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| Identifier: | 03AMMAN2367 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03AMMAN2367 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Amman |
| Created: | 2003-04-20 10:28:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | EPET ETRD ENRG IZ JO |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 002367 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2013 TAGS: EPET, ETRD, ENRG, IZ, JO SUBJECT: TFIZ01: JORDAN'S ENERGY MINISTER ON OIL SITUATION, GAS FUTURES Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm, reasons 1.5 (b,d) 1. (c) Summary: Jordanian Energy Minister Mohammed Bataineh told us April 17 that after a slow start, Gulf oil was now flowing into Jordan to replace Iraqi crude. Jordanian reserves had dipped initially when Iraqi oil stopped flowing, but had since stabilized and were expected to replenish soon. This new system, though, is causing significant financial and environmental disruptions in Jordan. While the GOJ is making plans to accommodate the new reality of market prices for crude in the future, it will feel sharp fiscal pain in the short term as it makes the adjustment. End summary. -------------------- Gulf Oil Deal Update -------------------- 2. (c) Bataineh praised the flexibility and reliability of his Saudi interlocutors, noting that they had not only come through as promised with a three-month deal to provide 50,000 bpd, but had also agreed to restructure the delivery schedule from three to two shipments at the GOJ's request. Bataineh said one ship had already lifted one million barrels of crude from Yanbu and had arrived at Aqaba. It had not yet begun offloading. The 3-month deal, he said, was formally an agreement between ARAMCO and the Jordan Petroleum Refinery Company (JPRC), not/not a government-to-government deal. He added that this arrangement was made at ARAMCO's request. 3. (c) Bataineh was somewhat frustrated with his Kuwaiti colleagues, however. He said Kuwaiti oil and port authorities had raised objections about the ship the GOJ had chartered to transport the oil, refusing it entry into the loading site on the grounds that it did not meet safety standards (Bataineh admitted it was an older, single-hulled vessel). He said the Kuwaitis were less flexible about consolidating shipments, meaning the GOJ would have to make additional trips and lease the ship for longer in order to collect the oil, which resulted in significant additional costs (see below). The Kuwaitis ultimately agreed to a ship-to-ship transfer of 240,000 tons of crude, which Bataineh said was currently being effected, after which the leased ship would head to Aqaba. 4. (c) As for the Emirates' promise of a cash grant to cover purchase of 25,000 bpd, Bataineh said this matter was being handled directly by the Finance Ministry. He had no knowledge as to whether or not any grants had been received. Bataineh also denied reports that Jordan had lifted oil from Ras Tanura. He said the site had been proposed as a lifting option, but that they and the Saudis had decided instead to lift from Yanbu which is much closer, and hence less costly. ------------------------------ Reserves Down, but Stabilizing ------------------------------ 5. (c) Bataineh said land-based as well as shipboard reserves were down significantly over the past month. Crude reserves in Zarqa are down to 95,000 tons from a pre-war peak of 200,000 tons, and reserves on the tanker "Jerash," moored in Aqaba, were down to 140,000 from 280,000. (Note: Bataineh told us in a previous meeting that all land reserves were refined product, and all crude storage was shipboard. End note.) Bataineh attributed the dip in reserves to the need to offset the loss of crude flows from Iraq when the war started. He said reserves are now stable at the new, lower level. He added that, with the arrival of the feeder from Yanbu, reserves should "top up" again to their previous levels "in a few weeks," and noted there are an additional 30,000 tons of crude storage in Aqaba currently. ---------------------------- Financial, Opportunity Costs ---------------------------- 6. (c) Bataineh asserted that the new system was resulting in significant financial and other costs. While exact figures are unavailable for the total additional cost to the GOJ of the current system, Bataineh provided many illustrative examples: rental of the two feeder ships was costing the GOJ $25,000 and $85,000 per day respectively just in rental fees. Bataineh complained that these fees were assessed monthly, even though the ships were only making one or two trips. The ships incurred additional costs at port. When lifting, the ships are assessed a $1.50/ton fee, and once they reach Aqaba, they incur significant additional costs as they maneuver in and out of the sole oil jetty - which is also used to offload vegetable oil, refined product, and sulpho-chemicals. 