US embassy cable - 03COLOMBO688

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 COLOMBO 000688 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, SA/PD, S/CT 
 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958:   DECL:  04-22-13 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, KPAO, EAID, CE, NO, JA, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT:  Tigers announce they are suspending peace 
talks; GSL, most observers see move as tactical 
 
Refs:  Colombo 685, and previous (Notal) 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills. 
Reasons:  1.5 (b, d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In a press release dated April 21, the 
Tamil Tigers suspended their participation in the peace 
talks and said they will not attend the June donors 
conference.  The GSL has not yet reacted in public to 
the statement (short of a very brief letter to the 
Tigers taking note of their statement).  Minister 
Moragoda told us that he thought the move was tactical, 
"shock therapy" by the Tigers, as he put it.  Other 
observers agree with this perspective.  While the Tigers 
are always hard to read, we tend to agree that they 
still see the peace process as a going concern.  A 
suggested press statement for Washington's immediate 
review is contained in Para 10.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------- 
Tiger Statement 
--------------- 
 
2.  (U) In a long press release dated April 21, the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) suspended its 
participation in peace talks with the Sri Lankan 
government and said the group will not attend the June 
donors conference in Tokyo.  (Note:  Per the statement, 
the seventh round of GSL-LTTE talks, which had been set 
to take place in Thailand from April 29 - May 2, is now 
off.)  The press release came in the form of a letter 
from the LTTE's London-based spokesman and senior 
negotiator Anton Balasingham to Prime Minister Ranil 
Wickremesinghe.  (Note:  The text of the statement, as 
carried by pro-LTTE websites, is contained in Para 11.) 
 
3.  (U) The statement begins by tipping its hat to the 
peace process, noting that the prior rounds of talks and 
other interactions among the LTTE, government, and 
Norwegian government facilitators had "fostered trust 
and confidence."  After this brief introduction, the 
statement hits it stride when it makes the following 
three major complaints about the peace process: 
 
-- April 14 Seminar:  The statement asserts that the GSL 
and the Norwegian facilitators should have ensured the 
LTTE's participation in all meetings on international 
assistance issues.  Instead, the GSL and GoN allowed 
Washington to be the venue of the April 14 seminar on 
Sri Lanka despite being "fully aware of the fact that 
the United States has legal constraints in inviting 
representatives of a proscribed organization" to the 
U.S.  The statement goes on to claim that the LTTE's 
"exclusion" from the conference "has seriously eroded 
the confidence of our people in the peace process." 
(Note:  The LTTE could not attend the seminar because 
the group is on our Foreign Terrorist Organization, 
"FTO," list.  This part of the statement is the only 
place where the U.S. is mentioned.) 
 
-- Ceasefire Accord Implementation:  In its second key 
section, the statement asserts that the government has 
not done enough to implement the February 2002 ceasefire 
accord (a.k.a., "the Ceasefire Memorandum of 
Understanding").  The LTTE asserts that "tens of 
thousands of government troops continue to occupy our 
towns, cities and residential areas, suffocating the 
freedom of mobility of our people."  The statement goes 
on to claim that the GSL's "repeated assurances that the 
resettlement of displaced people would be expedited have 
proven futile."  (Note:  About 300,000 displaced persons 
have, in fact, returned to their homes in the north and 
east since the peace process began.  About 500,000 
people remain displaced.)  A specific reference is made 
to Jaffna District, where the LTTE has long complained 
that the GSL has not done enough to reduce the size of 
its "high security zones." 
 
-- Focus of Assistance:  The third major section 
involves a long, rambling, vague claim that the 
government should not be asking for international 
assistance for all of Sri Lanka, but only for the war- 
torn north and east.  According to the LTTE, "(T)he 
poverty that is prevailing in southern Sri Lanka is a 
self-inflicted phenomenon, caused by the disastrous 
policies of past governments in dealing with the Tamil 
national conflict...This approach grossly understates 
the severity of the problems faced by the people in the 
northeast." 
 
4.  (U) Briefly reciting these complaints, the statement 
wraps up by saying: 
 
"Under these circumstances, the LTTE leadership has 
decided to suspend its participation in the negotiations 
for the time being.  We will not be attending the donor 
conference in Japan in June.  While we regret that we 
are compelled to make this painful decision, we wish to 
reiterate our commitment to seek a negotiated political 
solution to the ethnic question." 
 
