US embassy cable - 03ABUJA720

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000720 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
CAIRO FOR POL - J. MAXSTADT 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 
TAGS: PREL, KCRM, EFIN, ECON, PINS, PTER, PHUM, PGOV, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reasons 
1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary. The April 19 election will test the 
tensile strength of Nigerian democracy and its 
supporting institutions.  While many will play 
important roles in this national drama, the primary 
antagonists are President Obasanjo and Muhammed 
Buhari.  Not only is this election a litmus test of 
democratic consolidation in Nigeria, it also could 
spell substantive policy differences on issues key to 
the bilateral agenda.  Obasanjo and Buhari differ on 
economic reform, i.e. privatization, poverty 
reduction, and working with the IFI's. Both would 
fight corruption and drug-trafficking but their 
priorities and approaches would be dissimilar.  Both 
would want to maintain our strong security assistance 
relationship, but Obasanjo would be more aggressive. 
Human rights might be better protected under the 
President, and our anti-corruption efforts might bear 
more fruit under Buhari.  In the end, we could deal 
effectively with either man; the bilateral 
relationship would just vary in areas of accord and 
disagreement.  History suggests that Obasanjo, 
however, would be more predictable and proactive in 
seeking a good relationship. End Summary 
 
 
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DEMOCRACY 
--------- 
 
 
2. (C) Twice Nigeria has attempted a civilian-to- 
civilian transition through elections; twice it has 
failed.  Each time a flawed electoral process was 
followed by successful coups.  The quality of the 
April 19 Presidential election and its resultant 
aftermath will determine if democracy has been 
solidified or put in great peril.  Right now, the 
signs are not good; dark clouds are gathering, 
portending a storm of controversy, with possible 
unrest and violence in many areas of the country.  The 
possible saving grace this time is that there is no 
sign the military is particularly interested in 
executing a coup now or in the near future. 
 
 
3. (C) The allegations of massive vote manipulation by 
the opposition have cast a pall over the elections and 
could bring into question the legitimacy of the winner 
and his government.  The opposition has alleged that 
the fraud committed on April 12 exceeds the 
malpractices of 1999 and harkens to the failed 
elections of 1983.  Compounding the historic 
connection to 1983 is the fact that President Obasanjo 
was the military leader who handed power to the 
civilian government that conducted the 1883 elections; 
Buhari was a military leader who engineered the coup 
terminating that government. 
 
 
4. (C) In an April 16 press statement, Buhari 
explicitly drew the parallel to 1983, exhorting 
supporters to take "mass action" if the Presidential 
election repeated the systemic fraud that afflicted 
the April 12 contests.  (Comment:  Buhari's call for 
mass action was purposely vague as to exactly what 
steps he will ask his followers to take in the 
eventuality of another controversial vote count. 
While vague, the threat was not veiled.  Buhari 
basically has told his followers to be ready to grind 
the country to a halt if the election is manipulated. 
End Comment.) 
 
 
5. (C) Much of the criticism of the April 12 election 
appears warranted; unfortunately, these irregularities 
will likely reappear on April 19.  There probably has 
been significant vote manipulation in many areas. 
Unlike 1999 when all three parties fixed the voting in 
areas within their spheres of influence, most credible 
allegations this time are being levied against the 
ruling PDP.  While 1999 may have been a "fair cheat", 
this time the wrongdoing seems heavily dominated by 
only one party, the PDP. 
 
 
6. (C) The irregularities surrounding the elections 
are too significant to ignore.  We expect both 
international and domestic observers to be critical. 
We also have to be prepared to make a statement that 
may not set comfortably with the putative winner, 
Obasanjo.  While we may not reach the point of calling 
the entire outcome into question, any public USG 
statement must point out the obvious deficiencies and 
point fingers at those who were responsible.  Given 
the contested nature of the elections, we also must 
call on the eventual victor to reach out to the 
vanquished to strengthen an otherwise controversial 
and defective mandate by keeping them involved in the 
governance process in a meaningful, if informal, way. 
A call for national consensus and unity on the way 
forward has to be a part of our message. 
 
