US embassy cable - 03AMMAN2427

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 AMMAN 002427 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR NEA AND PRM; PLEASE PASS TO USAID 
NICOSIA FOR LAPENN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2013 
TAGS: PREF, PREL, EAID, MOPS, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: 950 ASYLUM SEEKERS AT JORDAN-IRAQ BORDER, UNHCR 
CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
 
REF: A. AMMAN 253 
     B. AMMAN 1054 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Doug Silliman for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) The GOJ is not admitting most asylum seekers to the 
UNHCR refugee camp at Ruweished.  As of mid-day on 
April 22, 950 people (roughly 800 Iranian Kurds, 50 Iranian 
oppositionists and 100 Palestinians) are being held in 
no-man's land between the Iraqi and Jordanian border posts, 
where they are receiving assistance from UNHCR and its 
implementing partners.  Senior GOJ officials, who view the 
Iranians as a security threat and a potential long-term 
refugee population, have made it clear to UNHCR and us that 
none of them will be admitted to Jordan.  The GOJ is 
pressing UNHCR to establish a camp for the Iranian 
asylum-seekers inside Iraqi territory.  In return, the GOJ 
is promising to admit Iraqis and Palestinians to the UNHCR 
refugee camp at Ruweished.  Late on April 21, the GOJ 
admitted to the UNHCR camp 94 Palestinians with family ties 
to Jordan.  UNHCR/Amman recognizes the need for cross- 
border operations but needs UNHCR/Geneva approval and 
guarantees -- including that coalition forces inside Iraq 
can establish a secure environment for a camp.  We view 
the establishment of UNHCR cross-border operations as 
the only practical solution to this increasingly 
difficult problem.  End summary. 
 
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THE PROBLEM 
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2.  (U) Since April 12, a steady and growing stream of 
asylum seekers (totaling 950 on April 22) has made its way 
toward the Karameh/Trebil border crossing.  The GOJ has 
denied entry to this group, holding it in the roughly 2-km 
wide strip of land between the Iraqi and Jordanian border 
posts.  GOJ border officials confirmed that this land, 
generally referred to as "no-man's land," actually is 
Jordanian territory.  The asylum seekers are comprised 
of the following groups: 
 
- (U) At least 800 Iranian Kurds from UNHCR's Al Tash 
refugee camp, located near the Iraqi city of Ar-Ramadi. 
(According to UNHCR, total population in Al Tash camp 
is approximately 13,000, comprised of Iranian Kurds 
who first sought refuge in Iraq in 1982.)  This group 
began arriving on April 13 and is composed almost 
entirely of families.  Their stated reasons for 
leaving Iraq range from a lack of humanitarian 
services in Al Tash camp to a general breakdown of 
law and order and fear of reprisals following the fall 
of the Iraqi government.  UNHCR believes that there 
most likely is a lack of basic humanitarian services 
in Al Tash camp, as UNHCR withdrew its expatriate 
staff from Iraq before hostilities and cannot confirm 
whether local staff is still at work.  UNHCR also 
reports that its implementing partner for Al Tash 
camp had been the Iraqi Red Crescent which has 
"disintegrated" during the war.  UNHCR is unable to send 
expatriate staff back into Al Tash camp -- even to conduct 
an assessment -- until coalition forces and then UNSECOORD 
declare the area to be permissive.  UNHCR has been unable 
to conduct detailed interviews with this group, due to the 
chaotic and constantly changing conditions at NML.  We and 
UNHCR assume this influx will continue until the core 
problems at Al Tash camp are resolved. 
 
- (C) An estimated 50-60 Iranians who have identified 
themselves as oppositionists and may have ties to 
Mujaheddin-e-Khalq.  A total of 96 such Iranians arrived in 
several groups April 12-13.  They are mostly men (only 12 
women) and all are unmarried.  They all are carrying travel 
documents, but most are expired refugee convention travel 
documents issued by western European countries.  Three are 
carrying expired US-issued refugee travel documents.  UNHCR 
reports that some members of this group whose travel 
documents have been found to be invalid have willingly 
returned to Iraq.  Another five are carrying valid French 
and Canadian passports and were allowed to enter Jordan 
April 21 en route to France and Canada.  Two Iranians are 
carrying valid Australian passports but have been denied 
entry to Jordan by GOJ border guards.  GOJ officials have 
announced -- including to the press -- that they will not 
admit this group to Jordan (see para 6).  UNHCR 
understands that this group could have ties to a terrorist 
organization and is not urging the GOJ to admit its 
members to the UNHCR refugee camp at Ruweished. 
 
