US embassy cable - 03KABUL1007

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 001007 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
NSC FOR ZKHALILZAD, JDWORKEN, HMANN, RHANSON, DSEDNEY 
DEPT FOR SA/PAB, SA/AR, S/CT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, PTER, AF, PK 
SUBJECT: SE KHALILZAD'S APRIL 11 MEETING WITH FM ABDULLAH 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT P. FINN FOR REASONS 
1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: During his April 11 meeting with FM Abdullah, 
SE Khalilzad addressed both regional and domestic Afghan 
developments.  Khalilzad suggested that the renewed activity 
of the Taliban and other destabilizing elements in the South 
might be addressed through a trilateral 
(U.S.-Afghan-Pakistani) working group.  Abdullah responded 
favorably to this proposal, noting he welcomed improving 
relations with Pakistan.  Khalilzad also sought Abdullah,s 
views on priority domestic issues that demanded immediate 
attention.  FM Abdullah suggested that the top three priority 
issues were ensuring successful results for the 
Constitutional Commission, the Election Commission, and 
ANA/NDS reform.  End Summary. 
 
============================== 
SE Khalilzad Offers Trilateral 
Working Group Proposal 
============================== 
 
2. (C) SE Khalilzad met with Afghan FM Abdullah on April 11 
to review conditions in Afghanistan.  Accompanying Khalilzad 
were the Ambassador, NSC,s Rebecca Hanson, DOD/OSD,s 
Mustafa Popal and Econ/Commoff (notetaker).  SE Khalilzad 
began discussions by noting his concern about the poor state 
of Afghan-Pakistan relations.  The recent killing of an ICRC 
worker in Kandahar and reported Pakistani and Taliban 
cross-border incursions were of great concern to Washington. 
SE Khalilzad proposed a trilateral arrangement as a means to 
address this growing problem.  He proposed further that 
CJTF-180 commander, General McNeill, could head a high-level 
standing committee which would meet monthly.  Others could 
form a working-level body that could meet more frequently. 
The goal of these trilateral arrangements would be to stop 
all Taliban activities in Afghanistan.  Khalilzad noted he 
had not yet proposed this idea to President Karzai and hoped 
to get the FM,s views first. 
 
3. (C) Abdullah responded that concern was indeed growing 
over Taliban activities in Afghanistan.  In Ghazni, for 
example, the Taliban had time to establish a network and 
launch concerted operations recently.  This level of 
organization worried Abdullah.  Abdullah noted that Pakistan 
complained about negative perceptions of Pakistan and poor 
Afghan treatment of Pashtuns in Afghanistan.  The FM noted it 
would take time to reverse such feelings, but that this 
process would not be helped by such activities as the Taliban 
and Pakistan were reportedly engaged in.  Abdullah reported 
that security forces in the South were now acting to 
destabilize the region. 
 
4. (C) According to Abdullah, President Musharraf had 
complained of Indian covert destabilization activities in 
southern Afghanistan through the Indian consulate in 
Kandahar.  Abdullah,s opinion was that India was unlikely to 
engage in such activity, and had merely established its 
presence to promote its growing (mostly commercial) interests 
in Afghanistan.  India was active in Afghanistan, Abdullah 
noted, including a promised donation of trucks and an offer 
of military training to the ANA, building the Zaranj-Delaram 
road, and a $70m assistance pledge.  Abdullah welcomed 
Pakistan balancing this commitment from their side and 
Pakistan,s involvement in Afghanistan, but rejected any 
notion that Pakistan could &veto8 Indian activities here. 
Abdullah concluded that establishing military and 
intelligence-led trilateral discussions was the best way to 
begin addressing these issues.  The diplomatic channel, he 
added, obliged parties to &take sides8 on these issues. 
Ambassador noted that the diplomatic channel was, however, 
useful as a marker of progress. 
 
=============================== 
A Review f Domestic Conditions 
=============================== 
 
5. (C) SE Khalilzad, acknowledging that domestic issues were 
not the FM,s specific responsibility, then asked FM Abdullah 
for his view on current conditions inside Afghanistan. 
Khalilzad said that there was not as much progress in some 
areas as hoped, including the security sector generally, the 
progress of the national army, establishing a clear DDR 
policy, Ministry of Defense reform towards becoming a 
national organization, and limited progress on NDS (National 
Directorate of Security) reform. 
 
6. (S/NF) Abdullah agreed that there had been less progress 
than hoped for in these areas.  The FM noted that 
misunderstandings between OMC and General Baryalai over 
organizational models for the ANA had caused some delays. 
Abdullah noted that models for ANA organizational 
arrangements must be adapted to fit Afghan circumstances. 
Further, greater levels of support from the local leadership 
was needed to recruit soldiers from Kandahar and Jalalabad, 
which was critical to establishing the required ethnic 
diversity of the ANA.  Turning to DDR, Abdullah noted that 
practical and political considerations were involved in the 
selection of the first effected regions ) early success was 
key to this effort.  An apparent misunderstanding over the 
appropriate numbers of forces involved and whether NDS 
operations would be fully funded by the U.S had also slowed 
reform of NDS.  These NDS issues were now apparently 
resolved, and according to Abdullah, NDS Chief Aref had told 
him reform was ready to move forward. 
 
7. (C) Abdullah then turned to the controversy over 
appropriate methods of holding the annual celebration 
(&jashn8) of the Mujaheddin victory over the Soviets.  The 
main concern was whether the ANA ) rather than Mujaheddin 
fighters exclusively - would march in this event,s parade. 
Abdullah recommended that the ANA should participate to 
illustrate its role as a national military force.  The 
Ambassador noted he was aware of this issue and said the 
parade should not take place.  He had discussed this with 
President Karzai twice, and told him that an all-Mujaheddin 
event would send the wrong signal at the wrong time ) with 
elections coming up and the constitution being drafted. 
Further, it was a violation of the Bonn Agreement.  The 
Ambassador suggested that a celebration of peace, rather than 
a military event, might be more appropriate.  Abdullah noted 
that last year,s celebrations were &too military8, but 
added that it was not simply a matter of Kabul,s 
celebrations - this event would be celebrated in cities 
throughout Afghanistan.  Ambassador noted that the character 
of the celebration would be a key issue. 
 
8. (C) Abdullah then turned to Taliban activities in the 
provinces, reporting that they were very focused on the 
provinces.  The Taliban knows what,s happening in Zabol, he 
added, but we do not.  Abdullah also offered his assessment 
on the 2004 elections, reflecting pessimism that the work of 
the Constitutional Commission was proceeding quickly enough. 
SE Khalilzad suggested that the U.S. and Afghan governments 
needed to decide on a set of high priority issues to work on 
closely together.  Khalilzad warned that criticism would grow 
unless progress accelerated, and that a mechanism for 
addressing these priority issues was needed.  Khalilzad asked 
Abdullah for his recommendation of the top two or three items 
which needed to be brought to closure.  Abdullah quickly 
suggested the following priorities: 1) the Constitutional 
Commission, 2) the Election Commission, and 3) ANA/NDS 
reform.  SE Khalilzad shared his concern over the level of 
cooperation from the MOD, noting that MOD reform was key to 
many other areas.  The Ambassador added that we needed to 
stress continued U.S. commitment to remaining engaged in 
Afghanistan and our strong support of reforms.  If such 
reforms happen, we need to continue our support for the 
reformed organizations so that they will not be left 
isolated.  Ambassador added his view that the NDS reform will 
ultimately be successful. 
FINN