 
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ECONOMIC REFORM 
--------------- 
 
 
7. (C) Overall, Obasanjo is more inclined to free 
market, private sector oriented reform than Buhari. 
Obasanjo's present term started promisingly, but 
toward the end, the drive toward reform gave way to 
backward steps toward protectionist tariffs. Whether 
Obasanjo would be a plodding, imperfect reformer or a 
dedicated one will be revealed by his political 
appointments. If he returns many of the same Ministers 
and senior officials, reform will be little more than 
a shibboleth. Should he bring out the broom and sweep 
his Cabinet to make room for a cadre of young 
technocrats, meaningful reform has a chance.  We would 
also have to watch the behavior of Vice President 
Atiku.  Not only does Atiku promise to be actively 
involved in the domestic agenda, he will try to steer 
policy and decisions to maximize his electoral chances 
in 2007. This could throttle reform, particularly in 
the last half of the term.  Atiku simply does not show 
the same reformist impulse exhibited by Obasanjo. 
Meanwhile, Buhari will be a perfect reformer; the 
unfortunate thing is that at least some of his reforms 
will likely be retrograde.  He is at heart a statist 
and wary of the free market and foreign investment. He 
deplores the IFI's. However, he recently has exhibited 
willingness to consider privatization's merits.  While 
Obasanjo is a dedicated micro-manager of economic and 
other issues, Buhari is likely to delegate heavily, 
and many of his advisors share his statist tendencies. 
 
 
8. (C) Privatization: This has been one of Obasanjo's 
accomplishments and he will likely accelerate the 
pace.  Conversely, Buhari believes that privatization 
will  surrender Nigeria's assets to predatory 
foreigners and already affluent Nigerians who gained 
their wealth dishonestly. For him, privatization is a 
scam to make the rich guys richer. His policy would be 
to retain many of the parastatals and make them work 
better by instilling discipline, fighting corruption, 
and making them more efficient.  He would likely halt 
the ongoing privatization of the national power 
company, NEPA.  The opportunity costs of keeping 
inefficient, non-performing alive, would probably not 
be apparent to Buhari, much less deter him. 
 
 
9. (C) Relations with the IFIs: Obasanjo does not like 
the IFIs but knows that he must work with them.  If 
elected, he would resume a formal arrangement with the 
IMF, for example. On the other hand, Buhari had a 
confrontational relationship with the IFIs as a 
military leader and he is prepared to resume that same 
dissonance as the elected Head of State. 
 
 
------------------- 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
------------------- 
 
 
10. (C) This is President Obasanjo's ken. During this 
election period, he took a leave from active 
leadership in West African and regional statesmanship, 
except for intermittent forays into the Zimbabwean and 
Ivoirien crises. Freed of the constraints imposed by 
the elections, we would expect Obasanjo to resume a 
high level of engagement; more importantly, we could 
expect a good degree of cooperation and harmony of 
views, with the exceptions of Zimbabwe and single- 
country resolutions in international fora.  We also 
would expect Obasanjo to do more in Liberia, and exert 
more pressure to bring Taylor made control.  We could 
even engage with him in ways of getting the rascal 
out.  Nigerian foreign policy would remain Africa- 
centric, and Obasanjo would try to give a greater push 
to West Africa integration. Buhari is not equally 
interested in regional affairs. He has told us Nigeria 
should not be involved in Cote d'Ivoire and he would 
oppose sending peacekeepers. While Obasanjo hardly 
needs a fillip, Buhari would have to be vigorously 
courted to engage actively in regional affairs. 
 
 
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NEPAD 
----- 
 
 
11. (C) This is Obasanjo's brainchild and he will 
continue to be one of its prime movers, particularly 
on the peer review mechanism. Buhari probably has no 
affection for this endeavor. First, it bears 
Obasanjo's stamp. Second, the no-nonsense, old- 
fashioned Buhari would likely dismiss NEPAD as some 
vague, pie-in-the-sky construct that will yield little 
practical results.  Relations with South Africa and 
Senegal would progressively cool. 
 
 
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CORRUPTION 
---------- 
 
 
12.  (C)  Both men would fight corruption.  Obasanjo 
would continue to use the Anti-Corruption Commission 
(ICPC) as his spearhead. However, his efforts will be 
diluted if he retains many of his current Ministers 
and advisors.  If so, he risks losing the battle on 
corruption to the extent that his second term might 
become the Nigerian equivalent of President Grant's 
venal second Administration during America's Gilded 
Age. Buhari would likely initiate a no-holds-barred 
battle against corruption. He would not rely on the 
Anti-corruption Commission as presently constituted, 
if at all. He would use existing bodies (such as the 
Code of Conduct Bureau) and the police and other 
security agencies more than the ICPC.  There have been 
frequent public allegations that Obasanjo and the 
Presidency have used the ICPC as a political tool. 
These allegations may be untrue, but they have damaged 
the ICPC in the eyes of many in the opposition. 
 
