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| Identifier: | 03HARARE768 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03HARARE768 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Harare |
| Created: | 2003-04-17 14:54:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV ZI SADC |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000768 SIPDIS LONDON FOR CGURNEY PARIS FOR CNEARY NAIROBI FOR PFLAUMER NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR JENDAYI FRAZER E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2013 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ZI, SADC SUBJECT: TSVANGIRAI WELCOMES MULUZI INITIATIVE REF: A) HARARE 767 B) STATE 98702 C) PRETORIA 2012 Classified By: political section chief Matt Harrington. Reasons: 1.5 ( B) and (D). 1. Summary: In an April 17 conversation with the Ambassador, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leader Morgan Tsvangirai welcomed the initiative by President Muluzi to encourage political dialogue in Zimbabwe and expressed hope that it might help forestall further mass action -- and its unpredictable consequences -- planned by the MDC. He said Muluzi should facilitate talks between ZANU-PF and the MDC while leaving substantive details of potential agreements to the two parties. The MDC leader enouraged the USG to make it clear to the Zimbabwean armed forces that we would not accept military intervention in favor of any one political party. The Ambassador once again expressed concern about reports that individuals are planning violence and claiming senior MDC endorsement of their activities. Tsvangirai promised to make clear the MDC's opposition to violence internally and to consider issuing a statement condemning violence as a means of achieving political change and anyone advocating such an approach in the name of the MDC. End Summary. 2. (C) The Ambassador met on April 17 to deliver points in reftel B to Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) President Morgan Tsvangirai. He emphasized that the USG sees the upcoming April 24 visit by Presidents Muluzi and Mbeki as a potentially constructive development that could lead to an interim coalition government. He stressed our view that any agreement resulting from this initiative should provide for President Mugabe's departure; restore the rule of law; provide a legitimate role for the MDC and prevent domination by ZANU-PF in an interim government; and pave the way for new, free and fair elections. The Ambassador indicated that we were prepared to be helpful in this effort, by offering incentives or maintaining international pressure. He asked whether Tsvangirai agreed that an interim coalition would represent a useful way forward. Tsvangirai confirmed that our conditions reflected MDC views on how a transition might proceed. Muluzi involvement "positive" ---------------------------- 3. (C) Tsvangirai said the Malawian High Commission in Harare had been in touch with him to arrange a meeting with President Muluzi. He was not aware of President Mbeki's plans to attend, but said Mbeki's participation would be welcome. (Note: We later confirmed that the South African High Commissioner here is aware of Mbeki's planned participation and will head to South Africa on April 18 to consult on the visit. End Note.) Tsvangirai described the Muluzi initiative as a positive development which could help avoid looming confrontation in Zimbabwe, and said it was consistent with the three-phased solution long advocated by the MDC. First, Mugabe's departure was a necessary first step which would reduce tensions between the parties and increase the chances for a serious negotiation. Second, an interim period was essential, during which time a number of confidence-building measures would be implemented, laying the groundwork for an environment conducive to a free and fair election. The last phase would be a new election held under international supervision. 4. (C) The Ambassador noted that Muluzi had told us he had some concerns about the MDC's receptiveness to his engagement. If Tsvangirai considered Muluzi's involvement positive, it was important for him to encourage the Malawian president in his efforts. Tsvangirai said he had done so via the Malawian High Commission. Mugabe, he reported, was trying to "throw a spanner" into the Muluzi visit, dictating when and where the SADC heads of state could meet with Tsvangirai. Tsvangirai underscored that they preferred SIPDIS Muluzi to be a "facilitator" rather than a "negotiator," finding a way to engage the two sides in direct talks but not focusing on substance. Any substantive details regarding the way forward should be addressed by the two parties during the dialogue. MDC negotiating position getting stronger ----------------------------------------- 5. (C) Tsvangirai said he hoped Muluzi could convince ZANU-PF to engage in serious talks, as he preferred the route of dialogue to a sustained nationwide mass action whose outcome was unpredictable. He noted that the longer ZANU-PF continues its repression and the longer the economic decline continued, reconciliation would become increasingly hard to achieve. ZANU-PF's negotiating position was weakening by the day, he said, while the MDC's was getting stronger. The Ambassador cautioned against allowing overconfidence to preclude a willingness to talk to the other side, and Tsvangirai agreed. Asked how the U.S. could be helpful, SIPDIS Tsvangirai replied that, although there was no need for a SIPDIS USG-led Baghdad-like intervention in Zimbabwe, after Iraq the USG was now better placed to exert pressure on the regime in Harare. The MDC leader urged the Ambassador to make it clear to Zimbabwe Defense Forces Chief General Zvinavashe that the United States would consider unacceptable any military intervention in support of any one political party. The Ambassador agreed to look for ways to make that point. 6. (C) We briefed Tsvangirai on ZANU-PF spokesman Nathan Shamuyarira's remarks to us regarding Mugabe's willingness to retire (ref A). Tsvangirai found it interesting that Mugabe may be prepared to leave office early, although the MDC finds an interim transitional arrangement more appealing than an immediate election. MDC Violence ------------ 7. (C) The Ambassador revealed that we continue to hear reports of MDC-associated individuals planning violence, claiming party endorsement for their activities, and said the USG might be forced to distance itself from the party if such activities occurred. The Government of Zimbabwe believes it has firm evidence of the opposition party's instigation of some of the violence during the mid-March stayaway. The Ambassador added that four people had approached our embassy in Pretoria on April 16 (ref B) claiming they had authorization from the highest levels of the MDC to carry out violent attacks, and he provided Tsvangirai with their names. Tsvangirai looked at their names, appeared not to recognize them, and undertook to look into their allegations and get back to us with a response. Tsvangirai stated that he is planning to make remarks at an upcoming celebration of the party's recent parliamentary by-election victories strongly criticizing anyone advocating violence in the MDC's name. Encouraged by the Ambassador to issue a public statement with the same message, Tsvangirai agreed to consider this. SULLIVAN
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