US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU961

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000961 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, NP, Political Parties 
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  KING KEEPS PARTIES AT BAY 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 0942 
     B. KATHMANDU 0814 
     C. KATHMANDU 0684 
 
Classified By: CDA ROBERT K. BOGGS.   REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) His public and private statements of support for the 
principle of multiparty democracy notwithstanding, King 
Gyanendra continues to hold mainstream political parties at 
arm's length.  Contrary to recent widespread expectations, he 
has taken no visible steps to form an all-party government. 
Instead, Cabinet ministers have continued--presumably with 
royal sanction--to criticize the behavior and past 
performance of party leaders.  The political parties, 
meanwhile, remain unable to shape a persuasive argument for 
their inclusion in an interim Cabinet or a coordinated 
political platform, and their joint protests so far have 
attracted scant popular support.  Political and diplomatic 
contacts are uncertain why the King continues to resist 
making an overture to the parties.  Some sources suggest that 
Maoist insurgents may have told the Palace that they will 
break off dialogue if an all-party government is appointed. 
Alternatively, the King may believe that the ceasefire and an 
ongoing anti-corruption campaign (septel) are gaining him 
sufficient popular good will to put off dealing with the 
parties for the time being.  Long-standing mutual distrust 
between the parties and the Palace is undoubtedly a factor as 
well.  End summary. 
 
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PARTIES' PROLONGED "JOINT STIR" 
CAUSES LITTLE COMMOTION 
--------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) Five mainstream political parties continued their 
combined protest program, or "joint stir," for the third week 
(Ref B) to little apparent avail. (Note:  The parties have 
pledged to continue the protests until the Constitution is 
"reactivated" by the appointment of an all-party interim 
government with full executive authority.  End note.)  The 
demonstrations have remained largely peaceful, although 
police reportedly baton charged participants in a May 18 
protest in Kathmandu.  Although party officials routinely 
declare each daily program a grand success, so far the 
protests appear to have attracted little popular support or 
participation beyond professional party activists and members 
of affiliated student wings.  The Maoists have not taken part 
publicly in any of the daily demonstrations, and the Maoist 
student wing has been busy conducting its own independent 
protest campaign against private schools.  (Note:  No 
international schools have been targeted in this campaign. 
End note.)  Despite their consecutive protests, the parties, 
moreover, remain unable to articulate either a persuasive 
public argument for their inclusion in an interim Cabinet or 
a coordinated political platform. 
 
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NO TEA, NO SYMPATHY 
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3.  (C) The tepid turnout at their protest rallies is not the 
only disappointment for the parties, however.  The leaders of 
the largest political parties--as well as members of several 
diplomatic missions, including the generally well-informed 
Indians--were expecting, based on firm indications from 
well-placed Palace sources, King Gyanendra to take steps to 
form an all-party government in early May.  (Note:  Party 
leaders in both the Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist 
Leninist and the Nepali Congress have indicated to us that 
they were led to expect a similar development on at least two 
previous occasions in December and February.  End note.) 
Some of the leaders reportedly were told to expect an 
invitation to a Palace "tea party" o/a May 2 (the vernacular 
press was even reporting the invitations as faits accomplis) 
in which the King was supposed to ask them to form a new 
interim government.  Some party sources say that leaders of 
the two largest parties had already agreed among themselves, 
if asked, that UML Secretary Madhav Nepal would head the new 
government.  Instead of the anticipated invitations to tea 
and royal reconciliation, on May 2 the parties heard a 
televised address by Prime Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand 
that chastised them for their poor performance over the past 
twelve years of democracy.  The failure of the rumored 
rapprochement to materialize as expected has only increased 
the party leaders' mistrust of the Palace. 
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WHY KEEP THE PARTIES OUT? 
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4.  (C)  Given the several occasions that the Palace has been 
rumored to be on the brink of forming an all-party 
government, and given the likely political and diplomatic 
support for such a step, the question arises why nothing has 
happened. (Note:  The King so far has never granted the 
parties' long-standing request for a joint meeting.  The 
Prime Minister, on the other hand, continues to invite them 
to all-party meetings--most recently on May 23--which they 
consistently boycott in protest of the "unconstitutionality" 
of his government.  End note.)  Citing the King's frequent 
public statements of support for multi-party democracy and 
his desire to remain no more than a constitutional monarch, a 
UML source noted that there is no ostensible philosophical 
difference between the King and the parties on how the 
interim government should be constituted.  Moreover, being 
left out in the cold for more than seven months has 
transformed long-time rivals G.P. Koirala, head of the Nepali 
Congress, and Madhav Nepal, leader of the UML, into 
temporary, if unlikely, allies, thereby belying the King's 
original justification for bypassing the parties--their 
inability to agree on a single candidate. 
 
