5. (C) Ersonmez Yarbay, an AK Party and Human Rights 
Committee member, told us reform opponents are forced for 
tactical reasons to feign rhetorical support for EU 
membership because they have no foreign policy alternative to 
put forward; Turkey is not economically strong enough to 
stand on its own, and Turkey's southern and eastern neighbors 
present no viable alternative to the EU.  Yarbay said many 
reform opponents genuinely fear that fully meeting EU 
membership criteria, particularly in areas such as religious 
freedom and Kurdish cultural rights, will threaten the 
foundations of the "secular", centralized Turkish State -- 
and the stature of the institutions to which the reform 
opponents belong.  Their strategy for the time being, he 
said, is to buy time by insisting that the EU must accept 
Turkey under special conditions, owing to Turkey's unique 
geography and history.  Yarbay fears this "haggling" will 
cause Turkey to miss the EU train.  If the GOT allows the 
hard-liners to dictate its EU membership strategy, it will 
repeat the mistake it made when it voted down the resolution 
to allow U.S. troops to transit Turkey into northern Iraq, he 
said. 
 
 
6. (C) Indeed, frustration over reform resistance has reached 
the point where even our normally hyper-cautious MFA contacts 
are beginning to discuss it openly -- MFA DDG for EU Affairs 
Selim Yenel recently conceded that the Turkish bureaucracy 
was one of the biggest obstacles to EU membership. 
 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Military, Kemalist Bureaucrats Fear Reform 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 
7. (C) And exactly who are the opponents of reform?  MPs, 
human rights advocates across the spectrum, and the press 
point to elements of the military as a major source of 
opposition.  Our contacts attribute opposition among some 
military officers to fear that EU membership criteria require 
Turkey to reduce the military's political influence.  Our 
contacts also blame Kemalists who hold key offices in the 
bureaucracy, many of whom were appointed by the Nationalist 
Movement Party (MHP) when it was in government.  Key among 
these are public prosecutors, who, in the Turkish system, 
have broad powers to indict "suspicious" individuals or 
groups based on anything they deem "evidence."  Some 
observers, like Human Rights Foundation President Yavuz Onen, 
think AK itself is divided.  Onen told us he believes the 
more Islamist wing of AK opposes reforms related to Kurdish 
identity because it fears the rise of Kurdish politics as a 
threat to Islamist politics. (Note: AK's ethnically Kurdish 
Islamists as a rule are strong supporters of radical 
pro-Kurdish reforms.  They, and the more Turkish nationalist 
elements in AK, agree that by undercutting the military's 
political power, the reform process is key to AK's survival 
as a party -- and perhaps in government as well.  End note.) 
Leading columnist and chief editor of center-left "Radikal" 
Ismet Berkan has also reported that P.M. Erdogan has issued 
instructions that the bureaucracy go slow on consideration of 
property claims from minority religions (i.e., Christian and 
Jewish foundations). 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Opponents Gnawing Away at EU Candidacy 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
7. (C) The fall-out from Kilinc's latest salvo, and other 
recent anti-reform steps enumerated below have undermined 
Turkey's image in EU capitals: 
 
 
-- an Ankara State Security Court prosecutor May 6 led police 
on another in a continuing series of fishing-expedition raids 
of the Human Rights Association's Ankara offices (reftel B); 
 
 
-- contacts and the press continue to report that parents who 
wish to give their children "unapproved" (i.e., Kurdish) 
names are being thwarted (the new package would remove the 
prohibition on such names); 
 
 
-- Turkey's highest court announced the closure of the 
pro-Kurdish HADEP party March 13, the same day a chief 
prosecutor opened a case to close a sister party, DEHAP 
(reftel C); 
 
 
-- Jandarma officials prevented lawyers and relatives from 
visiting jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan for 15 weeks 
ending in March (reftels D-E); 
 
 
-- prosecutors in October 2002 indicted five German 
pro-democracy foundations on spurious charges of separatism 
and espionage (reftel F), although the case was finally 
dismissed in March; 
 
 
-- although Parliament in August 2002 adopted legislative 
reforms allowing Kurdish language broadcasts and courses, the 
bureaucracy has drafted highly restrictive implementing 
regulations preventing establishment of any such courses or 
broadcasts (reftels G-H); 
 
 
-- the Turkish Establishment continues to promote 
inflexibility on Cyprus; 
 
 
-- the pro-military "Cumhuriyet" daily, well-connected to 
senior military, reported May 23 that TGS Chief Ozkok has 
endorsed Kilinc's views, implying that he did so to counter 
the increasingly intense public reporting and speculation on 
divisions within the military leadership (ref I); 
 
 
-- "Cumhuriyet" also highlighted the growing discomfort of 
younger officers with the AK Party and government -- a report 
likely to resonate with Turks, who are familiar with the role 
junior officers traditionally have played in prompting their 
superiors to actively oppose civilian governments they find 
troubling (ref I). 
 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
 
8. (C) As the government seeks to meet EU membership 
criteria, human rights reforms begin to cut closer to the 
foundations of the Kemalist State.  We are thus seeing 
heightened attempts to blunt and undermine reforms led by 
reactionaries in the armed forces, the bureaucracy and other 
bastions of Establishment propriety.  For Turkey's critics in 
the EU, failure by AK's leaders to gain control of the reform 
process will provide fresh evidence of the GOT's inability to 
fully implement the reforms necessary for EU membership. 
P.M. Erdogan, FonMin Gul and others in ruling AK party are 
mindful of this danger to Turkey's candidacy from continued 
Establishment resistance and appear committed to persevere in 
their reform efforts, but their task is a difficult, 
step-by-step one. 
PEARSON