US embassy cable - 95STATE260249

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// INR ASSESSMENT // - NORTH KOREA - DANGER IN THE WIND

Identifier: 95STATE260249
Wikileaks: View 95STATE260249 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Secretary of State
Created: 1995-11-03 22:27:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PINR PGOV PREL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
R 032227Z NOV 95
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS
AIT TAIPEI 0000
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY ROME 
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 
USCINCPAC HONOLULU
XMT AMEMBASSY KOROR
AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
AMCONSUL BRISBANE
S E C R E T STATE 260249 
 
USTR FOR SANDS/LEHR 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL: 11/3/05 
TAGS:    PINR, PGOV, PREL 
SUBJECT: // INR ASSESSMENT // - NORTH KOREA - DANGER IN THE WIND 
 
DOD/ISA/AP FOR EIKENBERRY, NSC FOR ROTH/SUETTINGER, NSA 
FOR LANDIS, DIA FOR NIXON, CIA WASHDC, LONDON FOR HALL, 
ROME PLEASE PASS EMBASSY VATICAN 
 
1.  SECRET ENTIRE TEXT 
 
2.  THE FOLLOWING INR ASSESSMENT WAS PRODUCED BY THE 
OFFICE OF EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AND IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR 
INFORMATION AND COMMENT. 
 
3.  (SUMMARY) PYONGYANG'S ECONOMIC DISTRESS AND 
CONTINUING POLITICAL PARALYSIS RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT 
WHETHER THE CURRENT NORTH KOREAN REGIME CAN LAST THE 
WINTER. IF PRAGMATISTS IN THE LEADERSHIP ARE UNABLE TO 
SHOW TANGIBLE BENEFITS FROM THE AGREED FRAMEWORK SOON, 
CONTINUED DETERIORATION OF THE ECONOMY AND WORSENING FOOD 
SHORTAGES COULD PROMPT A TAKEOVER BY MILITARY HARDLINERS. 
 
THE NORTH KOREAN MILITARY ARE NOT "MODERNIZERS"--THEIR 
COMING TO POWER WOULD GREATLY RAISE TENSIONS AND SHARPLY 
INCREASE THE DANGER OF WAR. THERE IS EVIDENCE OF CONCERN 
WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP OVER THE MILITARY'S INTENTIONS. 
 
4. WE DISAGREE WITH ASSESSMENTS, PRIMARILY FROM SOUTH 
KOREA, THAT PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE NORTH IN MID-OCTOBER 
HAVE ALREADY PUT THE MILITARY IN CONTROL. THE NORTH'S 
NEGOTIATIONS WITH KEDO AND THE CLEAR, CONSISTENT SIGNALS 
IT IS SENDING SUPPORTING THE AGREED FRAMEWORK SUGGEST 
THAT, SO FAR, THE AGREEMENT'S FOES HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO 
DERAIL IT OR SIGNIFICANTLY IMPEDE ITS IMPLEMENTATION. 
 
UNCOMMON FLEXIBILITY. 
 
5. THE NORTH'S DELEGATES TO THE KEDO TALKS INSISTED 
CRITICS WERE PRESSING THEM TO SECURE AN LWR SUPPLY 
AGREEMENT, BUT USED THE POINT LESS TO PRESSURE KEDO THAN 
AS A RATIONALE FOR MODIFYING THEIR OWN NEGOTIATING 
POSITION. 
 
6. OTHER SIGNALS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THIS 
INTERPRETATION. FOR EXAMPLE, AT THE PARTY'S 50TH 
ANNIVERSARY FETE ON OCTOBER 10, THE MAIN SPEECH, 
DELIVERED BY THE NEW DEFENSE MINISTER, CRITICIZED NEITHER 
THE US OR THE AGREED FRAMEWORK. 
 
KEEPING A FIREBREAK. 
 