5.  (C)  One theory holds that the Maoists, whose strategy 
appears to hinge on keeping the parties and the Palace 
divided, may have secretly told the Palace that they will not 
negotiate with an all-party government.  In particular, the 
Maoists are widely believed to oppose a government led by the 
UML, which they consider a rival for leftist support.  Since 
the members of the current interim Cabinet were all 
hand-picked by the King and are widely assumed to work in 
close consultation with him, the Maoists may reason that 
negotiating with the current Cabinet is the closest they can 
get to negotiating directly with the King.  The Palace may be 
unwilling to jeopardize the little progress made to date 
toward dialogue with the insurgents by introducing a less 
predictable, less pliable, and more partisan Cabinet at 
mid-stream.  Both the Government of Nepal (GON) and the 
Maoists may have decided, some believe, that retaining the 
Chand Cabinet during the negotiations is the simplest 
alternative available, at least for the near term. 
 
6.  (C) Most political sources, however, believe the King has 
not brought the parties on board because he wants a more 
active role in governing.  Sources who knew the monarch as a 
businessman describe him as a "hands-on" manager, unlikely to 
be content with the detached role and circumscribed powers of 
his late brother.  These sources interpret several of the 
King's moves since October, including a royal ordinance 
limiting government oversight of the Palace budget; the 
appointment of Sharad Chandra Shah, a notorious anti-democrat 
from the autocratic Panchayat era as advisor to the PM; the 
PM's uncompromising, critical speech of May 2; and the recent 
anti-corruption drive (septel) as virtual "in-your-face" 
challenges to the parties, and thus evidence of this 
purported ambition. 
 
7.  (C) The King may also believe that he is better able to 
address the many challenges besetting Nepal than the feckless 
democratic leaders.  He could argue that he has been able to 
respond to the two most pressing public concerns--peace and 
corruption--by securing a ceasefire, resuming dialogue with 
the Maoists, and initiating an intensive anti-corruption 
campaign (septel).  In addition, the GON can point with pride 
to a number of reforms (many of which were initiated, 
however, under earlier democratic governments) that have 
earned it high praise--and increased levels of funding--from 
international financial institutions (Ref A).  Adding to his 
confidence may be the parties' failure so far to generate 
greater public support for their protests, contrasted with 
the relatively large (if equally stage-managed) reception to 
his own public appearances (Ref C). 
 
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COMMENT 
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8. (C) There are a number of plausible reasons why the King 
has not yet made an overture to include the parties. 
Possible Maoist objection to an all-party government, coupled 
with the precarious nature of the peace process, may be the 
most persuasive.  The absence of public indignation (and, in 
some quarters, the appearance of tacit support) at his 
actions since dismissing the Deuba government on October 4 
may also influence his thinking.  But the number of rumored 
false starts, in which the parties were apparently led to 
believe an all-party government was imminent, is disturbing 
and can only contribute to the atmosphere of debilitating 
mutual distrust.  Inserting himself so near the forefront of 
government operations also carries an implicit risk for the 
King, making him more visibly responsible for both its 
successes and failures.  Any lasting political resolution to 
the insurgency will, moreover, require the support of the 
political parties.  The King should enlist the support of all 
the legal and democratic forces--including the all-too-often 
difficult and intractable political parties--in the GON 
effort to craft a workable resolution to the conflict.  Some 
contacts tell us that the King is torn by conflicting advice 
within the Palace, but his current lack of initiative may 
prove to be a regrettable squandering of political 
opportunity. 
BOGGS