------------ 
GSL Reaction 
------------ 
 
5.  (C) The government has not yet issued an official 
public reaction to the LTTE statement.  (Note:  Late 
April 22, Prime Minister Wickremesinghe sent a very 
brief letter to the LTTE's Balasingham stating that the 
GSL had taken note of the Tigers' concerns and planned 
to respond to them in full.  A copy of this letter is 
being faxed to SA/INS.)  In an April 22 conversation, 
Minister Milinda Moragoda, who had just returned from 
Europe, told the Ambassador that he thought the LTTE's 
announcement was basically tactical in nature, "a way to 
regain control of the agenda by the Tigers," as he put 
it.  It was positive that the Tigers had made clear they 
were not pulling out of the talks on a permanent basis 
and had not pulled out of the ceasefire accord, for 
example.  On this point, Moragoda related he had met J. 
Maheswaran, a pro-LTTE Tamil of Australian nationality, 
on his plane trip back from Europe.  Moragoda said 
Maheswaran had told him he (Maheswaran) still intended 
to participate (as a LTTE representative) in ceasefire- 
related meetings.  (Note:  The Sri Lanka Monitoring 
Mission has also told us that the LTTE has given no 
indication that it intends to cancel its participation 
in ceasefire-related meetings, including in the Sub- 
Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation 
Needs in the North and the East, "SIHRN.") 
 
6.  (C) In making the statement, Moragoda said the LTTE 
seemed to be using "shock therapy" because it felt a bit 
cornered, as many of the easy steps regarding the peace 
process had already been taken, leaving only tough 
decisions.  In addition to being upset about the 
April 14 seminar, Moragoda remarked that he thought the 
group was also disturbed by political happenings in the 
south, including a possible linkup between the 
Opposition People's Alliance (PA) and the radical, anti- 
peace process Janantha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).  Noting 
that he had met with Norwegian envoy Solheim while in 
Europe, Moragoda said he and other GSL officials 
involved with peace process issues planned to meet with 
the Prime Minister late April 22 to formulate next 
steps.  Ambassador Wills commented that the government 
would be wise to be restrained in what it says, but it 
should be firm with the LTTE.  Moragoda said he agreed 
with that posture, and based on an earlier conversation, 
he thought the PM was on board for that sort of 
approach.  He confided that he had spoken with G.L. 
Peiris, the GSL's chief negotiator, who seemed a bit 
"frazzled" by the LTTE's announcement, however. 
(Note:  Peiris is also the government's chief 
spokesman.) 
 
7.  (U) (((Note:  Shortly after her return from an 
official visit to Bangladesh, President Kumaratunga 
issued a statement critical of the LTTE's announcement. 
The president's statement called the LTTE's rationale 
for pulling out of the talks "feeble" and called for the 
group to reconsider its decision.  In a rare joint 
meeting of the two political adversaries, the president 
and the Prime Minister are scheduled to discuss the 
situation on 
April 22.))) 
 
-------------- 
Other Reaction 
-------------- 
 
8.  (C) Most observers we have spoken to agree with 
Moragoda that the Tigers' statement was tactical in 
nature and not an indication that the group plans to end 
the peace process.  Comments we have picked up included 
the following: 
 
-- N. Raviraj, a Tamil National Alliance (TNA) MP who 
has expressed concerns about the LTTE in the past, 
commented that he had "full confidence" that the current 
problems could be worked out.  He said he believed that 
the Tigers' non-invitation to the April 14 seminar was 
the "spark" that led to the LTTE's releasing the 
statement, but he thought the group could be convinced 
to re-enter the talks. 
 
-- Joseph Pararajasingham, a Tamil MP with very close 
LTTE links, told us that Tiger officials had recently 
assured him that the group would not scrap the ceasefire 
accord.  He was also confident that if the Norwegians 
took part in "shuttle diplomacy" they could get the LTTE 
to attend the June donors conference in Tokyo.  He said 
he thought the LTTE truly was angered over the Sri 
Lankan military's continuing large-scale presence in 
Jaffna, as well as its "exclusion" from the April 14 
conference in the U.S.  Notwithstanding the hard 
feelings, he predicted that these issues could be 
"overcome," allowing the peace process to move forward. 
 
