US embassy cable - 03SANAA1136

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

SANAA EAC MEETING MAY 18

Identifier: 03SANAA1136
Wikileaks: View 03SANAA1136 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Sanaa
Created: 2003-05-20 08:24:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: ASEC AMGT PREL PTER CASC YM EAC COUNTER TERRORISM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001136 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/IP, 
DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2013 
TAGS: ASEC, AMGT, PREL, PTER, CASC, YM, EAC, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING MAY 18 
 
REF: STATE 131676 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull, for Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (S/NF)  Summary:  The Ambassador convened an Emergency 
Action Committee (EAC) meeting on May 18 to assess Embassy 
security posture and threat information.  Drawing upon 
lessons learned in Riyadh and Casablanca, post is  expanding 
the ongoing security review, and is working closely with ROYG 
to correct deficiencies.  End summary. 
 
2.  (S/NF)   Key offices and personnel represented at the 
5/18 EAC meeting included: visiting CJTF HOA Commander - 
General Sattler, ADMIN, AMB, CONS, DCM, FPD, IRM, MSG, OMC, 
ORCA, PD, POL/ECON, RSO, and SOC YEMEN. 
 
3.  (S/NF)  ORCA reported no new threat information. 
 
4.  (S/NF)  RSO reported detection of possible new 
surveillance of Embassy personnel/property by Saudi plated 
vehicles.  This surveillance was detected by Embassy's 
Surveillance Detection Team and has been reported septel. 
 
--------------- 
Security Review 
--------------- 
 
5.  (S/NF)  Ambassador briefed on recent high-level security 
contacts with ROYG.  In response to events in the region, 
post and ROYG have launched a comprehensive review of the 
security posture in Yemen.  On 5/18, Ambassador met with 
Minister of Interior Alimi to discuss lessons learned from 
the attacks in Riyadh and Casablanca.  Alimi confirmed that 
ROYG, like the USG, is taking the initiative and performing a 
security review using information gleaned from recent 
attacks.  He also advised that the Embassy should see 
security enhancements shortly. 
 
6.  (S/NF)  Post has taken the following actions to ensure 
the security readiness of the Embassy community: 
 
-- Post held a Warden meeting on 5/19 to discuss increased 
awareness and the importance of becoming a hard target -- 
varying routes and times, checking your vehicle for foreign 
objects, and reporting suspicious activity to the appropriate 
authorities. 
 
-- On May 19 DCM and RSO completed a walk-through of Hadda 
compound, home to a number of permanent employees, to assess 
the security posture.  They met with security officials of 
both Yemen Hunt Oil and Canadian Nexxen, and discussed 
numerous new measures to ensure that Hadda cannot be 
successfully targeted using techniques employed in the Riyadh 
attacks. 
 
-- DCM visited the Sanaa International School (SIS) on 5/15 
to discuss the attacks in Riyadh and the security 
implications for SIS.  SIS will meet with ROYG officials to 
discuss their security posture, and, if necessary, contact 
the Embassy for additional assistance/expertise. 
 
-- On 5/15 RSO and ROYG officials completed a walk-through of 
the Sheraton Hotel complex to assess security.  ROYG assigned 
additional assets the next day (5/16). 
 
-- Post responded (septel) to DS's request for information on 
the condition and effectiveness of barriers, and expects a DS 
team in the near future to make the requisite repairs and 
alterations. 
 
7.  (S/NF)  Post will take the following measures to continue 
our security review of both hard and soft targets: 
 
-- DCM and RSO will inspect security arrangements at the 
Tourist City compound, home to both permanent and TDY 
personnel, on May 20. 
 
-- RSO will continue to work with ROYG to maintain an 
appropriate security posture at the Hadda and Tourist City 
compounds, the Sheraton Hotel, and the Sanaa International 
School (SIS). 
-- RSO will investigate and correct reports of deficiencies 
in security procedures on the compounds, at the Sheraton, and 
at SIS as they occur. 
 
-- Post will work with our neighbors on the Hadda compound, 
particularly Hunt Oil, to ensure that recommended security 
upgrades are implemented. 
 
-- Post will request additional ROYG security forces at choke 
points on well-known routes to and from the embassy. 
 
-- Post will request the periodic positioning of ROYG 
roadblocks on the approaches to the Hadda compound and other 
Embassy residences to introduce another layer of deterrence. 
 
-- Ambassador will join ROYG security officials later this 
week for a walk-through of the Sheraton Hotel, home to many 
Embassy TDYers, to assess the security situation. 
 
-- RSO will interview all domestics working for the Embassy 
community and request police and medical checks.  Upon the 
successful completion of this process, post will issue 
appropriate Embassy documentation to approved domestic 
employees. 
 
 
HULL 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04