US embassy cable - 03SANAA969

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DEMOCRACY YEMENI STYLE: TIDBITS FROM THE AFTERMATH

Identifier: 03SANAA969
Wikileaks: View 03SANAA969 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Sanaa
Created: 2003-05-05 14:10:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV KDEM YM DOMESTIC POLITICS DEMOCRATIC REFORM HUMAN RIGHTS
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000969 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, YM, DOMESTIC POLITICS, DEMOCRATIC REFORM, HUMAN RIGHTS 
SUBJECT: DEMOCRACY YEMENI STYLE: TIDBITS FROM THE AFTERMATH 
 
REF: SANAA 955 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull for Reasons 1.5 (b,d) 
 
1.   (U)  Summary:  Despite several irregularities in 
post-election procedures, the assessment of the April 27 
elections remains generally positive, even among the 
opposition.  Observers express concern that the make-up of 
the new parliament, with its overwhelming General People's 
Party (GPC) majority and fairly inexperienced members, will 
weaken the institution.  Other observers point to a united 
opposition and the power of the expected Speaker of 
Parliament as factors that will serve to strengthen it. 
Several prominent figures gained seats.  The new government 
is expected to be formed by mid-May.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Negotiating the Results; 
Assessment Still Generally Positive 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
2.  (U)  As of May 5, four seats remain undecided.  These 
seats may go into by-elections.  The results are the 
following: 
 
GPC   225 
Islah       45 
YSP         7 
Independents      14 
Baathists   2 
(pro-Syrian) 
Nasserites  3 
Undecided   4 
GPC/Islah (al-Ahmar)    1 
 
 
3.  (U)  In typical Yemeni political style, several 
unresolved constituencies are undergoing or completed 
high-level "backroom" negotiation towards resolution rather 
than going through the election-law mandated legal 
procedures.  For example, reliable sources indicate that 
President Saleh and the GPC offered the Islah party five 
seats in exchange for conceding one seat in Sanaa won by 
Islah -- the so-called "unity constituency" where the 
President voted.  The Islah party reportedly turned the offer 
down.  Many political observers cannot understand the 
candidate selection process in this important symbolic 
constituency (#11).  The GPC ran al-Masawari, a close 
associate of Saleh whose tenure as Mayor of Sanaa was so 
marked by perceptions of corruption that the joke on election 
day went "vote for al-Masawari, or else he will go back to 
running the capital." 
 
4. (U)  Several pro-government and pro-opposition journalists 
told Pol/Econoff May 3 that despite the reported 
manipulations of the counting process, they still believe 
that these elections are a milestone in Yemen's democratic 
development.  They agreed unanimously with NDI's assessment 
(ref), highlighting the report's balance of positive and 
negative developments.  While some members of the Joint 
Meeting Parties (JMP) have called for some form of action to 
protest the results, including a boycott of parliament, most 
observers do not believe the JMP will chance losing their 
platform in parliament. 
 
5.  (U)  The JMP held a press conference May 5 (covered by 
national and international press) and announced that it would 
not withdraw from parliament, as some JMP members had 
threatened.  However, during the press conference, 
representatives from the Islah and Nasserite parties 
challenged President Saleh directly, accusing him of meddling 
in the election and calling upon him to act as a "unifying" 
force rather than a party leader.  President Saleh tends to 
command widespread deference, and this direct challenge 
represents a departure from the support he usually receives 
across party lines. 
 
6.  (C)  The editor-in-chief of the Islah party newspaper 
al-Sahwah, Nabil al-Sufi (please protect), said May 3 that 
his assessment was mostly positive.  He noted high turnout, 
an organized and modern campaign, vastly improved election 
administration and Islah's high-profile wins in Sanaa (10 of 
19 constituencies) as positive developments that show 
"democracy works" in Yemen.  He said that while the 
violations were troubling, it was "to be expected" in a 
developing democracy and he looked ahead to the next 
elections (local council and presidential in 2006) with 
optimism. 
 
---------------------------- 
Parliament Possibly Weakened; 
Lots of New (and Old) Faces 
---------------------------- 
7.  (U)  Some political observers lament the number of 
brand-new politicians to the ranks of parliament, expressing 
concern that the relatively less-educated and inexperienced 
members will weaken the parliament. While the GPC 
overwhelming majority may also serve to weaken parliament's 
oversight of the government, close cooperation among 
opposition parties and the power wielded by the veteran 
Speaker of Parliament, Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar, should 
provide a counter-balance.  Also, as noted by the GPC 
political director Mohamed Qubaty on May 5, the lack of 
complete party unity within the GPC affects the ability of 
the government to pass legislation.  Often, other 
considerations, such as tribal or regional interests, play a 
larger role than party affiliation. 
 
8.  (U)  Among the "new blood" are several sons of prominent 
political figures, including Dr. Rashad al-Alimi (son of the 
Minister of Interior), Sadiq Ameen Abu Ras (son of the 
Minister of Local Administration) and Ali Hassan al-Shater 
(son of a close aide to Saleh and the Editor-in-Chief of 
September 26 weekly newspaper). 
 
9.  (U)  None of the seven Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) 
winners have parliamentary experience, nor are they from the 
party's known current senior leadership.  However, the only 
YSP member from the 1997 parliament (who ran independent 
during the boycott) may still gain a seat, because his 
constituency remains under dispute and observers report he 
was leading the vote. 
 
10.  (C)  Two of Post's most useful contacts in the outgoing 
parliament, Sultan al-Barakani (Chairman of the GPC bloc) and 
Nabil Basha (Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee), retained their seats.  Both have played effective 
roles in the parliament's ratification of a number of 
international conventions related to counter-terrorism. 
 
11.  (C)  Among the more infamous of winners, the GPC former 
governor of Sanaa and Marib, Naji al-Sufi, won a seat in 
Sanaa governorate.  He is known for his flagrant violations 
of human rights while he was serving as governor of Sanaa, as 
noted in the 2000 Human Rights Report, including violations 
such as attacking judges, arbitrarily arresting citizens and 
maintaining a private prison. 
 
------------------------------ 
Family Affair -- the al-Ahmars 
------------------------------ 
 
12.  (U)  Five members of the al-Ahmar family gained seats in 
parliament.  Sheikh al-Ahmar, widely expected to resume his 
post as Speaker of Parliament, is now joined by four of his 
sons.  Two are from Islah and two are from GPC, while Sheikh 
al-Ahmar was elected with the support of both parties.  This 
result is more evidence of how family and tribal ties often 
trump political party ties in Yemeni politics.  Some joke 
that the al-Ahmar bloc alone rivals that of the YSP with its 
seven members. 
 
-------------------- 
Government Formation 
-------------------- 
 
13.  (U)  The parliament will meet on May 10, and observers 
estimate that a new government will be formed by May 15. 
Details reported septel. 
HULL 

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