US embassy cable - 03COLOMBO780

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000780 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEW DELHI PLEASE PASS TO SA A/S ROCCA 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT 
 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  05-09-13 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, CE, NO, JA, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT:  In latest effort, Norwegian facilitators press 
case, but Tigers don't say yes to talks 
 
Refs:  Colombo 773, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of 
Mission.  Reasons 1.5 (b, d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Closely following up the visit of a 
senior Japanese envoy, Norwegian facilitator Erik 
Solheim met May 8 with Tiger leaders.  The meeting was 
cordial, but the Tigers did not confirm that they will 
come back to the peace talks or attend the June donors 
conference.  Norway's FM is expected to visit next week 
to press the case again.  While an impressive display of 
diplomatic activity, the tag team efforts of the GoN and 
the GoJ have not forced the Tigers to buckle yet.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (U) In the latest of the increasingly frenetic tag 
team efforts to engage the Tigers, Norwegian special 
envoy Erik Solheim met with senior Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leaders on May 8.  (Note:  Solheim's 
meeting closely follows that of Japanese envoy Yasushi 
Akashi, who met with LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran on May 7 
-- see Reftel.)  The meeting took place in the LTTE- 
controlled town of Kilinochchi in northern Sri Lanka. 
Present from the Tiger side were chief negotiator Anton 
Balasingham, Sea Tiger leader Soosai (one name only), 
and a number of other LTTE military leaders. 
 
3.  (C) Solheim's intervention did not break the 
deadlock over the peace process.  Tomas Stangeland, 
polchief of the Norwegian Embassy, attended the meeting 
and told us late May 8 that Solheim pressed the Tigers 
hard to return to the peace talks and attend the June 
donors conference in Tokyo.  The Tigers would not budge 
from their demand that the GSL had to earn LTTE trust by 
taking steps re delivery of humanitarian assistance and 
reducing military deployments in Jaffna District. 
 
4.  (C) Stangeland added that Solheim had pressed the 
Tigers hard on clear indications that LTTE operatives 
were engaged in a widespread campaign of assassination 
against Tamil opponents (see Reftels).  The Tigers 
denied the charge. 
 
5.  (C) Despite the brush off on substantive issues, 
Stangeland characterized the meeting as quite cordial. 
He thought that it was significant that Balasingham had 
brought Soosai, a well-known LTTE hard-liner, to the 
meeting.  (Note:  The Sea Tigers, the unit Soosai heads, 
has been involved in several violent confrontations with 
the Sri Lankan Navy in recent months.)  Stangeland 
thought this rare exposure of Soosai to international 
diplomacy might have a softening effect within LTTE 
inner circles in the long-term. 
 
6.  (U) Stangeland noted that Solheim had briefed Sri 
Lankan Prime Minister Wickremesinghe late May 8 about 
the meeting with the LTTE earlier in the day. 
In the meantime, the next step in engaging the Tigers 
seems to involve Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan 
Petersen, who is reportedly set to visit Sri Lanka next 
week.  (Note:  Petersen was to visit Sri Lanka earlier 
this year, but his visit had to be postponed because of 
the Iraq situation.)  Petersen will reportedly meet with 
the Tigers in Kilinochchi. 
 
7.  (C) COMMENT:  While an impressive display of 
diplomatic activity, the tag team efforts of the 
Norwegians and the Japanese have not forced the Tigers 
to buckle yet.  With the Japanese-mandated deadline 
(May 14) of one-week slipping away, a decision by the 
Tigers about the June donors conference in Tokyo must be 
made soon.  Our guess is that the inner circle of the 
Tigers will be huddling soon to discuss the group's 
future moves.  END COMMENT. 
 
8.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS