US embassy cable - 03ISTANBUL636

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ISTANBUL MAYORALTY: UP FOR GRABS?

Identifier: 03ISTANBUL636
Wikileaks: View 03ISTANBUL636 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Consulate Istanbul
Created: 2003-05-05 11:03:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV TK Istanbul
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000636 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, TK, Istanbul 
SUBJECT: ISTANBUL MAYORALTY: UP FOR GRABS? 
 
 
Classified By: Consul General David Arnett for reasons 1.5 (b & d) 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: The Istanbul Mayoralty, often characterized 
as the second most desirable political prize in the country, 
has become the focus of a back-room power struggle as players 
jockey for ground in advance of the April 2004 local 
elections. Mayor Ali Mufit Gurtuna, an independent since the 
Virtue Party was banned in 2001, narrowly escaped a recent 
Justice and Development (AK) Party-orchestrated no-confidence 
vote in the normally acquiescent City Council.  Following his 
now-public fallout with AK, there is widespread speculation 
that he may join media tycoon Cem Uzan's Youth Party (GP), 
thereby setting the stage for a tightly contested election 
next year.  Other high-profile names are also being floated 
as trial balloons, but most key political groups are waiting 
cautiously before deciding which horse to bet on.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
2. (U) For perhaps the first time ever, on March 28 the 
Istanbul City Council refused to approve the Mayor's annual 
report on the previous year's municipal activities.  118 of 
the 203 City Council members, including the Justice and 
Development (AK), Republican People's (CHP), and Felicity 
(SP) Party groups, voted to reject the report; 42 Motherland 
Party (ANAP) members voted in favor of approving the report. 
A two-thirds majority (i.e., another 35 nay votes) would have 
had the legal effect of a no-confidence vote.  The Governor 
would have been forced to appoint a temporary replacement and 
a formal dismissal case would have been opened against Mayor 
Ali Mufit Gurtuna.  This development is particularly 
surprising in light of the fact that the City Council is a 
largely powerless, rubber-stamp body.  While its formal 
duties do include approving the overall city budget, its 
activities have been generally limited to approval of the 
annual activity report and other ceremonial functions.  The 
City Council includes municipal officials from Istanbul's 
various districts, as well as part-time politicians who seek 
the office primarily for influence to help advance their 
private business careers. 
 
 
3. (C) So what did Mayor Gurtuna do to antagonize the City 
Council?  Veteran AK Group President Huseyin Evliyaoglu 
complained to poloff that the 2002 Municipal Report had not 
been "serious":  first, it failed to focus on last year's 
activities, simply recycling language and photographs from 
previous editions; second, it arbitrarily put forth 550 new 
spending projects (that deal less with the city's needs and 
more with the fact that their total number corresponds to the 
550th anniversary of the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul).  In 
short, it was a mere "public relations document."  Evliyaoglu 
did not deny, however, that the report was typical of 
previous reports.  Pressed for more substantive criticisms, 
Evliyaoglu openly suggested (while refraining from offering 
details) that the real opposition to Gurtuna stemmed from 
concerns about corruption and malfeasance.  Evliyaoglu also 
complained that the major media groups have all been "bought 
off" by the Mayor, claiming that in one incident Gurtuna 
capitulated to demands from Star newspaper representatives 
for contracts and concessions when he was threatened with an 
incriminating file with both evidence and allegations. 
 
 
4. (C) ANAP Group President Recai Delibasioglu, whose party 
"saved" Gurtuna by voting in favor of the report, told poloff 
that the report was merely a pretext for an AK-orchestrated 
effort to unseat, or at least discredit, the Mayor. 
According to Delibasioglu, AK resents the fact that Gurtuna, 
who came to power as Erdogan's deputy with the then-Virtue 
Party, has maintained his distance from the party's more 
successful successor.  The rift between them has now grown to 
the point where all bridges have been burnt.  ANAP, 
meanwhile, faces a disintegrating voter base and a bleak 
political future.  But with 6 Istanbul district mayors 
dependent on good ties with the city mayor's office, ANAP 
remains on good terms with Gurtuna.  The fact that 
Delibasioglu also indicated that he expects to play an 
important role in the upcoming and potentially lucrative 
privatization of the Istanbul Natural Gas Distribution 
Corporation suggests that there may have been some quid pro 
quo in return for ANAP's support. 
 
 
5. (C) Evliyaoglu told poloff that relations between AKP and 
Gurtuna have reached new lows and that he sees Gurtuna's 
chances of being the AK candidate for mayor in next year's 
local elections as "one in a hundred" (i.e., as close to zero 
as you can get in Turkey's unpredictable politics). 
Evliyaoglu was particularly incensed that he had heard that 
Gurtuna hoped to use his recent trip to Washington for the 
American-Turkish Council Meeting to convince U.S. officials 
that he remains a likely AKP candidate and to secure their 
support in convincing PM Erdogan to offer him the nomination. 
 Evliyaoglu declined to join the delegation for the trip 
precisely because he was worried that his presence might 
convey the impression that Gurtuna was maintaining good ties 
with AKP.  On the other hand, Muge Altas, Advisor to the 
Mayor, argued to poloff that the rift between Gurtuna and AK 
is not nearly as wide as others believe.  She also 
downplayed, but did not deny, the rumors that Gurtuna might 
be considering the Youth Party. 
 
 
6. (C) Other high-profile names have also been floated as 
possible contenders for the Istanbul Mayoralty in next year's 
elections. Delibasioglu claimed that former Interior Minister 
and ANAP parliamentarian Sadettin Tantan might be convinced 
to throw his hat in the ring.  Tantan, formerly the Mayor of 
Istanbul's Fatih district, is well-known and well-liked in 
Istanbul.  In a chance meeting with poloff, however, Tantan 
refused to confirm rumors about his potential candidacy.  CHP 
parliamentarian and former Economy Minister Kemal Dervis is 
another name that we have heard mentioned as a possible 
contender, although most dismiss this as unlikely. 
7. (C) Comment:  While the opposition of the toothless City 
Council is clearly not one of Gurtuna's major worries, it is 
an indication of the Mayor's political isolation.  The roots 
of Gurtuna's problems with the City Council largely stem from 
his refusal to politically align himself with one of the 
major parties.  It is clear that relations between Gurtuna 
and the Istanbul-based AK Party have been seriously strained, 
but AK and Gurtuna continue to represent each other's best 
chance to win in the upcoming local elections.  If AK's 
popularity deteriorates significantly before next year's 
elections, we do not rule out the possibility of a 
last-minute reconciliation, or at least "alliance of 
convenience," between Gurtuna and AK Party Chairman Tayyip 
Erdogan.  Contenders from other parties, even names like 
Tantan and Dervis, would be long-shots unless they emerge as 
consensus candidates after a fundamental realignment of the 
center-right or center-left parties. 
QUINN 

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