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| Identifier: | 03ANKARA2903 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03ANKARA2903 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ankara |
| Created: | 2003-05-05 14:31:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV TU |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 051431Z May 03
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002903 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2013 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: FRIENDSHIP AND FEAR IN RURAL ANKARA (U) Classified by PolCouns John Kunstadter. Reason: 1.5 (b,d). 1. (C) Summary: In conversations at all levels during April visits to Ankara sub-provinces, poloffs encountered Turks eager to get U.S.-Turkish relations back on track. Nevertheless, we also noted the kind of suspicion and doubt from State authorities about the purpose of our trips that we normally encounter in the more sensitive Southeast. Although we expect a certain level of natural curiosity, the extent of official wariness seems especially noteworthy given that these trips occurred so close to cosmopolitan Ankara. End summary. 2. (C) Poloffs have recently made trips to Ankara sub-provinces to engage local officials in open discussions about U.S.-Turkish relations and Turkish domestic politics. Visits included: sub-provinces in the Ankara conurbation; Kazan, a town of some 15,000 people, who rely on primarily agriculture to sustain the local economy; and Kizilcahamam, a poor, insular, conservative community capitalizing on nearby natural springs to grow its tourism. ---------------------------------- Eager to reaffirm U.S.-Turkey ties ---------------------------------- 3. (C) In our visits to Kazan and Kizilcahamam, Turks at all levels -- from police chiefs and village leaders to sub-provincial governors (kaymakam) and teachers -- displayed a genuine affinity toward the U.S. and a desire to get U.S.-Turkish relations back on track. We had lively, open discussions across the board with the mayors, both of whom are members of the ultranationalist MHP, normally suspicious of the U.S. They blamed the media for creating and perpetuating any anti-U.S. sentiment in Turkey during the war in Iraq. Both regretted that Turkey had not been part of the coalition. During lunch in a small Kazan village, the local muhtar (village leader), imam, and the leader of the village elders all spoke positively of Turkey's long friendship with the U.S. 4. (C) In a chance meeting, the Kazan police chief, who had spent 3 years in the U.S. as bodyguard to then-ambassador and current MFA Deputy U/S Baki Ilkin, was eager to praise the U.S., noting that he had seen real democracy in America. He also praised the law enforcement system in the U.S., which, he said, demonstrates a level of politeness and flexibility alien to the Turkish system. We witnessed his influence first hand. While speaking with vendors at a vegetable market, we ran into a uniformed police officer, doing his own shopping, who then invited us for tea and arranged the meeting with the police chief. ------------------- Old Habits Die Hard ------------------- 5. (C) Although we encountered an overwhelmingly pro-U.S. attitude from the man on the street, we were struck by the high level of State suspicion concerning the purpose of our visits and our planned agenda. The Kazan kaymakam, for example, claimed he had to notify the Interior Ministry, Foreign Ministry, and the Turkish National Intelligence Organization before agreeing to meet with us. 6. (C) Our conversation with the garrulous Kazan mayor was quickly interrupted by an Interior Ministry inspector, who happened to be in town. After seizing control of the meeting, he took the opportunity to deride U.S. Iraq policy. In a subsequent conversation, the mayor apologized for having to defer to the inspector and, using a very crude phrase, explained that his hands had been tied. 7. (C) In Kizilcahamam, the kaymakam was alternately helpful in terms of arranging meetings and extremely nervous about our agenda -- to the point of visibly shaking in our meeting with him. He questioned our motives in meeting with local political party offices and made sure that the sub-provincial police chief accompanied us to every location. 8. (C) In planning an upcoming trip to Haymana, a sub-province south of Ankara proper, the local kaymakam tried to dictate which villages we could visit. Wanting some insight into villages which have long been inhabited by Kurds, we indicated to the kaymakam that we intended to visit two Kurdish villages. He angrily claimed that they are "centers of separatist activities" -- 50 kilometers from Ankara -- and tried to suggest another village that would be "safer." ------- Comment ------- 9. (C) Our trips served to reaffirm that even close to Ankara there is a fundamental gap in Turkey. On the one hand are ordinary citizens who, although pious and conservative, are very warm toward Americans. On the other hand are the representatives of the Turkish State (sub-provincial governors), who continue to be stiff and wary toward outsiders. PEARSON
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