US embassy cable - 03SANAA1088

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SANAA EAC MEETING MAY 13

Identifier: 03SANAA1088
Wikileaks: View 03SANAA1088 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Sanaa
Created: 2003-05-13 13:23:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: ASEC CASC PTER YM EAC COUNTER TERRORISM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SANAA 001088 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS, 
DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2013 
TAGS: ASEC, CASC, PTER, YM, EAC, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING MAY 13 
 
REF: A) SECSTATE 12430 B) SANAA 963 C) SANAA 1071 D) 
 
     SANAA 1072 E) SANAA 1080 
 
Classified By: Ambassador E.J. Hull. Reasons: 1.5 (B) and (D). 
 
 1. (S/NF)  The Ambassador convened an Emergency Action 
Committee (EAC) meeting on May 13  to assess the threat of a 
"copy cat" attack similar to Riyadh, to determine the best 
approach to ROYG officials regarding the events in Riyadh and 
to evaluate Embassy security preparedness.  Key offices and 
personnel represented at the meeting included: AMB, DCM, 
ADMIN, CONS, DAO, FPD, OMC, ORCA, PD, POL/ECON, RSO and SOC 
YEMEN. 
 
2. (S/NF) DCM briefed on the events in Riyadh, reviewing the 
methodology of the attack in Riyadh and the need for Embassy 
community to be aware of potential "copycat attacks." As of 
this morning, the attacks on the compounds were believed to 
be conducted by two cars, a lead car that was used to take 
out the guards, and a second car containing explosives. DCM 
stressed that this latest modus oparandi should be understood 
and incorporated into our security posture. 
 
3. (S/NF) After receiving notification of the Riyadh attacks 
just before 3 am local time, RSO notified Embassy Security, 
the Sheraton Hotel, Tourist City and Haddah compound security 
contacts and asked them all to increase security.  RSO 
briefed that some believe that the Riyadh operation may have 
been in connection with a possible hostage-taking attempt and 
noted one uncorroborated report (Ref B) of a potential for 
hostage taking in Sanaa. Per Reftels C, D, E, the RSO also 
stated that he is investigating a possible case of 
surveillance by individuals in a Saudi-plated car currently 
under investigation.  In another case, an NGO representative 
called the RSO to report a rumor that the ROYG had 
intercepted a pick up truck with UAE plates containing 
explosives. 
 
4. (S/NF) ORCA reported no new threat information concerning 
Yemen. 
 
5. (S/NF) The EAC discussed how to share information about 
this attack with ROYG officials.  The RSO will brief his MOI 
and PSO contacts with details of the attack methodology (when 
known) and raise the rumor about the UAE truck. SOC Yemen 
will discuss the same issues with CSO. 
 
6. (S/NF) DCM reviewed the Embassy security posture and the 
EAC agreed that an Admin notice should be sent to encourage 
the Embassy community to maintain vigilant security 
procedures.  Ambassador asked Consul to schedule a Warden 
meeting for this week.  DCM raised the question of whether 
the Embassy community should return to "Move Safe Lite," in 
which Embassy officials are encouraged among other measures, 
to use armored shuttles and limit non-essential movement. 
EAC agreed that absent specific threats, Admin should make 
the shuttles available for those who wish, but it was not 
necessary to return to Move Safe Lite. EAC also reviewed 
present travel procedures, both for TDYers arriving in Yemen 
and within country travel, and agreed that while the 
community is still under Authorized Departure, no change was 
needed for TDYers.  In country travel procedures will 
continue to be reviewed by the RSO and coordinated with local 
government officials. 
HULL 

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