US embassy cable - 03ABUJA718

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000718 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR AF AND DRL 
. 
CAIRO FOR J.MAXSTADT 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, EPET, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA:  WARRI CRISIS COMING TO A HEAD 
 
 
REF: A. DAO ABUJA IIR 6 B871 0098 03 (17APR03) 
     B. ABUJA 716 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5 (b) and 
(d). 
 
 
1.(C) Summary:  In the dense mangrove swamps of Delta State, 
a group of perhaps 300 militant and well-armed Ijaw youths 
last month was able to shut down over 40 percent of Nigeria's 
oil production, costing over USD one billion to date. 
Although initially emanating from a local political dispute, 
this crisis is also the product of the environment of easy 
money, lawlessness, and ethnic chauvinism characterizing this 
turbulent region.  As the youths continue to issue public 
threats to disrupt elections and attack oil facilities, the 
Federal Government, oil companies and even the traditional 
Ijaw leadership, appear stumped and unable to find a 
solution.  Bluntly put, the GON is at an armed impasse with 
the Ijaw militants.  Unless the Ijaws back down, the GON is 
likely to attack them.  The countdown to military action will 
likely be after the elections, and that countdown may have 
already started.   End Summary. 
 
 
The Ijaw 
-------- 
 
 
2.(C) The Ijaws assert they are Nigeria's fourth largest 
ethnic group, numbering over 8 million.  Two organizations 
based in Port Harcourt claim to represent the "Ijaw Nation" 
which spans across five states -- the Ijaw National Congress 
(INC) and Ijaw Youth Council (IYC).  Historically, the INC 
has been more conservative.  The more aggressive IYC drafted 
the 1998 Kaiama Declaration that called for the cessation of 
oil production until Ijaw political and environmental 
grievances were heard and addressed.  There are some 22 Ijaw 
clans spread out across the coastal swamps of the states of 
Ondo, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, and Akwa Ibom.  Only two of 
these are involved in the current crisis in Warri -- the 
Gbaramatu and Egbeme. 
 
 
3.(C) The village that appears to be the base of operations 
for the Ijaw militants is Okenrenkoko, a former Itsekiri 
village on the Escravos creek in Warri Southwest.  According 
to NGO workers who have talked to Gbaramatu youths, these 
militants are radicalized and are now beyond the control of 
traditional village or clan leaders.  One NGO worker building 
a school in a nearby village was confronted by a Gbaramatu 
youth who said, "I could kill you right now and it wouldn't 
mean a thing to me."  Older Ijaws admit these Delta creek 
youths are outside the traditional authority structure.  They 
have become an anti-establishment gang. 
 
 
4.(C) Many of these youths have been used to receiving 
direct payments from the oil companies to refrain from 
vandalizing oil installations or threatening oil companies' 
personnel. Disbursed under the guise of a community guard or 
watch program, these payments average the equivalent of $300 
per month.  These widespread individual payments, coupled 
with the companies' continued practice of paying communities 
or youth groups to resolve incidents such as hostage takings 
or demonstrations, have underminded indigenous institutions, 
delegitimized traditional leaders, and created a culture of 
criminality.  Education, vocational skills, and community 
elders are no longer held in high esteem; capacity to disrupt 
or to be violent has become the coin of the realm. Uneducated 
criminal youths have become the local power elite. 
 
 
5.(C) Though the demands of these Delta State Ijaws may 
diverge from the aspirations of the larger Ijaw body, the INC 
and IYC leaders feel restrained to disagree publicly with 
those militants for fear of being labeled a sell-out or being 
the victim of reprisals.  In an early April meeting with 
Embassy's Corporate Responsibility Officer (CRO), the IYC 
President admitted that the Gbaramatu youth did not 
coordinate their actions with IYC leadership. However, the 
IYC would not condemn the Delta militants' use of force or 
threats to destroy oil installation; the IYC is in solidarity 
with their struggle, he declared. 
 
 
6.(C) That struggle is somewhat hard to understand given the 
lack of clear leadership or representation of this anarchic 
armed gang in Warri Southwest.  Despite repeated pleas from 
the government and even some Ijaw elders to stop fighting and 
rescind the threats to oil facilities, the Gbaramatu 
militants have yet to tone down their political demands for 
increased representation among the ten electoral wards of the 
Warri Southwest Local Government Area (LGA) and their grander 
economic demands of some control over oil company operations 
in "Ijaw-land."  A recent statement, attributed to the group, 
proclaimed that "all the oil companies that vacated Ijaw 
territory should sign a memorandum of understanding with the 
Ijaw communities with respect to the development of the area 
. .  .before resuming production."  In short, these youth are 
advocating an inchoate yet militant nationalism.  They claim 
the land is theirs, so the oil under it also belongs to them. 
 Thus, they also must be included as one of the important 
ethnic groups in Nigeria.  Instead of talking about the big 
three (Yoruba, Hasua-Fulani, and Igbo) there should now be 
the big four. 
 
