US embassy cable - 03ABUJA860

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000860 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR JFRASER 
CAIRO FOR MAXSTADT 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, PINR, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: OBASANJO'S MANDATE - HOW HE WON IT; 
WHAT HE MUST DO NOW. 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter.  Reason: 
1.5(d). 
 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: According to the Independent National 
Electoral Commission, President Obasanjo won the 
election with 62 percent of the vote, with the ANPP's 
Muhammadu Buhari trailing in the distance at 32 
percent.  Despite his first Administration not living 
up to popular expectations, most Nigerians accept that 
Obasanjo won the Presidency outright.  However, they 
believe the margin of victory was less.  In addition 
to the dispute over Obasanjo's margin of victory, the 
actual outcomes of many gubernatorial and National 
Assembly contests are controversial and in dispute. 
Consequently, many Nigerians are discontented with the 
overall results of the recent elections. 
 
 
2. (C) The official results give the PDP eighty 
percent of the gubernatorial seats as well as "super- 
majorities" in the National Assembly (House of 
Representatives and Senate) and most State Assemblies. 
On paper, the PDP looks like a leviathan "mega-party"; 
however, many Nigerians see a much more divided 
political organization and movement.  While the 
Obasanjo/PDP mandate looks both fat and firm, in 
reality it is leaner and less sturdy.  Obasanjo should 
reach out to the opposition to lower political 
tension, and, in the process, enhance his ability to 
govern.  END SUMMARY 
 
 
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MISGIVINGS OVER OBASANJO'S MANDATE 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
3. (U) Obasanjo won the election with 62 percent of 
the national vote compared to Buhari's 32 percent. 
Obasanjo also received the minimum 25 percent of votes 
cast in 32 states, surpassing the eligibility 
requirements of one-quarter of the votes in two-thirds 
of Nigeria's 36 states and the Federal Capital 
Territory.  These are the official results. 
 
 
4. (C) Buhari die-hards and some other opposition 
figures aside, most Nigerians concede victory to 
Obasanjo.  However, they question Obasanjo's margin of 
victory and the strong mandate it implies.  They fear 
that Obasanjo will act more imperially than before if 
he deceives himself into believing that these skewed 
figures reflect his popular approval.  At the very 
least, the 30 point differential between Obasanjo and 
Buhari is inflated.  Our calculations point to 
Obasanjo winning in a closer race. 
 
 
5. (C) The discrepancy between the official and actual 
results and how that shapes the Presidential mandate 
is worrisome enough by itself.  However, there 
actually is more controversy over some of the 
gubernatorial and National Assembly contests.  This 
controversy only compounds the turbid atmosphere. 
Unlike the Presidential election where most people 
assumed Obasanjo would win, there are dozens of 
contests where the focus is not on the margin of 
victory; the actual outcomes are disputed and 
disbelieved by much of the electorate.  There are many 
"official" winners who lost the actual vote.  Because 
most of these ersatz victors are PDP members, there is 
a spill-over onto the Presidential contest.  Anger 
over the legislative and gubernatorial elections has 
negatively affected public perception of the 
President.  To a certain degree, discontent over these 
lesser elections has merged with the suspicion over 
the President's margin of victory; this has served to 
cast a glare on Obasanjo who, to a large degree, has 
become the ex-officio lightning rod for criticism of 
all alleged PDP electoral chicanery. 
 
 
6. (C) Some observers fret that these elections have 
put Nigeria on a road to the establishment of a one- 
party state, with all of the possible anti-democratic 
consequences such a development could entail. 
Moreover, many people are irate because they sense 
that PDP majorities in the national and state 
legislatures and the PDP's hold on most state houses 
would have been weakened, perhaps significantly, if 
the vote had been properly tallied.  Their concerns 
cannot be dismissed summarily.  Despite a pallid 
performance at all levels of government over the past 
four years, this election has turned the PDP into a 
behemoth.  It is a "mega-party"; the largest single 
party in Africa.  The PDP has 28 of 36 governorships, 
a super-majority in the National Assembly, and super- 
majorities in most State Assemblies.  If party loyalty 
is maintained, there are few laws or constitutional 
amendments the PDP cannot pass.  This concentration of 
political power frightens some Nigerians.  (Comment: 
Already some alarmist opposition politicians are 
contending that returning PDP governors will seek to 
remove the two-term limit from the constitution. 
Given the PDP track record over the past four years, 
maintenance of strict party loyalty will give way to 
internecine fractions and rivalries.  This 
factionalization would impede attempts to establish 
the PDP as a super-party or to amend the constitution. 
End Comment) 
 
