US embassy cable - 03ABUJA809

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000809 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
CAIRO FOR MAXSTADT 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, EAID, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: POST-ELECTIONS MEETING WITH NATIONAL 
SECURITY ADVISOR 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter for reasons 1.5 (b) 
and (d). 
 
 
1.(C) Summary:  Although admitting significant manipulation 
of the presidential and  gubernatorial elections in some 
states, National Security Advisor Aliyu Mohammed pointed to 
the electoral tribunals as the appropriate channel for 
resolution of these problems.  Mohammed said Obasanjo clearly 
won the presidential contest; he dismissed ANPP candidate 
Muhammadu Buhari's claims of victory. End Summary. 
 
 
 
 
2.(C) Ambassador, accompanied by RAO Chief and CRO, met 
National Security Advisor General (retired) Aliyu Mohammed 
April 22 to review the April 19 presidential and 
gubernatorial elections.  Mohammed appeared relaxed and in 
good spirits.  The Ambassador asked for a comparison between 
this election and the 1983 contest.  Mohammed noted that 
General Buhari overthrew the democratically elected 
government of Shehu Shegari in 1983, then "did nothing for 18 
months" except jail political opponents.  Mohammed pointed to 
the irony of Buhari's current situation; Buhari, the leader 
of the 1983 coup that toppled Nigeria's last civilian 
government, was now complaining of democratic malpractices. 
 
 
3.(C). Mohammed scoffed that Buhari "will make a lot of noise 
now," but eventually will recede from prominence.  In 
appraising Buhari's bid for the Presidency, Mohammed opined 
that Buhari made a fundamental error by basing his campaign 
on religion.  This, claimed Mohammed, limited Buhari's 
appeal, confining his support to a group of northern states. 
 
 
4.(C) The Ambassador asked the NSA if President Obasanjo will 
concede Buhari's status as king-maker in the north or if he 
might have more decisive say in the formation of the new 
Obasanjo Administration.  Mohammed rejected the 
characterization of Buhari as the preeminent leader in 
northern Nigeria.  That title still belonged to former 
military Head of State, Ibrahim Babangida.  However, he 
conceded that Buhari is a force to be reckoned with.  The NSA 
predicted that, as was the case after the 1999 elections, 
Obasanjo will bring into his government select members of the 
defeated opposition parties.  The President will include some 
members of Buhari's ANPP, but will do this "on his own terms, 
not Buhari's." 
 
 
5.(C)  Pointing out that the ANPP has rejected the vote 
results and threatened "mass action," the Ambassador asked if 
the Presidency expects serious resistance from the main 
opposition party.  Mohammed affirmed the likelihood of 
resistance in parts of the Northwest where unemployment and 
religion will fuel agitation.  The militant Odua People's 
Congress (OPC) and other groups of unemployed youth will be 
the basis for unrest in the Southwest, he predicted.  In 
response to the Ambassador's question on how the Federal 
Government will respond to such resistance, the NSA vaguely 
said "we have our ways," but would not amplify any further. 
 
 
6.(C) The Ambassador noted that international observers saw 
severe irregularities in several parts of the country on 
April 19; statements by IRI, NDI and the EU reflect this.  As 
an example, he disclosed that he had photographic evidence of 
stolen ballot boxes that were dumped in a ravine in Rivers 
State.    Mohammed agreed there were problems in the 
South-South and Southeast, citing Rivers, Bayelsa and Enugu 
states specifically.  "I question some of these results 
myself," he admitted.  The NSA expressed particular concern 
over Rivers State, asserting that the Rivers controversy 
needs to be taken to the electoral tribunal. 
 
 
7.(C) Reviewing results from the Yoruba-dominated Southwest, 
Mohammed admitted surprise at the large PDP gains made at the 
expense of the AD.  He agreed with the conclusion that this 
could be a mortal blow for Afenifere, the Yoruba 
social-political organization, which the NSA characterized as 
a gerontocracy that was too tribal-focused and out of touch 
with the general populace in the Southwest.  Bola Tinubu, 
though a top Yoruba politician, won the only Southwestern 
state (Lagos) for the AD because he succeeded in appealing to 
the cosmopolitan mix of voters in West Africa's largest 
metropolis, concluded Mohammed. 
 
 
8.(C) Responding to the Ambassador's request for a summary 
judgment on the elections, Mohammed proclaimed his support 
for President Obasanjo, "based on the candidates available" 
and predicted that Buhari would "go to the streets" and 
attempt to call out the military to take over.  In response 
to the Ambassador's request for any message to Washington on 
the elections, Mohammed laughed and stated "you should 
remember Florida in 2001 when Gore was gracious in accepting 
defeat and in congratulating Bush . . .you should 
congratulate Obasanjo."  Mohammed in turn asked the 
Ambassador who from the USG should be invited to President 
Obasanjo's May 29 inauguration, which the Ambassador 
deflected by noting that this is for the GON to decide. 
 
 
9.(C) The NSA disclosed that he had written Obasanjo a 
memorandum the previous day recommending that the President 
meet with Ambassador Jeter, the UK High Commissioner and the 
head of the EU Mission to discuss the elections aftermath and 
the President's plans for his new term.  Mohammed hoped that 
this meeting would take place later in the week.  (Note: This 
meeting has yet to take place. End Note) 
 
 
 
 
WARRI CRISIS 
------------ 
 
 
10.(C) Turning to the ongoing crisis in the oil-producing 
area of Warri in Delta state,  Jeter gave Mohammed a letter 
informing the Federal Government of our intent to provide 
disaster relief assistance to Ijaw and Itsekiri villagers 
displaced by the fighting and asking for approval to deliver 
the aid in the Warri communities.  CRO emphasized that the 
assistance is purely humanitarian -- food, clothing and 
bedding -- and would be distributed equitably through a U.S. 
non-governmental organization already operating in the Warri 
area.  The NSA expressed appreciation for the humanitarian 
initiative (and provided the requested approval in an April 
27 letter), but cautioned that such efforts must be seen as 
non-partisan, helping all affected parties.  In resolving the 
stalemate in the region, the NSA claimed that force would not 
be used unless necessary, but quickly added that "we cannot 
allow a gang of thugs to terrorize the area."  Mohammed also 
cited the serious problem of illegal bunkering of oil from 
the area, a diversion of as much as 10 percent of Nigeria's 
crude oil production to the black market.  Some of this 
stolen crude is shipped to a refinery in Cote d'Ivoire, where 
oil is traded for weapons and sent back to the Ijaw militants 
in the Warri area. 
 
 
 
 
11.(C) The meeting concluded with Mohammed noting that he 
would be stepping down as National Security Advisor at the 
time of President Obasanjo's May 29 inauguration but would 
not offer any hints of possible continued public service in 
the new Administration. 
 
 
12.(C) Comment:  Mohammed's relationship with Obasanjo has 
been rocky.  Neither trust the other and Obasanjo probably 
feels that Mohammed always remained more loyal to Babangida 
than to him.  However, in the contest against Buhari, both 
Obasanjo and Mohammed were fellow travelers. Obasanjo wanted 
to win; more than Obasanjo winning, Mohammed wanted Buhari to 
lose.  A Buhari loss might just keep Babangida as the 
strongest star in the northern political environment.  Now, 
with the job done, Mohammed will exit the Obasanjo 
Administration but this will not be the last we hear from 
him.  However, the next time we see him, we expect that he 
will be walking close to Babangida. 
 
 
JETER