 
The Itsekiri 
------------ 
 
 
7.(C) Although fewer in number (estimated population of 
300,000), the Itsekiri are the descendents of the 600 
year-old Warri Kingdom.  They have far greater representation 
in local and state political circles and, as stated recently 
by several Ijaw leaders, they have a more effective public 
relations effort, with great influence over at least one 
major newspaper (The Vanguard), which is owned by an 
Itsekiri. The are viewed as the victims in the Warri 
violence, and have vowed not to send the displaced Itsekiri 
(most currently camped in Warri and Sapele towns) back to 
their villagers until the Ijaw youths are subdued. House of 
Representatives member for the Warri area Temi Harriman 
(ethnic Itsekiri) and Itsekiri leader Chief Rita Lori told 
POLCOUNS recently that they are demanding federal action be 
taken to protect the "Warri Kingdom" of Itsekiri. 
 
 
Boycotting and Disrupting the Vote 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
8.(C) All of the Gbaramatu and part of the Egbeme clan -- 
together making up a majority of the Warri Southwest 
population -- boycotted the 1999 elections and boycotted the 
voters registration for the 2003 elections.  Not content with 
abstaining from the polls, the militant Gbaramatu and Egbeme 
have sought to disrupt all polls in the three Warri LGAs. 
Chief E.K. Clark, a local Warri Ijaw leader explained to CRO 
that the Ijaws would not tolerate an election that would 
yield inadequate Ijaw representation.  (Note: Since they 
failed to register although they are more numerous than the 
Itsekiri, this is tantamount to saying elections should never 
be held in Warri.  This is another manifestation of militant 
ethnic chauvinism.  Since the Ijaw claim to "own" the land, 
the GON has no right to hold elections that would help their 
rivals, the Itsekiri. End Note) 
 
 
9.(C) A violent April 11 attack on the Warri North LGA 
capital of Koko by Gbaramatu youth contributed to the 
postponement of the National Assembly elections in the three 
Warri area LGAs by a day.  Dan Ekpedibe of the Federated 
Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (lately serving as the 
mouthpiece for the militant Gbaramatu and Egbeme youth) 
stated April 15 that "We are going to make sure on Saturday 
(April 19) there won't be any election in our area." 
 
 
The Lucrative Business of Bunkering 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
10.(C) Both Itsekiri and Ijaw are guilty of bunkering, 
according to GON officials and oil company executives, but 
the more numerous and maritime Ijaw most likely have the 
lion's share of this trade in stolen oil.  Tapping into 
Shell's pipelines and flow stations in Warri Southwest and 
North at night, hoses are run to small tankers and barges 
that come up the creeks to load the stolen crude.  These 
sophisticated operations must be sanctioned by some senior 
officials in Abuja, according to Shell's MD and other GON 
officials.  According to a GON source, Naval personnel are 
also involved, but they rely on the help of well armed Ijaw 
militants to secure the tapped pipelines and hookup the hoses 
to the tankers. 
 
 
11.(C) Shell claims it loses 80,000-100,000 barrels per day 
to this illegal bunkering.  Multiple oil industry sources and 
ethnic leaders subscribe to the belief that the Warri crisis 
started as the result of a oil bunkering deal between corrupt 
Nigerian Navy officers and Ijaw militants gone sour: the Navy 
opened fire on the militants and a full fight ensued.  In a 
recent meeting with Ambassador Jeter, President Obasanjo 
confirmed that Navy personnel stationed in the Warri area 
were involved in bunkering; he stated that the Navy Commander 
responsible for Warri, Titus Aweyemi, and his deputy were 
transferred to another post shortly after the crisis because 
of their involvement in this illegal trade. 
 
 
Companies cautiously resume . . . 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
12.(C) Although the two affected oil companies -- Shell and 
Chevron-Texaco, have resumed limited production in Delta 
State, all of this is south of the Warri LGAs or off shore. 
The shortfall in pre-March production is running on the order 
of 300-400,000 barrels-per-day. While the oil companies' 
continue to state publicly that they are awaiting further 
calm in the local security situation before moving into the 
creeks of Warri, there may be another more powerful factor. 
Shell's Director for External Relations, Precious Omuku, told 
CRO that Shell is concerned that the Army will carry out 
reprisal attacks on the Ijaw soon after the April 19 
elections.  This view is widely shared by NGOs in the area. 
The recent movement of approximately 1,000 Ijaw from villages 
to central towns such as Warri and Obe-Ijoh -- reportedly 
because they fear imminent military reprisals -- add further 
weight to this view. 
 