 
7. (C) On paper, Obasanjo and the PDP have strong, 
definitive mandates.  In reality, the election 
outcomes were probably much closer and results more 
ambiguous as to which party or parties appealed to the 
general public.  Minus electoral irregularities, the 
number of PDP victors would be fewer and the PDP's 
overall mandate less resounding.  If Obasanjo and the 
PDP think the INEC results genuinely reflect the 
popular will and that the party by itself represents a 
national political consensus, they could act 
arrogantly, and perhaps even capriciously, toward the 
opposition.  Cross-carpet dialogue could be minimized 
as the PDP uses its substantial majorities to govern 
as it pleases with little consultation or regard for 
the positions of other parties.  Discontent could 
mount and the art of governance would become more 
complicated over time, with a frustrated opposition 
seeking to undermine government, question authority, 
and even foment trouble by inciting ethnic, religious 
or other animosities.  However, if the PDP recognizes 
that some of its gains were purloined, it may be more 
willing to reach out and find ways to invite 
opposition participation in governance.  This would 
reduce friction and be a positive step toward creating 
a genuine political consensus.  In short, there is a 
need for some post-electoral adjustments that better 
reflect political reality.  This may weaken the PDP 
paper mandate but, in making that mandate more 
genuine, it also would make it stronger. 
 
 
-------------------------- 
OBANSANJO - WHY HE WON 
-------------------------- 
 
 
8. (C) Despite his failings, Obasanjo remained the 
only candidate with national reach, recognition, and 
appeal.  Although he was weak in many parts of the 
North, Obasanjo still had some support there, even in 
the core Northwest.  Conversely, Buhari's perceived 
regional chauvinism, religious extremism, and record 
as a merciless Head of State frightened people, 
particularly in many areas of the South.  Despite the 
fact that Buhari was running as a challenger, his 
negatives were stronger than those of Obasanjo. 
Buhari's appeals to religion as an instrument to 
attract support frightened many voters, Christians and 
Muslims alike.  Buhari's running mate, Chuba Okadigbo, 
once expelled from the Senate over allegations of 
corruption, brought nothing to the ticket, and may 
have even diminished Buhari's image.  The fractious 
ANPP party convention severely weakened the party's 
image, and projected an image of ANPP disunity and 
serious questions about Buhari's democratic 
credentials.  By contrast, the PDP's well organized 
and orderly convention projected an image, however 
contrived, of near unity within that political 
movement. 
 
 
9. (C) While Obasanjo did not play well in parts of 
the North, Buhari did not place at all in many areas 
of the South.  The religious card and Buhari's 
opposition to the Niger Delta Development Corporation 
(NDDC) were factors in his lack of appeal.  Further, 
unlike 1999, either Obasanjo came home to the 
Southwest or the Southwest warmed to him.  In any 
event, the Yoruba's bloc went to Obasanjo, in a show 
of unambiguous support.  Meanwhile, none of the other 
16 presidential candidates had enough national 
presence to mount a challenge. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
HOW OBANSANJO WON - ORGANIZATION AND NUMBERS 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
 
10. (SBU) The PDP was well organized and present 
throughout the country.  Not only did the PDP control 
the Presidency, it also held a majority in both the 
House of Representatives and Senate and controlled 21 
state government houses.  Moreover, the PDP also 
controlled a majority of state legislatures.  This 
advantage allowed widespread dissemination of 
information and resources through these elected 
officials.  It also allowed the PDP to influence INEC 
in those jurisdictions under the party's control. 
 