7. (c) Land transport fees were actually cheaper under the new system ($9.10/ton versus $14.50/ton when trucked from Iraq), but trucks cannot be fully loaded (for the reason given below) and as a result have to make additional trips. Thus land transport costs are likely a wash. More concerning, though, is the significant damage being done to the just-completed bypass road that curls behind Aqaba to link with the Desert Highway. Bataineh showed us pictures of significant damage to the road and the surrounding environment from large amounts of spilled oil. According to Bataineh, the grade of the road is exceptionally steep, and Jordan's crude trucking fleet is exceptionally old. This combination has resulted in large amounts of spillage of crude onto the road and into the countryside. To counter this, the trucks are now traveling with only partial loads. However, since the road was designed essentially for cargo traffic and not tanker traffic, the axle load on the road from the crude trucks far exceeds the maximum allowable. This is further destroying the new road. ----------------- The Future is Gas ----------------- 8. (c) Bataineh said the cabinet was concerned about Jordan's energy future, in particular what would happen in three months when the Gulf concessions ran out. He said it was inevitable that Jordan would be paying market prices for crude, but noted this would have serious budgetary consequences. He said the cabinet is still discussing price hikes for refined product, but said it is a highly-charged issue, because of the social and political costs of such a move. 9. (c) On the bright side, he said, a number of natural gas-related projects were on schedule and would help limit Jordan's crude dependency. He noted that the undersea portion of the Egypt-Jordan gas pipeline was complete, and that documentation was nearly finalized to extend the pipeline to Amman. He expected the remaining land connections and receiving stations to be completed in the coming weeks, and said gas should be flowing by mid-June. Once the turbines at the Aqaba power station started using gas (they are already installed and ready to go), Jordan's fuel oil needs would be cut by about 60%. 10. (c) Bataineh said the Al Samra Independent Power Project (IPP) was still in train, but said progress had stalled with the departure of Tractebel, the original contractor. Bataineh said the GOJ was taking new bids on the combined-cycle plant, and had received serious interest from a number of energy companies. However, most of the bidders proposed greenfield projects, which would take too long to build to meet Jordan's medium-term energy needs. Bataineh predicted the IPP needed to be on-line by 2006 to meet Jordan's future electricity needs, and was asking bidders for new proposals that could build on the work already completed by Tractebel. ------------------------------- Happiness is Multiple Pipelines ------------------------------- 11. (c) Looking even further ahead, Bataineh said Jordan would likely have to look to re-establish an oil relationship with a new Iraqi government in order to meet its energy needs in the most cost-efficient way. Bataineh did not suggest that new oil concessions were in the cards, but looked rather to oil sector investment as a means to renew the relationship to mutual advantage. He said first that the Iraq-Zarqa pipeline was still on the books, and that the GOJ was eager to see a new Iraqi government in place that could meet its commitments under the terms of the deal (which includes, inter alia, delivery of loading stations by the developer to Iraqi government control). 12. (c) In addition, he said he had received a number of expressions of interest from developers looking to revitalize an idea from the mid-1980's to run a crude pipeline from Iraq to Aqaba, and to build additional refineries in Aqaba. Such a plan, he said, would bring Jordan revenue from transit fees and would reduce transportation costs for oil used domestically. He denied flat out, however, that there was any plan or discussion to restart a Mosul-Haifa crude pipeline as reported in the press. Any such talk, he said, was ridiculous, since the pipeline no longer exists as such. ------- Comment ------- 13. (c) The war has clearly brought additional costs to Jordan's energy sector. While those costs are not yet easily quantifiable, they are apparent, from the significant damage to Aqaba's new bypass highway to the fees associated with feeder ships, to say nothing of the looming elimination of subsidies on crude imports. Bataineh's plans for the sector's future appear sound, if somewhat ambitious. But if successfully completed, they would ease somewhat the burden of shifting to market prices for crude. In the short term, though, and especially after Gulf concessions cease in three months, Jordan will face serious financial strains from the cessation of its sweetheart oil arrangement with the Saddam regime. GNEHM
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