- (U) An estimated 100-150 Palestinians, carrying a mix of 
Iraqi and Egyptian travel documents -- or no documents at 
all.  Some members of this group have family ties to 
Jordan.  Late on April 21, the GOJ allowed 94 Palestinians 
from "mixed" families -- e.g., those with some Jordanian 
passport holders -- to enter the UNHCR refugee camp at 
Ruweished.  UNHCR officials advise that another 80 
Palestinians will be admitted to the UNHCR refugee camp 
later today, April 22.  The GOJ previously allowed a 
separate group of 40 Palestinians to come to Amman on a 
temporary basis, with guarantees from Jordanian family 
members that the entry truly would be temporary. 
Palestinians in no-man's land have told UNHCR protection 
officers that they are being threatened by Iraqis, told 
that they were "guests" of Saddam who no longer are 
welcome in Iraq.  Others have told UNHCR that they were 
evicted from their homes by Iraqis. 
 
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THE PRACTICALITIES 
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3.  (U) All of the above groups, plus a smattering of 
Iraqis and other nationalities with document problems, 
are being held in the roughly 2 km-wide "no-man's 
land" (NML) between the Jordanian and Iraqi border 
posts.  This "no-man's land" actually belongs to the 
Government of Jordan, as its territory extends to 
the Iraqi border post.  UNHCR and its implementing 
partners are providing services to the NML population. 
UNHCR has erected tents and rubb halls and is 
providing non-food items (blankets, cook stoves, 
hygiene kits, etc.) to each family upon arrival. 
UNHCR implementing partner Oxfam is providing water 
and sanitation facilities.  UNHCR implementing 
partner CARE is supporting overall "camp" management, 
including tent set up and food distribution.  MSF and 
UNHCR implementing partner Japan Platform are 
providing medical services.  Food currently is being 
provided on ad hoc basis by UNHCR, ICRC, Jordan Red 
Crescent and its NGO implementing partners in the TCN 
transit camp.  UNHCR has not established an overall 
"camp" management system -- registration lists, food 
ration cards and an organized security and protection 
system -- due to the temporary nature of the 
arrangement.  UNHCR also reports that it has been 
unable to conduct thorough interviews of individual 
asylum seekers, due to the chaotic and ever-changing 
circumstances in this area. 
 
4.  (U) On April 20, UNHCR -- in cooperation with GOJ 
implementing partner the Hashemite Charitable Organization 
(HCO) -- decided to expand capacity in NML to provide 
services for 5,000 people.  UNHCR reports that 
accommodations for 5,000 inside NML will be "tight" with 
little space between tents and tents set up right to the 
edge of the highway.  UNHCR acknowledges that security 
and protection would be difficult in such circumstances. 
 
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THE GOJ'S POSITION 
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5.  (C) From our earliest discussions with the GOJ on 
possible Iraq-related refugee flows (reftels), the 
GOJ has made it clear it would not permit Iranians 
or Palestinian asylum seekers to enter Jordan.  Yet 
it nevertheless signed a letter of understanding 
(LOU) with UNHCR in which it agreed to provide 
"temporary protection" to "persons in need of 
humanitarian assistance caused by possible 
hostilities ... in Iraq."  When, in an April 20 
meeting, the Ambassador reminded Foreign Minister 
Marwan Muasher and Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs Shaher Bak of the GOJ's obligations under 
the LOU, both officials replied that, due to 
security concerns, Iranians would not be permitted 
to enter Jordan.  Bak subsequently delivered the 
same message to UNHCR Representative Sten Bronee 
in an April 21 meeting.  Minister of Information 
Mohammed Adwan went public with the same message on 
April 21, telling the press that the GOJ would only 
allow Iranian Kurds and oppositionists to enter 
Jordan on the condition that "they will leave 
immediately after that," en route to other countries. 
Adwan also said that the GOJ will facilitate the 
establishment of a camp for Iranians near the 
Jordanian border, but inside Iraqi territory. 
 