-- M.L.A.M. Hizbullah, a National Unity Alliance MP and 
a Muslim, said he was convinced that the suspension of 
talks would have little long-term impact on the peace 
process.  He said the GSL should respond to the LTTE in 
good faith with proposals re the security zones in 
Jaffna and in other areas to assuage LTTE concerns.  He 
also expressed doubts that the LTTE would not, in the 
end, attend the donors conference in Tokyo, as "it was 
in their interest to be there." 
 
-- Taking a somewhat different tack, V. Thevaraj, the 
editor of a Tamil-language daily newspaper, expressed 
some concern over what he described as "deep anger" 
within the LTTE.  He stated that some in the LTTE 
remained furious over the deaths of 11 of its sea cadre 
in a confrontation with the Sri Lankan navy off the 
northeast coast in March (see Reftels).  The LTTE's 
statement, he averred, was an effort by its leadership 
to appease Tiger hard-liners, who remained bitter over 
this incident. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9.  (C) While the Tigers are always hard to read, we 
tend to agree that that their statement seems basically 
tactical in nature and that they still see the peace 
process as a going concern.  It was positive, for 
example, that the group did not permanently pull out of 
the peace talks; nor, based on what we are hearing, is 
it ending cooperation on ceasefire-related matters.  Our 
guess is that Moragoda is right and that the group is 
trying to regain control of the agenda via some "shock 
therapy."  The LTTE's decision, as it happens, also 
appears to fit into its seeming long-term desire to slow 
down the pace of the peace process.  (Note:  Some 
observers say, for example, that the LTTE wants to wait 
until arch-foe President Kumaratunga's term ends in late 
2005 before it agrees to a negotiated settlement.)  In 
issuing the statement, however, the LTTE is exposing 
itself to a lot of flak that it is undermining the peace 
track.  We think that pressure on the group to remain a 
part of the process will not only come from the south, 
but also from many Tamils, who know that a return to war 
would be devastating for their community.  END COMMENT. 
 
--------------------- 
Draft Press Statement 
--------------------- 
 
10.  (C) Attached below is a draft press statement for 
Washington's immediate review.  We would like 
Washington's clearance by April 23 morning (local), so 
that the statement can be issued that day.  We have 
received many press inquiries and would like to get a 
U.S. statement out right away.  As an alternative to the 
attached statement, Washington may wish to consider 
issuance of a "minimalist" statement that simply regrets 
the LTTE's decision, and urges it to reconsider, so as 
not to endanger the gains made by the peace process.  We 
think it is important to be up-front and direct with the 
LTTE about its action, which is why we recommend the 
attached statement.  Either way, we would appreciate 
Washington's guidance ASAP. 
 
Begin text: 
 
We regret the decisions by the LTTE to suspend its 
participation in the Sri Lankan peace talks and not to 
attend the Tokyo donor's conference scheduled for June. 
 
We reviewed carefully the ostensible reasons for these 
decisions cited in Mr. Balasingham's letter to the Prime 
Minister dated April 21.  We do not find them 
convincing.  A well-intentioned party that truly wants a 
peaceful, political settlement to Sri Lanka's conflict 
could deal with such grievances at the negotiating 
table.  We call on the Tigers to reconsider and to 
return to the negotiating track.  We also call on the 
LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka to honor the terms 
of the ceasefire even while the talks are suspended. 
 
In the meantime, this interregnum in the talks could 
prove useful by giving both parties the opportunity to 
recommit themselves to negotiations.  We have long 
supported the MOU even though we have also acknowledged 
it has not been implemented perfectly.  Blame for this 
does not fall exclusively on the side of the Government 
of Sri Lanka, however, as the LTTE's statement suggests. 
The Tigers, too, bear heavy responsibility for numerous 
breaches of the MOU.  While the talks are suspended, we 
urge the LTTE to reflect carefully on its own 
transgressions.  Assassinations of opponents, 
intimidation of Muslims, taxation without 
representation, aggressive Sea Tiger behavior and 
continued child recruitment do not build trust in the 
LTTE's intentions. 
 
We continue to believe that the way out of Sri Lanka's 
ethnic conflict is through negotiations facilitated by 
the Government of Norway.  In this regard, we remain 
willing to do whatever we can to assist Sri Lanka as it 
tries to bring an end to this ugly war. 
 
End text. 
 
---------------------- 
Text of LTTE Statement 
---------------------- 
 
11.  (U) The following is the text of the LTTE 
statement made by LTTE spokesman Anton Balasingham and 
issued late April 21: 
 
Begin text. 
 