7. THOSE BACKING THE AGREEMENT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ISOLATE 
THE KEDO TALKS FROM THE HARSH RHETORICAL EXCHANGES 
BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH. THE NORTH'S VENOMOUS 
RESPONSE TO PROVOCATIVE ROK STATEMENTS HAS NOT KEPT IT 
FROM NEGOTIATING ACROSS THE TABLE WITH ROK DELEGATES. 
SUCH COMPARTMENTALIZATION OF ISSUES IS RARE DURING A TRUE 
CRISIS OR POLICY REVERSAL. 
 
LEADERSHIP LOGJAM. 
 
8. WE BELIEVE THE DPRK LEADERSHIP IS SHARPLY DIVIDED, 
AND THAT THE FRAMEWORK IS A SYMBOL OF WHAT ITS CRITICS 
FEAR (AND ITS PROPONENTS HOPE) WILL BECOME THE NEW 
REGIME'S DIRECTION ON A BROAD RANGE OF FOREIGN AND 
DOMESTIC ISSUES. 
 
9. PRAGMATISTS SEEM TO FEAR A LOSS OF MOMENTUM IN THE 
FRAMEWORK PROCESS, WHICH WOULD UNDERCUT THEIR ARGUMENT 
THAT THE AGREEMENT BRINGS TANGIBLE BENEFITS TO THE NORTH. 
THEY APPARENTLY SOLD THE AGREED FRAMEWORK AS A GOOD 
BARGAIN--THE START OF A PROCESS THAT WOULD LEAD TO A 
LESSENING OF MILITARY PRESSURES AND INCREASED FOREIGN 
ECONOMIC COOPERATION. NOW, THEY ARE UNDER ATTACK FOR 
HAVING COMPROMISED DPRK SECURITY AND GAINED LITTLE IN 
RETURN. 
 
10. SHOWDOWN APPROACHING? A LENGTHY ARTICLE IN THE 
PARTY NEWSPAPER EARLY THIS MONTH SUGGESTS THAT A SHOWDOWN 
IS NEARING. IN DISCUSSING THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET 
UNION, THE ARTICLE ALLUDED TO KHRUSHCHEV'S DE 
STALINIZATION CAMPAIGN, ARGUING THAT "ENEMIES AT HOME AND 
ABROAD, USING THE ALLEGED PERSONALITY CULT AS AN EXCUSE, 
LAUNCHED ATTACKS AND COMMITTED TRAITOROUS ACTS TO DAMAGE 
HIS (STALIN'S) AUTHORITY; THE COUNTRY WAS RUINED WHEN HIS 
IDEAS AND ACHIEVEMENT WERE COMPLETELY REJECTED AND 
NEGATED."  THE ARTICLE WENT ON TO WARN AGAINST HAVING 
"ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE ENEMY'S CONSPIRATORIAL PEACE 
OVERTURES." 
 
11. THE ARTICLE APPEARS TO BE AN ESCALATION OF THE LONG- 
RUNNING DEBATE BETWEEN THE REGIME'S PRAGMATISTS AND 
HARDLINERS. IN THE CURRENT SITUATION, REFERENCES TO A 
 "PERSONALITY CULT" AND DE-STALINIZATION COUPLED WITH 
WARNINGS ABOUT THE ENEMY'S "PEACE STRATEGY" ARE THE 
POLITICAL EQUIVALENT OF NUCLEAR WARFARE. THE ARTICLE 
NECESSARILY RAISES THE QUESTION OF WHO--ASSUMING IT IS 
NOT KIM JONG IL--IS BEING SET UP TO PLAY THE ROLE OF 
KHRUSHCHEV. 
 
12. SUCH RHETORIC SUGGESTS THAT THE SITUATION IS MOVING 
TOWARD A SHOWDOWN. KIM JONG IL, WHOM INR BELIEVES LEANS 
TOWARD HIS MORE PRAGMATIC ADVISORS, WOULD NO DOUBT LIKE 
TO RESOLVE IT WITHOUT FIREWORKS. NEVERTHELESS, EVERYONE 
IN THE LEADERSHIP (KIM MOST OF ALL) KNOWS THAT KIM IL 
SUNG HAD TO PUT DOWN SEVERAL COUP ATTEMPTS IN THE LATE 
195 OS BEFORE FIRMLY ESTABLISHING HIS POSITION. 
 
13. PRESSURE INCREASING. THE CHANCES OF A NEARTERM 
SHOWDOWN ARE INCREASED BY UNREMITTING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
STRAINS AND POLITICAL PRESSURES GENERATED BY THE SLOW- 
MOTION SUCCESSION. A HARSH WINTER, PUSHING THE ECONOMY 
AND SOCIAL CONTROLS TO THE BREAKING POINT, WOULD PROBABLY 
BE MORE THAN THE FRAGILE POLITICAL SYSTEM COULD ENDURE. 
BY SPRING, FOOD SHORTAGES MAY BE THE WORST SINCE THE 
KOREAN WAR. 
 
14. PARTICULARLY DISTURBING IS EVIDENCE THAT THE CENTER 
IS NO LONGER ABLE TO HANDLE THE FOOD SITUATION AND IS 
TELLING LOCAL AUTHORITIES THAT THEY ARE ON THEIR OWN. 
THAT MESSAGE WILL SEND SHOCKWAVES THROUGH THE POLITICAL 
SYSTEM AND SORELY TEST SOCIAL CONTROL MECHANISMS. 
 
15.   WILL THE GENERALS STEP IN? SUCH A SCENARIO IS 
UNLIKELY TO LEAD TO A SOFT LANDING"--THAT IS, PEACEFUL 
TRANSFORMATION AND EVENTUAL REUNIFICATION WITH THE SOUTH. 
RATHER, A SHARPLY DETERIORATING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 
SITUATION IS LIKELY TO TRIGGER A TAKEOVER BY HARDLINE 
MILITARY ELEMENTS--"TRUE BELIEVERS," FOR WHOM DISCIPLINE 
AND MORAL RECTITUDE CAN OVERCOME ANY ADVERSITY, AND WHO 
SEE COMPROMISE WITH "EVIL" AS DEFEAT. 
 
16.   FOR YEARS, THESE HARDLINERS HAVE BEEN CHAFING AT 
WHAT THEY SEE AS A DANGEROUS DRIFT TOWARD POLICIES OF 
OPENING AND REFORM.  THEY HAVE BEEN ESPECIALLY ALARMED BY 
EVENTS SINCE THE DEATH OF KIM IL SUNG. NEVER HAPPY WITH 
THE SUCCESSION PLANS, THEY HAVE WATCHED WITH 
CONSTERNATION AS KIM JONG IL HAS MOVED STEP-BY-STEP 
TOWARDS AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE US AND EXPERIMENTATION 
WITH ECONOMIC REFORM. 
 
17.   UP TO NOW, KIM, LIKE HIS FATHER, HAS BEEN ABLE TO 
KEEP THE MOST CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS IN LINE. BUT 
PRAGMATISTS IN THE REGIME FEAR THAT, IF THINGS REMAIN AS 
THEY ARE, HE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DO SO MUCH LONGER. A 
HIGH-RANKING PARTY OFFICIAL RECENTLY WARNED A FOREIGN 
ACADEMIC THAT AN INTERNAL CRISIS WAS APPROACHING; HE 
EMPHASIZED THAT THE MILITARY WAS DOMINATED BY DOGMATISTS 
WHO LOOK ONLY TO VIOLENCE TO SOLVE PROBLEMS. EARLIER 
THIS MONTH, A DPRK DIPLOMAT TOLD A US OFFICIAL THAT THE 
MILITARY WAS DETERMINED THAT ANY COLLAPSE OF THE NORTH 
"WOULD NOT BE PEACEFUL." EVEN A HIGH-LEVEL KOREAN 
PEOPLE'S ARMY OFFICER PRIVATELY WARNED A FEW MONTHS AGO 
THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO START US-DPRK MILITARY CONTACTS 
BECAUSE THE ARMY WAS BECOMING RESTLESS AND HAD DANGEROUS 
PLANS. (SECRET) (RCARLIN/JMERRILL) 
 
 
CHRISTOPHER 

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