US embassy cable - 03ANKARA2596

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002596 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2012 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY: FORMER PRESIDENT DEMIREL TELLS AMBASSADOR 
TURKEY MUST MEND FENCES WITH U.S. 
 
 
REF: ANKARA 2521 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador W. R. Pearson.  Reason:1.5(b)(d) 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: In an April 21 meeting with Ambassador, 
former President Suleyman Demirel offered his thinking on the 
way ahead in U.S.-Turkey relations.  Demirel volunteered that 
there is a debate in Ankara power centers about Turkey's 
strategic orientation; but that in his view, "the Turkish 
Army cannot make war on the Kurds or the people of northern 
Iraq."  Turkey, he stated, has no alternative but to repair 
ties to the U.S.  End summary. 
 
 
2. (C) Demirel observed that Turkey would have been better 
served had the GOT been up front with the United States from 
the beginning on Iraq: "90% of the public was against the 
war.  They (GOT) should have told you that they simply could 
not open a northern front, but would support you in other 
ways.  Then they wouldn't have had to push the (failed) March 
1 motion in Parliament."  In Demirel's view, the result was a 
textbook case of "mismanagement, not 'democracy'" in action. 
He suggested that Parliament Speaker Bulent Arinc, who 
opposed the resolution, was among the few who understood 
clearly what he was trying to do; before the vote, Arinc 
declined to read aloud the rules about how votes would be 
counted (in this case, that abstentions could mean -- as they 
did -- the failure of the government to obtain the necessary 
absolute majority). 
 
 
3. (C) Demirel also observed that media critics in the United 
States had started to criticize "Turkey," vice simply the 
government -- which risked fomenting "anti-Americanism" in 
the Turkish press and elsewhere.  While it would be natural 
for Turkish media to try to rebut such charges, Demirel 
expressed concern lest it get out of hand.  "People will 
rally to defend Turkey.  I'm worried about provocations" in 
the Turkish press. 
 
 
4. (C) "Coming to the military," Demirel stated, "I don't 
know how or why" the military did not push to support the 
March 1 resolution.  "How come the Pentagon didn't work on 
them?"  Ambassador replied that USG/DoD had had continuing 
and detailed negotiations and consultations with military 
leaders on all aspects of the Iraq operation, including 
Turkey's potential role in it.  However, the USG sense is 
that the Turkish military is highly suspicious of USG 
intentions in northern Iraq, despite: (1) the fact that the 
U.S. is fully in control in the north and throughout Iraq; 
and (2) our repeated assertions on the need to maintain 
Iraq's territorial integrity and opposition to the emergence 
of an independent Kurdish state.  Demirel noted that Turkey 
is "sensitive" on the Kurdish question and regards it as a 
"casus belli."  He expressed strong confidence that the USG 
would live up to its commitments in this regard, but added, 
"I understand that you have to do something for the Kurds -- 
they helped you."  Demirel suggested that a federal state in 
n. Iraq would be reasonable so long as it had a regional vice 
ethnic name (i.e., no "Kurdish"/"Kurdistan").  To Demirel, 
the bottom line is that there is and will be a power vacuum 
in Iraq that only the USG can fill; the U.N. he said, would 
only make a hash out of the situation, as would the Iraqis, 
at least initially. 
 
 
5. (C) Demirel also raised concerns about problems associated 
with delays in the Baku-Ceyhan-Tbilisi pipeline and rumors of 
its possible "postponement," which he said, would promote an 
additional measure of "anti-American sentiment" in both 
Turkey and Azerbaijan.  Ambassador offered assurances that 
the USG continued strongly to support the project.  He noted 
that the problems, such as they are, revolve around BOTAS' 
management, which had led to a two-month delay in the 
construction schedule.  BOTAS needed to get back on the 
timetable. 
 
 
-------------- 
Whither Turkey 
-------------- 
 
 
6. (C) Ambassador stated that the U.S. is watching Turkey to 
determine where it is heading now that the Iraq war is over 
and there are new realities on the ground.  From the USG 
perspective, it is important to rebuild bilateral trust. 
Demirel intimated that there is a debate underway in Ankara 
now.  "Where should Turkey go -- with Iran, Syria, Egypt, 
Russia?"  In his view, "Turkey's interests in development 
dictate that we side with the West, the U.S. and the EU.  We 
have no other alternative."  Returning to Turkish military 
suspicions of the U.S., Demirel said that "soldiers should 
talk to soldiers."  Though the military worries about the 
PKK/KADEK presence on both sides of the Turkish-Iraqi border, 
"the Turkish Army cannot make war on the Kurds or the people 
of northern Iraq."  The USG must adhere to President Bush's 
commitment to combat terrorism.  Ambassador replied that the 
USG is committed to ensuring that Iraq will no longer serve 
as a haven for any terrorist groups. 
 
 
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Comment 
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7. (C) Demirel's influence with the civilian political class 
is waning -- he has so far been unable to shake the 
right-of-center DYP, his political baby, out of the 
increasingly deep torpor into which DYP leader Agar appears 
to be dragging it.  He does, however, have the ear of the 
Turkish State; there is no politician to whom the military 
will more readily listen than the conciliatory ex-President 
-- though as reftel suggests, perhaps fewer and fewer 
ultimately share his views on U.S.-Turkish relations. 
(Moreover, it is unclear how much influence he has with 
Sezer, whose performance in the run-up to the war suggests he 
takes little guidance from his predecessor.) 
PEARSON