US embassy cable - 95RIYADH5221

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

SAUDI ARABIA: WHAT IF THE KING REMAINS INCAPICITATED?

Identifier: 95RIYADH5221
Wikileaks: View 95RIYADH5221 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Riyadh
Created: 1995-11-30 13:12:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PINS SA
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
O 301312Z NOV 95
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2174
INFO DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
DA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CHUSMTM DHAHRAN SA IMMEDIATE
CHUSMTM RIYADH SA IMMEDIATE
CJTF-SWA RIYADH SA IMMEDIATE
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCCC// IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 
GCC COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 005221 
 
 
LONDON FOR TUELLER 
PARIS FOR ALLEGRONE 
 
 
E.O.12356: DECL:  11/30/15 
TAGS:  PGOV, PINS, SA 
SUBJECT:  SAUDI ARABIA:  WHAT IF THE KING REMAINS 
          INCAPICITATED? 
 
REF:  (A) RIYADH 5218; (B) RIYADH 5219 
 
1.  CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.  CLASSIFIED BY DCM 
THEODORE KATTOUF - 1.5 B,D. 
 
2.  (C) THE CURRENT MEDICAL PROGNOSIS FOR KING FAHD, 
ALBEIT INCOMPLETE AND TENTATIVE, SUGGESTS THE 
POSSIBILITY OF MEDIUM-TERM OR EVEN PROLONGED RECOVERY 
FROM WHAT IS DESCRIBED DEFINITIVELY BY OUR MEDICAL 
SOURCES AS A STROKE.  AT THIS STAGE, WITHIN HOURS OF 
FAHD ENTERING THE HOSPITAL, THE KING'S CONDITION DOES 
NOT REPEAT NOT APPEAR IMMEDIATELY LIFE-THREATENING 
(ALTHOUGH IT COULD LATER MOVE IN THAT DIRECTION). 
INDEED, OUR RMO ALSO NOTES THAT RAPID AND FULL RECOVERY, 
EVEN WITHIN A DAY OR TWO, IS ALSO ENTIRELY POSSIBLE. THE 
KING'S PERSONAL SECRETARY STRONGLY IMPLIED IN A CALL TO 
THE AMBASSADOR THAT SUCH AN UPBEAT PROGNOSIS IS 
WARRANTED (SEE REF B). 
 
3.  (C) ASSUMING, HOWEVER, THAT SOME DEGREE OF 
INCAPACITATION PERSISTS, PERHAPS OVER A PERIOD OF WEEKS, 
THE ISSUE OF ITS IMPACT ON DECISION-MAKING AND ON 
INTERNAL DYNAMICS WITHIN THE AL SAUD MUST BE FACED. 
 
4.  (C) ASSUMING THAT FAHD DOES NOT SHOW IMMEDIATE SIGNS 
OF FULL RECOVERY WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS, THE 
COUNCIL OF ELDERS, CONSISTING OF THE MEMBERS OF THE AL 
SAUD AND MOSTLY OF THE SENIOR SURVIVING SONS OF ABDUL 
AZIZ, WILL LIKELY GATHER INFORMALLY AND QUIETLY TO 
ASSESS THE KING'S CONDITION.  THEY WILL BE MOTIVATED TO 
PROJECT AN AURA OF STABILITY, CONTINUITY, FAMILY UNITY, 
AND CONTINUED LOYALTY TO KING FAHD.  ALMOST CERTAINLY, 
THE IMMEDIATE CONSENSUS WILL BE THAT CROWN PRINCE 
ABDULLAH SHOULD BE ASKED TO ACT IN THE NAME OF THE 
KING.  SENIOR ULEMA, THE OTHER PILLAR OF THE SAUDI 
REGIME, ARE LIKELY TO TACITLY AGREE.  THE COUNCIL OF 
MINISTERS, COMPOSED PARTLY OF NONROYALS, WILL NOT PLAY A 
ROLE IN ANY DECISION THAT IS REACHED. 
 
5.  (C) OUTSIDE THE FAMILY CONSULTATIONS, THE SAG IS 
LIKELY TO KEEP MEDIA REPORTS AND SPECULATION ABOUT THE 
KING'S HEALTH TO A MINIMUM.  POSITIVE BULLETINS ARE 
LIKELY TO BE STANDARD FARE.  WE CAN ALSO EXPECT EVEN 
MORE STEPPED-UP SECURITY PRECAUTIONS AT PUBLIC BUILDINGS 
AND IN THE COUNTRY GENERALLY, IN A BID TO MINIMIZE 
CHANCES OF A SECOND TERRORIST ATTACK OR OTHER POLITICAL 
VIOLENCE IN A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY. 
 
6.  (C) OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS AND WEEKS, ASSUMING 
FAHD'S CONDITION REMAINS STABLE, ABDULLAH IS UNLIKELY TO 
BE DESIGNATED AS REGENT, IF ONLY BECAUSE THE ONLY 
PRECEDENT FOR THE NEW SITUATION IS THE FAMILY'S DECISION 
TO TRANSFER KING SAUD'S POWERS TO CP FAYSAL AS REGENT IN 
1964.  THE CRUCIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO SITUATIONS 
IS THAT SAUD WAS REMOVED BECAUSE OF INCOMPETENCE AND NOT 
FOR REASONS OF PHYSICAL INCAPACITY.  CROWN PRINCE 
ABDULLAH REGULARLY CHAIRS THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND 
HAS LONG BEEN PROJECTED TO THE NATION, AND TREATED, AS 
THE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED NO. TWO BEHIND THE KING.  WE 
HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT HE WOULD NOT EFFECTIVELY 
STEP FORWARD, WITH FULL FAMILY BACKING, AT THIS TIME. 
 
7.  (C) ADDING TO THE INNATE CONSERVATISM OF THE AL SAUD 
AND THE FAMILY'S LONG TRADITION OF MAINTAINING COHESION 
AND SOLIDARITY WILL BE CONCERN WITH TH SECURITY 
ENVIRONMENT FOLLOWING THE NOVEMBER 13 OMBING ATTACK ON 
OPM/SANG.  BECAUSE THIS HAS BEEN WIDELY VIEWED AS AN 
ATTACK ON THE REGIME AS MUCH AS ON THE U.S., THE SENIOR 
PRINCES WILL BE FURTHER ENCOURAGED TO AVOID ANY 
APPEARANCE OF DISUNITY BY DEVIATING FROM THE ESTABLISHED 
LINE OF AUTHORITY OR SUCCESSION. 
 
8.  (C) IN SUM, IN THE SHORT TERM (DEFINED AS OVER THE 
NEXT 30 OR SO DAYS), WE ANTICIPATE A SMOOTH AND PEACEFUL 
EMPHASIS ON MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO. 
DECISION-MAKING, NEVER A RAPID PROCESS IN SAUDI ARABIA, 
MAY SLOW DOWN CONSIDERABLY, ESPECIALLY AS ABDULLAH WILL 
CAREFULLY AVOID ANY SIGN OF PRESUMING FAHD'S PERMANENT 
REMOVAL FROM OFFICE OR BY INAPPROPRIATELY ACTING AS IF 
HE WERE KING. 
 
9.  (C) LOOKING AHEAD FURTHER THAN A MONTH, THE KING'S 
ACTUAL MEDICAL CONDITION WILL DETERMINE WHAT DECISIONS 
THE COUNCIL OF ELDERS WILL TAKE.  A PROGNOSIS OF A SLOW 
BUT SURE RECOVERY OF FAHD'S FACULTIES WILL UNDOUBTEDLY 
LEAD THE ELDERS TO CONCUR IN THE NEW STATUS QUO.  A 
PROGNOSIS OF PROLONGED OR PERMANENT INCAPACITATION WOULD 
FORCE THE COUNCIL, I.E. THE AL SAUD, TO THEN ADDRESS THE 
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE OF ACTUAL SUCCESSION.  AT THIS 
JUNCTURE, WE HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE PRIME OBJECTIVE 
AGAIN WILL BE TO PROJECT AN IMAGE OF CONTROL, STABILITY, 
AND CONTINUITY. 
 
10.  (C) SHOULD FAHD'S MEDICAL CONDITION DETERIORATE AND 
HE DIE, THE INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM OUTLINED ABOVE WOULD 
ALSO COME INTO PLAY.  UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THE ROLE 
OF THE ULEMA MIGHT BE MORE VISIBLY ENHANCED AS THE NEW 
KING - CP ABDULLAH RAISED TO THE THRONE - WOULD REQUIRE 
THEIR FORMAL SANCTION.  IN A SENSE, THE KING'S DEATH, 
WHILE PRECIPITATING COMPLEX SCENARIOS OF POWER TRANSFER 
TO CP ABDULLAH AND SPECULATION ABOUT WHO WILL FOLLOW 
ABDULLAH, WOULD BE SIMPLER, IF ONLY BECAUSE THE CURRENT 
LINE OF SUCCESSION IS SO WELL ESTABLISHED.  WE SEE 
LITTLE CHANCE THAT THE CP COULD OR WOULD BE PUSHED 
ASIDE; NOR, IN FACT, DO WE BELIEVE THAT MINDEF SULTAN, 
CURRENTLY THIRD IN LINE TO THE THRONE, WOULD MAKE SUCH A 
PLAY.  EVEN LESS LIKELY WOULD BE AN ATTEMPT BY ANOTHER 
PRINCE - WHETHER ANOTHER SON OF ABDUL AZIZ OR A GRANDSON 
- TO SECURE POWER. 
 
MABUS 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04