US embassy cable - 03SANAA963

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EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE MEETING 04/30/03

Identifier: 03SANAA963
Wikileaks: View 03SANAA963 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Sanaa
Created: 2003-05-04 13:03:00
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Tags: AMGT ASEC CASC PREL PTER EAC COUNTER TERRORISM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SANAA 000963 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS, 
DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2013 
TAGS: AMGT, ASEC, CASC, PREL, PTER, EAC, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE MEETING 04/30/03 
 
 
Classified By: ACTING DCM RUSSELL  JONES, FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (S/NF) Begin Summary:  On April 30, 2003, the Chief Of 
Mission chaired a core Emergency Action Committee meeting 
with COM, ORCA, DATT, FPD, SOC-Yemen and RSO in attendance. 
The topic of discussion was TD-3/OO/13299-03, 21 April 03, 
regarding a senior Al-Qaida planner in Saudi Arabia who was 
attempting to revive plans for a kidnapping operation 
(of US or UK citizen) in Yemen.  EAC members noted that 
election tension still remain in some districts where the 
vote has not been counted and election results are expected 
to be finalized within the next two or three days. 
End Summary. 
 
2.  (S/NF) Regarding the kidnapping threat against mid-level 
officials, the EAC noted: 
- That the veracity of the source and information was 
hard to assess. 
 
- The threat information, according to ORCA, demonstrated 
the potential for a continuing threat in Yemen, showing that 
remnants of terrorist cells still want to do something. 
 
- Extreme elements are displaying disappointment in 
Al-Qaida's failure to follow-up on threats against 
American interests following Coalition action 
against Iraq. 
 
- Kidnapping according to ORCA, has been a historic factor 
for many years and more specific information on kidnapping 
does not necessarily mean that the threat level has risen. 
 
- EAC members agreed that no one can be certain if the 
threat is against official Americans, members of the 
western business community or both official and 
non-official Americans and other third country nationals. 
 
3.  (SBU) The EAC was unanimous in its opinion that the 
American community at large, must not become complacent 
now that a lessening of security tensions has occurred in 
Yemen following the war with Iraq and the conclusion of 
national elections. 
 
4.  (SBU) The EAC noted that community members were 
beginning to ask questions regarding the security situation 
and are looking for security guidance regarding daily 
activities within Sanaa and Yemen, following the war and 
the national elections on 27 April. 
 
5.  (C) The EAC was advised about the following RSO liaison 
and discussions with MOI: 
- The potential for kidnapping Americans (MOI provided no 
guidance). 
- The potential for transnational terrorism and border 
security (MOI indicated that border security was a very 
sensitive national security matter and RSO's MOI contact 
was reluctant to comment on it). 
 
6.  (SBU) The RSO also reviewed: 
- Surveillance Detection Team (SD) efforts to monitor 
Embassy Officer residences. 
- Security screening at the Sheraton Hotel with senior MOI 
officials to identify areas of improvement in security 
practices by Yemeni officials at entry points. 
 
7.  (SBU) EAC members noted the worldwide warden message 
warning Americans to be cautious during overseas travel. 
 
8.  (SBU) The Ambassador concluded the EAC meeting by 
stating that he would schedule a warden meeting with the 
wider American community to discuss post-war and 
post-election security concerns.  The Ambassador also 
directed the RSO to coordinate with the Administration 
Officer regarding follow-up with the MOI on issuance of 
non-diplomatic license plates for Embassy vehicles. 
Finally the Ambassador directed the RSO to draft a message 
to the American community regarding security awareness. 
HULL 

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