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| Identifier: | 03ISTANBUL636 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03ISTANBUL636 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Consulate Istanbul |
| Created: | 2003-05-05 11:03:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV TK Istanbul |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000636 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2013 TAGS: PGOV, TK, Istanbul SUBJECT: ISTANBUL MAYORALTY: UP FOR GRABS? Classified By: Consul General David Arnett for reasons 1.5 (b & d) 1. (C) Summary: The Istanbul Mayoralty, often characterized as the second most desirable political prize in the country, has become the focus of a back-room power struggle as players jockey for ground in advance of the April 2004 local elections. Mayor Ali Mufit Gurtuna, an independent since the Virtue Party was banned in 2001, narrowly escaped a recent Justice and Development (AK) Party-orchestrated no-confidence vote in the normally acquiescent City Council. Following his now-public fallout with AK, there is widespread speculation that he may join media tycoon Cem Uzan's Youth Party (GP), thereby setting the stage for a tightly contested election next year. Other high-profile names are also being floated as trial balloons, but most key political groups are waiting cautiously before deciding which horse to bet on. End Summary. 2. (U) For perhaps the first time ever, on March 28 the Istanbul City Council refused to approve the Mayor's annual report on the previous year's municipal activities. 118 of the 203 City Council members, including the Justice and Development (AK), Republican People's (CHP), and Felicity (SP) Party groups, voted to reject the report; 42 Motherland Party (ANAP) members voted in favor of approving the report. A two-thirds majority (i.e., another 35 nay votes) would have had the legal effect of a no-confidence vote. The Governor would have been forced to appoint a temporary replacement and a formal dismissal case would have been opened against Mayor Ali Mufit Gurtuna. This development is particularly surprising in light of the fact that the City Council is a largely powerless, rubber-stamp body. While its formal duties do include approving the overall city budget, its activities have been generally limited to approval of the annual activity report and other ceremonial functions. The City Council includes municipal officials from Istanbul's various districts, as well as part-time politicians who seek the office primarily for influence to help advance their private business careers. 3. (C) So what did Mayor Gurtuna do to antagonize the City Council? Veteran AK Group President Huseyin Evliyaoglu complained to poloff that the 2002 Municipal Report had not been "serious": first, it failed to focus on last year's activities, simply recycling language and photographs from previous editions; second, it arbitrarily put forth 550 new spending projects (that deal less with the city's needs and more with the fact that their total number corresponds to the 550th anniversary of the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul). In short, it was a mere "public relations document." Evliyaoglu did not deny, however, that the report was typical of previous reports. Pressed for more substantive criticisms, Evliyaoglu openly suggested (while refraining from offering details) that the real opposition to Gurtuna stemmed from concerns about corruption and malfeasance. Evliyaoglu also complained that the major media groups have all been "bought off" by the Mayor, claiming that in one incident Gurtuna capitulated to demands from Star newspaper representatives for contracts and concessions when he was threatened with an incriminating file with both evidence and allegations. 4. (C) ANAP Group President Recai Delibasioglu, whose party "saved" Gurtuna by voting in favor of the report, told poloff that the report was merely a pretext for an AK-orchestrated effort to unseat, or at least discredit, the Mayor. According to Delibasioglu, AK resents the fact that Gurtuna, who came to power as Erdogan's deputy with the then-Virtue Party, has maintained his distance from the party's more successful successor. The rift between them has now grown to the point where all bridges have been burnt. ANAP, meanwhile, faces a disintegrating voter base and a bleak political future. But with 6 Istanbul district mayors dependent on good ties with the city mayor's office, ANAP remains on good terms with Gurtuna. The fact that Delibasioglu also indicated that he expects to play an important role in the upcoming and potentially lucrative privatization of the Istanbul Natural Gas Distribution Corporation suggests that there may have been some quid pro quo in return for ANAP's support. 5. (C) Evliyaoglu told poloff that relations between AKP and Gurtuna have reached new lows and that he sees Gurtuna's chances of being the AK candidate for mayor in next year's local elections as "one in a hundred" (i.e., as close to zero as you can get in Turkey's unpredictable politics). Evliyaoglu was particularly incensed that he had heard that Gurtuna hoped to use his recent trip to Washington for the American-Turkish Council Meeting to convince U.S. officials that he remains a likely AKP candidate and to secure their support in convincing PM Erdogan to offer him the nomination. Evliyaoglu declined to join the delegation for the trip precisely because he was worried that his presence might convey the impression that Gurtuna was maintaining good ties with AKP. On the other hand, Muge Altas, Advisor to the Mayor, argued to poloff that the rift between Gurtuna and AK is not nearly as wide as others believe. She also downplayed, but did not deny, the rumors that Gurtuna might be considering the Youth Party. 6. (C) Other high-profile names have also been floated as possible contenders for the Istanbul Mayoralty in next year's elections. Delibasioglu claimed that former Interior Minister and ANAP parliamentarian Sadettin Tantan might be convinced to throw his hat in the ring. Tantan, formerly the Mayor of Istanbul's Fatih district, is well-known and well-liked in Istanbul. In a chance meeting with poloff, however, Tantan refused to confirm rumors about his potential candidacy. CHP parliamentarian and former Economy Minister Kemal Dervis is another name that we have heard mentioned as a possible contender, although most dismiss this as unlikely. 7. (C) Comment: While the opposition of the toothless City Council is clearly not one of Gurtuna's major worries, it is an indication of the Mayor's political isolation. The roots of Gurtuna's problems with the City Council largely stem from his refusal to politically align himself with one of the major parties. It is clear that relations between Gurtuna and the Istanbul-based AK Party have been seriously strained, but AK and Gurtuna continue to represent each other's best chance to win in the upcoming local elections. If AK's popularity deteriorates significantly before next year's elections, we do not rule out the possibility of a last-minute reconciliation, or at least "alliance of convenience," between Gurtuna and AK Party Chairman Tayyip Erdogan. Contenders from other parties, even names like Tantan and Dervis, would be long-shots unless they emerge as consensus candidates after a fundamental realignment of the center-right or center-left parties. QUINN
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