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| Identifier: | 03ANKARA2902 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03ANKARA2902 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ankara |
| Created: | 2003-05-05 14:20:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |
| Tags: | EAGR ETRD EFIN PREL TU |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002902 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR E AND EUR/SE TREASURY FOR OASIA - MILLS AND LEICHTER STATE PASS USTR - NOVELLI AND BIRDSEY STATE PASS USDA/FAS USDA/FAS FOR ITP/MACKE, MEYER, THORBURN USDOC FOR 4212/ITA/MAC/OEURA/DEFALCO E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAGR, ETRD, EFIN, PREL, TU SUBJECT: SUGAR LAW LEAVES BITTER TASTE REF: ANKARA 1447 Sensitive but Unclassified. Not for internet distribution. 1. (SBU) SUMMARY: A new sugar law implemented in September 2002 was supposed to eliminate the sugar industry's rampant overproduction, as well as GOT subsidies for its export, and eventually move the industry toward the free market. However, even as state-owned sugar company SEKER (its privatization process is scheduled to begin in June) is being reigned in, its lobbying efforts caused the GOT to include in the sugar law quotas that hurt SEKER's competitors in the cornstarch-based sweetener industry. END SUMMARY. Quotas Aimed at Ending Overproduction ------------------------------------- 2. (SBU) Prior to the onset of the Sugar Law, SEKER factories gave guaranteed procurement prices to Turkish sugar beet farmers, causing rampant overproduction (these guaranteed prices stemmed from a 1945 law). To reduce its stocks, SEKER needed significant GOT subsidies to export its overproduction at competitive world prices. (Beet sugar prices are higher, on average, than sugar cane because the costs of production are much higher. When combined with refining inefficiency, SEKER must sell its sugar at the rate of $550/ton. The world average is $260/ton.) 3. (SBU) The new Sugar Law, enacted in April 2001 and taking effect in September 2002, was intended to meet market liberalization criteria under the IMF Letter of Intent and the EU Accession Partnership Accord. The law ends guaranteed procurement prices to farmers as well as GOT export subsidies to SEKER and PANKOBIRLIK (Central Union of Sugar Beet Producers Cooperatives). The law establishes production quotas for the sugar industry, synchronizing sugar production with domestic demand each year until 2007 (at which time the industry is supposed to be totally deregulated, in accordance with Turkey's WTO obligations). The quotas are assigned by the Sugar Board, an independent regulatory body created under the Sugar Law that consists of seven members -- three from the GOT, three from the sugar-beet industry, and one from the cornstarch-based industry (Cargill). 4. (SBU) This year (September 2002-August 2003), SEKER is allowed to produce 1.67 million tons of sugar, PANKOBIRLIK 474,000 tons. Next year's (September 2003-August 2004) production quota for SEKER was supposed to be the same as this year, but has been reduced to 1.3 million tons due to 320,000 tons of remaining excess refined sugar (in addition to 220,000 tons of excess raw sugar). Due to the high costs of maintaining these stocks, our contacts say that, though export subsidies have officially been eliminated, SEKER has gotten special permission to export with the subsidy until August 2003. There is a substantial political push to increase these quotas. Since the Sugar Board was created prior to AKP's electoral victory in November, rumors are swirling that the new government is trying to abolish the board. These rumors have been confirmed by our contacts on the Sugar Board. Quotas for One, Quotas for All ------------------------------ 5. (SBU) Even as sugar production quotas are theoretically being brought down, subquotas mandated by the sugar law are limiting production from the entire cornstarch-based sweetener industry in Turkey to 10 percent of the total sugar quota, or 234,000 tons (in 2002-2003), well below the industry capacity of 468,000 tons. (The industry capacity, in turn, is below domestic market demand.) Cargill reps have told us that all of their corn syrup production goes to local Pepsi and Coca Cola factories. However, with such a low production quota, they cannot meet the demand of the soft drink makers. Cargill reps claim that, should the low production quotas continue, their Turkish operations cannot survive. 6. (SBU) This 10 percent quota was the result of a campaign from sugar beet farmers (approximately 380,000 of them) and SEKER to limit the competition during SEKER's transformation process. "There is a very strong political constituency to maintain sugar beet factories and employment within them," according to a World Bank official here. The cornstarch-based industry successfully lobbied the Council of Ministers to increase the quota to 15 percent for this year, or 351,000 MT. The industry is pushing the Council of Ministers to continue the 15 percent quota into next year - the quota is scheduled to return to the 10 percent mark in September. 7. (SBU) Cornstarch-based industry reps are also complaining that the GOT has assigned quota percentages for sugar and cornstarch-based sweeteners under a common umbrella. Most countries, including those in the EU, have separate production quotas for sugar and corn-starch based products. That is because the weight of purified centrifugal sugar is 100 percent dry matter while fructose corn syrup is diluted with 25 percent water. Thus, by comparing the weights of sugar and fructose corn syrup on a 1:1 scale, as the GOT production quotas have done, the sugar industry has a distinct advantage in how the quotas are weighed and quantified, says Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) Turkish Rep. Rint Akyuz. "It's like measuring apples and oranges," he said. SEKER Privatization Scheduled for 2004 -------------------------------------- 8. (SBU) The privatization of SEKER's sugar refineries, which has been postponed twice in the past, is scheduled to begin shortly. In early April, State Minister for Treasury Ali Babacan said the road map for the privatization of SEKER's sugar factories was expected to be approved by the High Privatization Council by the end of June. (The Council is comprised of PM Erdogan, Babacan, Coskun, Finance Minister Unakitan, and Transportation Minister Binali Yildirim. Yildirim was the most recent appointee, unseating Deputy PM Sener.) Coskun said April 18 that the privatization calendar for SEKER's 27 sugar refineries would be submitted to the IMF by June 30. He added that the GOT was planning to sell redundant and unused assets, and use the proceeds to strengthen the company and make it more attractive for investors. As an example of redundant assets, Coskun said the GOT was planning to sell the farmland in Ankara Etimesgut Sugar Factory to Ankara Municipality and the Union of Chambers and Stock Exchanges (TOBB). 9. (SBU) Ahmet Aksu, the Privatization Administration (PA) official responsible for the SEKER sale, gave us similar information on April 15. He said the GOT is still working to consolidate roughly $500 million in debts owed to the Treasury Ministry. He added that the 27 factories will most likely be sold in 5-6 separate blocks. SEKER's total assets in 2001 were $1.4 billion (per website www.turkseker.gov.tr). Comment ------- 10. (SBU) Political obstacles to liberalization and privatization of Turkey's sugar industry are similar to those of other state-owned monsters like TEKEL (reftel). In this case, Turkey's inefficient sugar industry employs some 20,000 workers, as well as 380,000 farmers, and the political cost of offending this constituency is huge. The sugar establishment is hindering GOT efforts to liberalize the market, and the net effect are government losses in the form of high storage prices, private industry losses in the form of unjust production quotas, and consumer losses in the form of higher prices. Given the political pressure to continue protective measures for the sugar industry, successful privatization of SEKER over the next 12 months will be a true test of the GOT's commitment toward free market reforms. PEARSON
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