Dear Prime Minister, 
 
In accordance with the decision of our leadership I am 
advised to bring to your urgent attention the deep 
displeasure and dismay felt by our organization on some 
critical issues relating to the on-going peace process. 
 
You are well aware that the Ceasefire Agreement that has 
been in force for more than one year and the six rounds 
of peace negotiations between the principal parties has 
been successful, irrespective of the occurrence of some 
violent incidents that endangered the peace process. 
The stability of the ceasefire and the progress of the 
peace talks, you will certainly appreciate, are the 
positive outcome of the sincere and firm determination 
of the parties to seek a permanent resolution to the 
ethnic conflict through peaceful means.  The cordial 
inter-relationship, frank and open discussions and the 
able and wise guidance of the facilitators fostered 
trust and confidence between the negotiators and helped 
to advance the talks on substantial levels.  The 
negotiating teams were able to form important sub- 
committees on the basis of equal and joint partnership. 
During the early negotiating sessions it was agreed that 
the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE should work 
together and approach the international community in 
partnership.  The Oslo Donor Conference held on 25 
November 2002 turned out to be an ideal forum for such 
joint endeavor. 
 
The LTTE has acted sincerely and in good faith extending 
its full cooperation to the government of Sri Lanka to 
seek international assistance to restore normalcy and to 
rehabilitate the war affected people of the northeast. 
The LTTE to date has joined hands with the government 
and participated in the preparation of joint appeals and 
programs.  In spite of our goodwill and trust, your 
government has opted to marginalize our organization in 
approaching the international community for economic 
assistance.  We refer to the exclusion of the LTTE from 
the crucial international donor conference held in 
Washington on 14 April 2003 in preparation for the major 
donor conference to be held in Japan in June.  We view 
the exclusion of the LTTE, the principle partner to 
peace and the authentic representatives of the Tamil 
people from discussions on critical matters affecting 
the economic and social welfare of the Tamil nation, as 
a grave breach of good faith.  Your government, as well 
as our facilitator Norway, are fully aware of the fact 
that the United States has legal constraints to invite 
representatives of a proscribed organization to their 
country.  In these circumstances an appropriate venue 
could have been selected to facilitate the LTTE to 
participate in this important preparatory aid 
conference.  But the failure on the part of your 
government to do so gives cause for suspicion that this 
omission was deliberate.  The exclusion of the LTTE from 
this conference has severely eroded the confidence of 
our people. 
 
As you are aware, considerable optimism and hopes were 
raised among the people when your government, shortly 
after assuming power, entered into a ceasefire agreement 
with our organization, bringing to an end twenty years 
of savage and bloody conflict.  Expectations were 
further raised when both sides began direct negotiations 
with Norwegian facilitation.  In particular, there was a 
justifiable expectation that the peace process would 
address the urgent and immediate existential problems 
facing the people of the north and east, particularly 
the million people who are internally displaced by the 
conflict and are languishing in welfare centers and 
refugee camps. 
 
As such, the Ceasefire Agreement included crucial 
conditions of restoring normalcy which required the 
vacation, by occupying Sri Lankan troops, of Tamil 
homes, schools, places of worship and public buildings. 
Despite the agreed timeframe for this evacuation of 
troops, which has since passed, there has been no change 
in the ground situation.  We have repeatedly raised the 
issue of continuing suffering of our people at every 
round of talks with your government.  Your negotiators' 
repeated assurances that the resettlement of the 
displaced people would be expedited have proven futile. 
The negotiations have been successful in so far as 
significant progress has been made in key areas, such as 
the agreement to explore federalism on the basis of the 
right to self-determination of our people.  But this 
progress has not been matched by any improvement in the 
continuing hardships being faced by our people as a 
result of your government's refusal to implement the 
normalization aspects of the Ceasefire Agreement and 
subsequent agreements reached at the talks.  As a 
result, considerable disillusionment has set in amongst 
the Tamil people, and in particular the displaced, who 
have lost all hope the peace process will alleviate 
their immense suffering. 
 
Through there is peace due to the silencing of the guns, 
normalcy has not returned to Tamil areas.  Tens of 
thousands of government troops continue to occupy our 
towns, cities and residential areas suffocating the 
freedom of mobility or our people.  Such a massive 
military occupation of Tamil lands, particularly in 
Jaffna - a densely populated district - during peace 
times denying the right of our displaced people to 
return to their homes, is unfair and unjust. 
 