 
11. (U) Obasanjo started campaigning much earlier and 
more intensely than his challengers.  He was well 
financed so his campaign had more staying power. 
Obasanjo made campaign stops in almost every state. 
He totally out-distanced his rivals, and in some 
instances, Obasanjo visited a state several times, 
particularly in the Southwest where he won 
overwhelmingly.  VP Atiku also campaigned actively in 
the Northeast, visiting most of the regional states 
several times. 
 
 
12. (U) Buhari did not start until March 8, after 
returning from the Hajj.  He fell ill shortly 
thereafter.  He launched his campaign in Port 
Harcourt, Rivers State; however, the ANPP's support 
remained based in the North, and Buhari covered that 
region well.  Buhari managed to make campaign stops in 
34 of Nigeria's 36 states in the run-up to the 
Presidential elections; however, his campaign was 
overly concentrated in the North, the area where he 
was already strong.  Thus, neither Buhari nor his team 
could come close to matching the geographic coverage 
Obasanjo and his campaign machinery achieved.  While 
Buhari's visits outside the North were relegated to 
rallies in major cities for the most part, Obasanjo 
would visit numerous places within a state and his 
organization would canvas door-to-door, not only in 
the cities but in towns and villages throughout the 
country. 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
HOW DID OBANSANJO WIN - PRESS COVERAGE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
13. (C) Obasanjo enjoyed an advantage with the press. 
Each of his campaign stops was extensively covered, 
while Buhari's efforts received far less exposure 
until the final two weeks of the campaign.  Buhari's 
first Port Harcourt rally was not immediately 
televised and the print media took days to publish 
articles covering it.  In contrast, Obasanjo's rallies 
were highly publicized, both by the print and 
electronic media.  Numbers were not always published 
except to say that the rally was widely attended. 
Movements were advertised well in advance and, in most 
instances, organized by the state governors as 
official functions.  Local PDP supporters were 
expected to fill the arenas and stadiums and many 
Local Government Chairmen were tasked with providing 
transportation and stipends for those attending.  The 
PDP was adept at generating crowds.  All political 
parties were required to get permits to hold rallies 
and pay a fee for the venue.  In some cases, permits 
for the ANPP were denied.  Most of Buhari's rallies 
were very well-attended by onlookers drawn by the 
chance to see the man; however, this did not 
necessarily translate into votes. 
 
 
----------------------------- 
HOW DID OBANSANJO WIN - MONEY 
----------------------------- 
 
 
14. (C) The ANPP had a much smaller war-chest than the 
PDP.  With only nine incumbent governors, the ANPP was 
not able to raise as much money from the states as 
their primary rival.  While commingling official state 
activities with campaign events was improper, this 
prohibition was not obeyed in practice.  The line 
between the use of the state apparatus for campaign 
purposes became a blur.  In addition, major 
contributors to the PDP included some of the biggest 
names in Nigerian business circles.  Aliko Dangote in 
the North, Emeka Offor in the Southeast, and Mike 
Adenuga in the Southwest were prime examples of 
prominent businessmen depositing big checks into 
Obasanjo's war chest.  Fund-raising dinners generated 
huge amounts of cash.  The Director-General of the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange formed a fund-raising 
committee for Obasanjo-Atiku which many thought was 
improper.  Without similar sponsorship, the ANPP was 
left depending on smaller contributions; it just could 
not mount the same intensive, well-financed campaign 
that the PDP was able to launch. 
 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
15. (C) Obasanjo has a mandate to lead the nation for 
four more years.  However, this mandate is not on the 
order of magnitude that the official election results 
would have us believe.  There is a danger that the 
ruling PDP, at all levels of government, will take the 
official results as a "super-mandate" and act in ways 
that do not take other politically relevant views and 
actors into consideration.  In 1999, Obasanjo brought 
opposition APP and AD figures into government even 
though he had a larger majority then than he has 
today.  Hopefully, Obasanjo will now feel as secure in 
victory that he again will reach out to key elements 
in the most important opposition parties, mainly the 
pragmatic elements of the ANPP and APGA.  If so, 
Obasanjo will calm the post-election waters and could 
actually buttress his mandate by lessening 
disappointment and anger over the electoral process. 
JETER