6.  (S) The GOJ views the Iranian Kurds from Al Tash 
camp as a long-term refugee problem that must be 
addressed by coalition forces and UNHCR.  As FonMin 
Muasher told the Ambassador April 20, coalition 
forces must restore security to Al Tash camp and 
create conditions appropriate for the Kurds' return 
to Al Tash camp.  UNHCR must also restore services 
inside the camp.  If UNHCR has been unable to 
resettle this group since 1982, why should Jordan 
open its borders and become host to yet another 
long-term refugee population?  Separately, the GOJ 
views the Iranian oppositionists as both a potential 
security threat and a political headache.  Muasher 
confirmed to the Ambassador on April 21 that the 
Iranian Government had requested that the GOJ arrest 
and extradite to Iran the presumed MEK supporters, 
a political and human rights problem the GOJ seeks 
to avoid.  The GOJ seems content to leave this group 
in NML until its members are moved to a third country, 
choose to return to Iraq or can be deported to 
coalition forces' control for internment. 
 
7.  (C) The question of the Palestinians is both more 
complicated and potentially more manageable, should 
the numbers remain small.  With enormous pressure 
not to allow Israeli "transfer" of Palestinians from 
the West Bank, the GOJ is reluctant to allow the 
"transfer" of Palestinians from Iraq to Jordan. 
Given its historical absorption of Palestinians 
following every major regional conflict since 1948, 
the GOJ also worries that it will be forced to 
accept another large influx of Palestinians 
from Iraq, an economic burden the GOJ feels it is 
unable to accommodate.  Yet given the numerous 
family ties between Palestinians in Iraq and Jordan, 
the GOJ also faces internal political pressures to 
allow at least some displaced Palestinians to enter 
Jordan.  The GOJ allowed 40 to do so in early April, 
as long as their relatives in Jordan provided 
guarantees that the stay truly would be temporary. 
We expect the GOJ will ultimately allow this current 
group of Palestinians to enter Jordan as well. 
MinState Bak offered such a "deal" to UNHCR on 
April 21, promising to admit all Palestinians if 
UNHCR would set up a camp for the Iranians inside 
Iraqi territory. 
 
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THE POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
--------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Although UNHCR would like to continue pressing 
the GOJ to uphold its first asylum obligations, UNHCR 
Representative Sten Bronee understands that the GOJ 
will not let the Iranians or the Iranian Kurds into the 
(nearly empty) UNHCR refugee camp at Ruweished.  UNHCR 
also realizes that establishing a camp for thousands of 
people in a very limited physical space where their 
status remains uncertain is not a viable solution. 
Bronee has told us he is considering establishing 
cross-border operations, but cannot make that decision 
without UNHCR/Geneva's approval.  He also said that 
UNHCR as an institution cannot agree to cross-border 
operations until it has key guarantees from the GOJ, 
donors and coalition forces regarding cross-border 
access for UNHCR staff, logistical and infrastructure 
support for a new camp, access to Jordan for critically 
ill asylum seekers (the nearest hospital is in 
Ruweished, Jordan), financial support for a camp inside 
Iraq, and -- from coalition forces -- guarantees for 
camp security requirements.  Finally, Bronee reported 
that he has requested an UNSECOORD assessment of the 
immediate cross-border area (an important first step 
in establish cross-border operations) as well as of 
Al Tash camp. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
COMMENT -- AND SUGGESTIONS ON USG NEXT STEPS 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) This rapidly growing population of asylum 
seekers is causing difficult political problems. 
We, the GOJ and UNHCR all believe that the current 
arrangements in NML are neither adequate nor 
long-term, especially if Al Tash camp continues 
to bleed refugees.  From both a political and 
practical perspective, we view the establishment 
of UNHCR cross-border operations as the only 
solution. 
 
10.  (S) In order to prepare the groundwork for 
what we see as an eventual UNHCR-run camp inside 
Iraqi territory, we suggest the following next 
steps: 
 
- A formal message of support (political and 
financial) from PRM to UNHCR/Geneva on 
cross-border operations in western Iraq. 
 
- Initiation of CENTCOM discussions with 
UNHCR over security requirements for a camp 
in western Iraq. 
 
- Designation of appropriate coalition forces 
to meet camp security needs. 
 
11.  (S) We also request that CENTCOM conduct 
a civil affairs assessment of Al Tash camp as 
quickly as possible, to determine the root 
causes of the population flow from the camp.  If 
security is a problem in the camp, we also request 
that CENTCOM designate appropriate forces that 
would enable UN agencies to re-establish 
operations inside Al Tash camp. 
GNEHM