Your government, in international forums, continues to 
place poverty as the common phenomenon affecting the 
entire country.  The Poverty Reduction Strategy forms 
the essence of the document Regaining Sri Lanka' which 
defines the macro-economic policy of your government. 
Though poverty and poverty alleviation constitute the 
centrality of the new economic vision of your government 
as exemplified in `Regaining Sri Lanka' the document 
fails to examine the causality of the phenomenon of 
poverty, the effects of ethnic war and the unique 
conditions of devastation prevailing in the northeast. 
 
In our view, the conditions of reality prevailing in 
Tamil areas are qualitatively different from southern 
Sri Lanka.  The Tamils faced the brunt of the brutal 
war.  Twenty years of intense and incessant war has 
caused irreparable destruction to the infrastructure in 
the northeast.  This colossal destruction augmented by 
continued displacement of the people and their inability 
to pursue their livelihoods due to military restrictions 
and activities have caused untold misery and extreme 
poverty among the people of the northeast.  Continued 
displacement has also depleted all forms of savings of 
these people disabling them from regaining their lives 
on their own.  The war-affected people need immediate 
help to regain their dignity.  They need restoration of 
essential services to re-establish their lives. 
Reconstruction of infrastructures such as roads, 
hospitals, schools and houses are essential for them to 
return to normal life. 
 
The poverty that is prevailing in southern Sri Lanka is 
a self-inflicted phenomenon, caused by the disastrous 
policies of the past governments (both the UNP and the 
SLFP) in dealing with the Tamil national conflict.  In 
its fanatical drive to prosecute an unjust war against 
the Tamil people, the Sinhala state wasted all national 
wealth to a futile cause.  The massive borrowings to 
sustain an absurd policy of `war for peace' by the 
former government caused huge international 
indebtedness.  The economic situation of the south has 
been further worsened by the mismanagement of state 
funds, bad governance and institutional corruption. 
Therefore, the conditions prevailing in the south are 
distinctly different from the northeast where the scale 
and magnitude of the infra-structural destruction is 
monumental and the poverty is acute.  Ignoring this 
distinctive reality, your government posits poverty as a 
common phenomenon across the country and attempts to 
seek a solution with a common approach.  This approach 
grossly under states the severity of the problems faced 
by the people in the northeast. 
 
The government's `Regaining Sri Lanka' document 
completely lacks any form of identified goals for the 
northeast.  Statistics presented for substantiating the 
policy totally ignore the northeast and solely 
concentrate on southern Sri Lanka.  However, this has 
been promoted as the national strategy to the 
international community to seek aid.  It is evident from 
this that the government lacks any comprehensive 
strategy for serious development of the northeast.  The 
poverty reduction strategy fails to address the poverty 
of the northeast as distinct from the rest.  In seeking 
international assistance your government disingenuously 
speaks of reconstruction being needed in all areas, 
thereby masking the total destruction of the 
infrastructure of the northeast which has resulted from 
the militarist policies of the past three decades. 
 
As we pointed out above, the exclusion of the LTTE from 
critical aid conference in Washington, the non- 
implementation of the terms and conditions enunciated in 
the truce document, the continuous suffering and 
hardship experienced by hundreds of thousands of 
internally displaced Tamils, the aggressive Sinhala 
military occupation of Tamil cities and civilian 
settlements, the distortion and marginalization of the 
extreme conditions of poverty and deprivation of the 
Tamils of the northeast in the macro-economic policies 
and strategies of the government have seriously 
undermined the confidence of the Tamil people and the 
LTTE leadership in the negotiating process.  Under these 
circumstances the LTTE leadership has decided to suspend 
its participation in the negotiations for the time 
being.  We will not be attending the donor conference in 
Japan in June.  While we regret that we were compelled 
to make this painful decision, we wish to reiterate our 
commitment to seek a negotiated political solution to 
the ethnic question.  We also urge the government of Sri 
Lanka to restore confidence in the peace process amongst 
the Tamil people by fully implementing, without further 
delay, the normalization aspects of the ceasefire 
agreement and permit the immediate resettlement of the 
internally displaced people of the northeast.  We also 
request the government to re-evaluate its economic 
development strategy to reconstruct the Tamil nation 
destroyed by war. 
 
End text. 
 
12.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS