US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU902

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000902 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2013 
TAGS: MOPS, PTER, PGOV, NP, Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: NEPALI ARMY REJECTS 5KM RESTRICTION DEMANDED BY 
MAOISTS 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 0860 
 
Classified By: CDA ROBERT K. BOGGS.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
---------------------------------------- 
ARMY SAYS IT IS NOT RESTRICTING MOVEMENT 
----------------------------------------- 
 
1.  (U) On May 14 Col. Deepak Gurung, spokesman for the Royal 
Nepal Army (RNA), publicly denied that the Government of 
Nepal (GON) had agreed to confine soldiers to a 5-km radius 
of their barracks, as reported by Maoist negotiators, the 
press, and other sources close to the negotiations (Reftel). 
Gurung said that the RNA had received no written order from 
the Ministry of Defense notifying it of any restriction of 
movement.  Maoist negotiator and spokesman Krishna Bahadur 
Mahara, speaking at a joint press conference, with GON 
negotiator Minister Narayan Singh Pun at his side, had 
announced the purported agreement immediately after the 
second round of talks on May 9.  Pun did not dispute Mahara's 
characterization at the time, adding only that the agreement 
would take time to implement. 
 
--------------------- 
GON "BACK-PEDALING"? 
--------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Almost immediately after the announcement--and the 
RNA's understandable dismay at it--the GON began frantic 
efforts to walk back the commitment apparently made by its 
negotiators.  The British Ambassador, who met with Prime 
Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand on May 12, told the Charge 
that the GON and the Palace were "back-pedaling," attempting 
to cast the reported restriction as a suggestion proposed for 
consideration.  Later that same evening, RNA Adjutant Maj. 
Gen. Dilip Karki told the Charge in private that the RNA 
would not tolerate limitation upon its freedom of movement. 
As the legitimate national army, Karki said, it is imperative 
that the RNA have access to all parts of the country.  Other 
officers pointed out that the 5km restriction would prevent 
the army from patrolling large stretches of the border, 
national parks, and performing other functions essential to 
its mandate. 
 
3.  (C)  The limitation would also hinder the RNA from 
carrying out a variety of civil affairs programs, including 
mobile medical clinics, that have reportedly increased their 
popularity and visibility in remote areas (septel).  In many 
of these areas, long deserted by other representatives of 
government authority intimidated by the Maoists, the RNA may 
provide the only contact members of the local population have 
with the government. Karki hypothesized that the Maoists' 
demand was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to 
obstruct these successful hearts-and-minds programs. 
 
4.  (SBU)  Only after the RNA spokesman went public with the 
Army's dissatisfaction did the GON begin to issue 
semi-official disclaimers.  On May 15 the press quoted 
unidentified GON and RNA sources characterizing the 
restriction as no more than a "proposal" tabled during the 
second round.  The Defense Ministry spokesman told us 
privately that the GON was in "confusion" over the issue and 
confirmed that his ministry had received no instructions, 
either written or verbal, limiting RNA movements.  At COB on 
May 15 the Maoists were reportedly holding a closed-door 
meeting at their newly established party headquarters in 
Kathmandu.  We imagine that the RNA's hard line--and the 
GON's apparent retraction--figure prominently in the 
discussions. 
 
-------- 
COMMENT 
-------- 
 
5.  (C)  The GON's five-day silence on this sensitive subject 
suggests to us that its negotiators did agree to the 
restriction, viewing it as a significant compromise from the 
Maoists' original insistence that the military not move out 
of barracks at all. The "confusion" over the issue, as the 
Defense Ministry spokesman put it, may be symptomatic of poor 
coordination between the Palace and GON negotiators and an 
overall lack of negotiating expertise.  While the Maoists are 
likely to cast this disagreement as an example of the GON's 
"bad faith" or lack of seriousness, we do not believe that 
this dispute will cause a serious rupture that could 
jeopardize the peace process. 
BOGGS