 
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NARCOTICS TRAFFIC AND MIL-TO-MIL RELATIONS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 
13. (C) Both men would fight narcotics trafficking. 
Judging by his past record, Buhari would be much more 
aggressive than Obasanjo has been.  He might beef up 
the NOLEA and aggressively go after major traffickers. 
More would be done to combat advance-fee and other "4- 
1-9" fraud, and harsh penalties would be levied. 
However, we would expect Buhari to be cool toward 
extraditions.  On military-to-military relations, 
Buhari would be less aggressive in deepening ties to 
Western states.  More of Nigeria's resources would be 
devoted to military preparedness.  Buhari might be 
more belligerent on Bakassi. 
 
 
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HUMAN RIGHTS 
------------ 
 
 
14. (C) Obasanjo has a relatively good human rights 
record with the clear exception of the Zaki Biam and 
Odi massacres. He has been good on the protection of 
political and civil liberties. An Obasanjo 
Administration will be expected to continue to improve 
its human rights stand on most fronts. Buhari is an 
unknown quantity.  His past term as a military leader 
was associated with numerous abuses such as draconian 
prison sentences, executions, and media intolerance. 
We do not expect him to be as ruthless as before but 
he will likely be less sensitive to human rights 
concerns than Obasanjo. 
 
 
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SHARI'A 
------- 
 
 
15. (C) Obasanjo opposes strict Shari'a punishments. 
He would like a test case to make it to federal court 
so that the GON could participate in the deliberations 
as a friend of the court.  His objective would be a 
ruling that declares harsh Shari'a punishments, such 
as stoning sentences for adultery, unconstitutionally 
cruel and unusual. While Buhari's supports Shari'a, we 
do not know his stance on the application of 
particular punishments like stoning. Most likely, 
Buhari would rather not see a case advance to the 
federal courts, out of concern that an adverse verdict 
could basically gut Shari'a.  Instead, he would 
probably prefer that the states be left to handle 
these affairs according to their individual Shari'a 
codes.  He might not object to the imposition of the 
harshest sentences but discourage governors from 
allowing them to be carried out.   Unlike Obasanjo, he 
would not "weep" for Nigeria if Shari'a sentences were 
carried out.  On the other hand, Buhari, unlike 
Obasanjo, would have clout with Northern Governors and 
religious leaders on the Shari'a issue, if he chose to 
intervene. 
 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
 
16.  (C) We know Obasanjo better than we know Buhari; 
however, familiarity should not affect our objectivity 
in analyzing the policies and our potential 
relationship with either of the two men, one of whom 
will be Nigeria's next President.  Obasanjo is pro- 
West and pro-America; however, we have had 
difficulties and significant disagreements with him. 
Buhari may not look to the West or America as much as 
Obasanjo; but he has not been antagonistic.  He 
appears to want a good bilateral relationship and has 
been accessible to American diplomats.  However, the 
relationship might show different areas of potential 
cooperation and different areas of disagreement than 
under Obasanjo. For instance, Obasanjo might be a 
fellow traveler when it comes to regional conflict 
resolution; Buhari may be exemplary against 
corruption.  During his previous incarnations as Head 
of State, then President Zia was the first Head of 
State received by Buhari in Nigeria.  Buhari would 
seek greater ties with the Muslim world, and would be 
pro-Arab on issues dealing with the Middle East. 
Differences of religion may become more prominent in 
Nigerian politics, no matter the winner of the 
Presidential race. 
 
 
17. (C) In the end, Obasanjo may be more reformist on 
more issues, but he is a flawed reformer who has thus 
far lacked the necessary focus and political will to 
prioritize and completely implement important 
structural reforms. Conversely, Buhari has the 
reputation of doing what he says he will do.  Buhari 
will be a person dedicated to making trains run on 
time, in part, by running fewer of them. With either 
leader, we would have to quickly engage with him after 
the election to identify how we can best advance areas 
of agreement and best manage our differences. 
JETER