US embassy cable - 03AMMAN2528

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 002528 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MOPS, PHUM, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: IRAQ WAR HITS POPULAR CREDIBILITY OF KING 
ABDULLAH, U.S.; MANY LOOK FOR PROGRESS ON THE PEACE PROCESS 
 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Doug Silliman for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (S)  The perceived support that King Abdullah gave to the 
military campaign in Iraq -- which many Jordanians contrast 
with his statements that U.S. forces in Jordan performed 
merely a defensive role -- has led to a good bit of 
anti-government grumbling and, during the war, some open 
criticism of the King at anti-war protests.  Jordanian 
popular mistrust of U.S. motives -- already significantly 
heightened over more than two years of the Intifada -- has 
soared in the wake of the war, with Jordanians expressing 
resentment and distrust of the U.S.  While time and a rebound 
in economic growth may convince some Jordanians of the wisdom 
of King Abdullah's decision to support the Coalition, 
concrete movement on the peace process would much more 
quickly vindicate the King's decision, and help regain some 
U.S. credibility as well.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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KING'S REPUTATION TAKES SOME HITS DOMESTICALLY 
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2.  (S)  Several GOJ officials have expressed to us recently 
worry over the effect of the Iraq war on King Abdullah's 
domestic standing in Jordan.  During the war, there were 
several demonstrations in the southern cities of Ma'an, 
Kerak, and Tafileh in which demonstrators carried signs and 
chanted slogans critical of the King and his perceived 
support for American military efforts against Iraq.  Several 
anti-regime pamphlets appeared in those and other cities as 
well, prompting GOJ security forces to tighten their control 
over demonstrations and watch opposition groups more 
carefully.  At the same time, there appears to have been a 
sharp drop in economic activity in the first quarter of 2003 
as businesses and individuals put off investment and 
consumption decisions in the lead-up to war. 
 
3.  (S)  Labor Minister Mozaheim Mohefen told Embassy FSN 
last week that, indeed, several protests in Karak and Tafileh 
during the war had contained "direct attacks" on King 
Abdullah, something that had traditionally been completely 
out of bounds.  In response, Mohefen -- who has tribal 
origins in the south -- said he had been dispatched to the 
region to look into and deal with the anti-King sentiment. 
Mohefen said the GOJ had offered paper "jobs" to hundreds in 
the two governorates in an effort to defuse a worrisome 
situation. 
 
4.  (C)  Several contacts outside the government have also 
reported to us that most average Jordanians believe that 
Jordan provided significant military support to the Coalition 
war in Iraq.  Since GOJ public acknowledgment of U.S. troop 
deployment was limited to Patriot air defense batteries, many 
Jordanians have let their imaginations run wild and believe 
the King permitted the launching of a "secret invasion" of 
Iraq from Jordanian territory.  Sketchy local press reports 
of sightings of khaki-clad foreigners and strange aircraft in 
the eastern desert have fueled this speculation -- and a good 
deal of hyperbole.  According to several contacts, many 
Jordanians have contrasted this popular perception of 
Jordanian support to the military effort with statements by 
King Abdullah and other senior GOJ officials that Jordan did 
not support the war or permit combat operations to be 
conducted from Jordanian territory.  The gap between the 
King's statements and the perceived reality, they argue, has 
damaged the King's credibility. 
 
5.  (S)  Similarly, we have heard reports that there was a 
certain amount of grumbling in the Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) 
about Jordanian government support for U.S. military efforts 
in Iraq.  Military contacts tell us that senior JAF officers 
held meetings with middle and low-ranking officers and troops 
in an effort to explain Jordan's national interest in 
supporting the U.S.  Sources in the Jordanian JCS indicate 
that a few soldiers who opposed the war were detained.  In 
the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), there was concern 
that Jordan's public association with the U.S. campaign would 
create problems GID would have to deal with -- both 
internally and from the Iraqi Intelligence Service. 
 
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AS DOES THE U.S. 
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6.  (S)  U.S. credibility -- already low following two and a 
half years of the intifada -- has also taken a big hit. 
Jordanian popular concerns about the U.S. in the aftermath of 
the Iraq war are numerous: many worry that Syria will be the 
next country to come under U.S. attack. Others criticize ORHA 
Chief Jay Garner as a "Zionist" who will try to lead a new 
Iraqi government into pro-Israel policies.  Nearly all see 
INC leader Ahmed Chalabi -- convicted of bank fraud in Jordan 
-- as a sinister tool of U.S. policy.  Finally, most 
Jordanians believe -- fed by a long series of press stories 
making this assumption -- that the U.S. invaded Iraq merely 
to gain control over Iraq's oil resources and plans for a 
long-term occupation much like the Israeli presence in the 
West Bank and Gaza.  The Jordanian press refers to both 
Israeli and U.S. forces as "occupation forces."  The number 
of Jordanians who draw parallels between the U.S. presence in 
Iraq and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank/Gaza is 
strikingly high, and the U.S. presence in Iraq is already 
referred to popularly as an "occupation." 
 
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COMMENT 
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7.  (S)  The damage to the King's standing is real, but is 
something from which he can recover given the right 
conditions.  The benefits of the King's decision will be more 
evident if there is concrete progress on the Roadmap.  The 
economic pressures and uncertainties may now also begin to 
ease, thanks to U.S. financial assistance and optimism about 
Jordan's economic future in a Saddam-free region. 
 
8.  (S)  For the U.S., the political cost is in lost 
goodwill.  Average Jordanians now ascribe to the U.S. the 
worst possible motive for any action.  This very negative 
post-war popular impression of U.S. goals may begin to fade 
if things move quickly and well in Iraq.  Even more 
important, however, will be U.S. moves to support the Roadmap 
and secure real progress toward the formation of a 
Palestinian state. 
GNEHM