 
While GON pushes peace . . . 
---------------------------- 
 
 
13.(C) On the surface, the Federal Government continues to 
show patience and restraint.  The Ijaw's repeated protests 
that the Army is planning a reprisal attack on their 
communities have been met by cool reassurances from the Army 
spokesmen both in Abuja and in Warri that force would not be 
the answer to this crisis.  Seeming to reinforce that 
message, President Obasanjo summoned Ijaw and Itsekiri 
leaders to Abuja for an April 7 meeting to "find a lasting 
solution to the Warri crisis." This "Warri Summit" led to the 
forming of a committee chaired by Minister of Defense Danjuma 
that began meeting immediately. 
 
 
Power Shift Among Ijaw 
---------------------- 
 
 
14.(C) This crisis is not new to Delta State, but rather a 
close repetition of Ijaw-Itsekiri fighting that broke out 
almost six years to the day -- in early March 1997.  At that 
time, Ijaw went on the rampage after the military 
administrator for Delta State changed the capital of the 
Warri Southwest LGA from Obe-Ijoh (Ijaw village) to Ogidigben 
(Itsekiri village).  That outbreak of violence left many 
Itsekiri villages in ruins, but was resolved peacefully. 
(Note: The Warri Southwest LGA capital was moved back to 
Obe-Ijoh in 2002 as the result of Delta State Assembly 
legislation. end Note) 
 
 
15.(C) The Ijaw aggressors in the current violence, however, 
appear more radicalized and much better armed  than their 
brethren six years earlier.  This gang of some 300 Ijaw youth 
are armed with new assault rifles and rocket-propelled 
grenade (RPG) launchers and are aided by a fleet of fast 
speedboats.  They have made the former Itsekiri village of 
Okerenkoko their home.  From this village situated 
strategically on the north bank of the Escravos Creek, they 
can control a major waterway while conducting attacks 
throughout Warri Southwest and Warri South LGAs.  According 
to GON and oil industry sources, they barter some of their 
stolen oil for weapons, ensuring a steady flow of arms into 
the region. 
 
 
The Pressures 
------------- 
 
 
16.(C) To date, the GON has hewed to the path of dialogue in 
addressing the conflict, but most observers believe this is 
because it has no other choice at the moment.  A large-scale 
attack by the Army and Navy would probably be indiscriminate 
and result in significant human rights violations. This would 
be politically costly for President Obasanjo and his PDP 
governor of Delta State just before elections.  The two 
ethnic factions in this crisis, however, have little faith in 
a dialogue and time is not on the side of the "doves" in the 
GON seeking a negotiated settlement.  With oil revenue losses 
mounting, the post-April 19 government will be under pressure 
to end this stalemate.  During an April 17 meeting with 
Ambassador Jeter, Shell Managing Director Ron Van den Berg 
predicted a military campaign against the Ijaw soon after the 
April 19 elections.  Indications of this have been given by 
Defense Minister Danjuma, who told the Ambassador on April 16 
that only "overwhelming force" would resolve this problem 
(ref A), and by the Director of the State Security Service 
(SSS) who told the Ambassador April 11 that an "enforcement 
action" would be launched soon against the Ijaw militants 
(ref B). 
 
 
Comment and Forecast 
-------------------- 
 
 
17.(C) The Warri crisis is clearly embedded in an historic 
inter-ethnic feud over land and resource control.  The 
purported political demands of the lawless Ijaw youth, 
however, smack of attempting to place a thin veneer of 
legitimacy over ongoing criminal enterprises (the large-scale 
theft of oil).  It seems illogical to demand additional 
electoral wards when all affected Ijaw have effectively 
boycotted the electoral process.  The opportunity to extort 
the oil companies and the government through their use of 
force is a far more likely driving force behind the armed 
toughs.  80,000 bpd at $15 per barrel would be $1.2 million 
per day for the Ijaw criminals and their associates, with no 
production costs to cover. 
 
 
18.(C) Ijaw elders see the looming military reprisals on the 
horizon but seem helpless to improve the prospects for 
peaceful reconciliation.  The absence of alternatives is all 
too apparent. The GON appears to hold few prospects for the 
peace dialogue it started in Abuja (read reftel) while the 
pressures for a quick but bloody military solution mount as 
conditions remain unstable in the economically vital area. 
The only effective solution many see is force, overwhelming 
force. 
 
 
19.(C) A large-scale military operation against the Ijaw is 
very likely in the near future, despite our own and the oil 
companies' best efforts to counsel restraint at the highest 
levels of the GON.  If taken, this action will probably lack 
precision, resulting in human rights abuses and could again 
shut down Shell and Chevron-Texaco oil production. 
JETER