US embassy cable - 03OTTAWA1123

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 001123 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2013 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, CA, IZ, Iraq 
SUBJECT: CANADA-U.S SECURITY RELATIONS - GETTING PAST IRAQ 
TO PURSUE OUR COMMON INTERESTS 
 
REF: (A) OTTAWA 892 (B) OTTAWA 1014 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Stephen R. Kelly, 
Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (C) With U.S.-Canada relations in flux and the role of the 
United Nations in question, Canadian foreign policy is at a 
crossroads.  The postponement of the President's state visit 
to Ottawa, after Canada chose not to participate in Iraq and 
senior GoC officials criticized the U.S.-led effort, has been 
a harsh but necessary reality check for Canada.  We will be 
on better footing after the February 2004 departure of Prime 
Minister Chretien, who prefers to work within international 
institutions even when they prove ineffective, and even when 
doing so damages our bilateral relationship.  Canada will 
still be a strong proponent of multilateralism after 
Chretien's departure, but we expect his successor - probably 
ex-Finance Minister Paul Martin - to bring greater balance to 
Canadian foreign policy. 
 
2. (C) SUMMARY CONT'D: In the meantime, we have a broad 
security agenda that must not languish while we wait for 
Chretien's replacement.  From counterterrorist cooperation in 
North America to military deployments in Afghanistan to 
putting pressure on the North Korean and Iranian nuclear 
programs, we need Canada's help.  We are also pushing Canada 
to go ahead with a decision to participate in missile 
defense.  While doing so should be a no-brainer, given the 
security benefits for North America as a whole, it would 
represent a major leap for Canadian foreign policy.  If 
Foreign Minister Graham and Defense Minister McCallum can 
convince Chretien to not pass the buck on this decision to 
his successor, then we need to work with the GoC to plug 
NORAD into missile defense command and control for North 
America.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3. (C) After the failure of its efforts to "bridge the 
divide" at the UN Security Council  and its subsequent 
decision not to participate in the military campaign against 
Iraq (ref. A), Canada finds itself in a awkward position. 
Its "primordial" bilateral relationship with the U.S. is 
strained, as was graphically demonstrated by the postponement 
of President Bush's May 5 state visit to Ottawa.  The GoC is 
rightly concerned about getting bilateral relations back on 
track, and is looking for ways to do so.  At the same time, 
Canada remains committed to multilateral institutions such as 
the United Nations, and will continue to push for them to 
have a role in dealing with international crises. 
 
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CHRETIEN UNREPENTANT ON IRAQ 
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4. (C) In the wake of the coalition's sweeping military 
victory, public opinion in Canada has swung from majority 
opposition to the war to roughly an even split (ref. B). 
Prime Minister Chretien, however, has been unrepentant.  He 
has maintained that Canada was right to not participate in 
Iraq without UN blessing, and has reiterated his concern 
about military actions aimed at regime change.  A few Liberal 
Party MPs have publicly stated their opposition to Chretien's 
decision on Iraq, and press reports indicate that Deputy 
Prime Minister John Manley argued for Canadian participation 
within Cabinet.  Meanwhile, the frontrunner to become the 
next Prime Minister when Chretien steps down in February 
2004, ex-Finance Minister Paul Martin, has criticized 
anti-American rhetoric within the Liberal Party but also said 
that the Prime Minister made the right decision on Iraq. 
This position puts him squarely in the middle of the party 
that will continue to govern Canada for the foreseeable 
future. 
 
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A ROLE IN POST-CONFLICT IRAQ 
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5. (C) On post-conflict Iraq, the GoC wants to see as much UN 
involvement as possible but has been careful not to get into 
the same box as it did on military action.  Manley has 
explicitly stated that Canada will not wait for UN approval 
to contribute to reconstruction efforts.  Thus far Canada has 
pledged US$70 million for humanitarian assistance, and is 
looking at specific expertise it could offer.  The RCMP, 
which has international experience in countries such as 
Bosnia and Haiti, has been mentioned as a possible source of 
assistance on the police front.  The GoC wants to make a 
significant contribution in Iraq and to get back in our good 
graces.  We need to work with them to find a useful role. 
 
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WAR ON TERRORISM, ARMS CONTROL 
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6. (C) Despite the rift over Iraq, we need to continue 
working closely with Canada on our national security agenda. 
We have much common ground in the war on terrorism and in 
arms control efforts.  We have worked extremely closely with 
Canada in law enforcement, intelligence and military channels 
on preventing future terrorist attacks in North America. 
Given the massive flows of people and goods between our 
countries, such cooperation is essential. Canada has also 
stepped up to the plate internationally in the war on 
terrorism.  Canada has been one of the biggest contributors 
to Operation Enduring Freedom, and will be supplying 1500 
personnel to ISAF IV and V beginning in August. 
 
7. (C) On the arms control front, Canada shares our strong 
concerns about the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs, 
has denounced the DPRK's withdrawal from the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, and has pushed for censure of Iran 
at the IAEA.  Canada will continue to be a valuable ally in 
multilateral arms control fora, where it has considerable 
expertise and can serve as a bridge to other countries. 
 
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MISSILE DEFENSE 
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8. (C) The big question now for the bilateral security 
relationship is missile defense.  Foreign Minister Graham and 
Defense Minister McCallum agreed in fall 2002 that Canada 
should participate in missile defense, and they are trying to 
gain Cabinet blessing to negotiate an agreement on 
participation with us.  Graham and McCallum are trying to 
allay longstanding Canadian concerns that such a system would 
damage arms control efforts, particularly the weaponization 
of space. 
 
9. (C) The deciding factor, as for all major GoC decisions, 
will be Chretien.  He has indicated a willingness for Cabinet 
to consider the issue, and he usually does not do so unless 
he is favorably disposed.  DFAIT and DND still expect missile 
defense to be taken up by Cabinet in the coming weeks, but do 
not yet have a clear sense of how the Prime Minister is 
leaning.  We know there will be opposition from some of the 
more left-leaning members of Cabinet.  Chretien can squash 
them if he chooses, and push this through.  Or he can decide 
that he does not want missile defense participation to be 
part of his legacy, and put off consideration by Cabinet. 
 
10. (C) Like on the issue of Iraqi reconstruction, we should 
engage Canada in a significant way if it chooses to 
participate in missile defense.  In particular, we should 
find a way to plug NORAD into missile defense command and 
control for North America.  This would be at the top of 
Canada's priority list for an agreement with us, as the GoC 
fears that NORAD will wither away if it is not involved in 
missile defense.  We will need to show some flexibility on 
this issue, despite the recent assignment of missile defense 
regional oversight to NORTHCOM, in order to help our allies 
sell a missile defense agreement in Ottawa. 
CELLUCCI