US embassy cable - 03HARARE768

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TSVANGIRAI WELCOMES MULUZI INITIATIVE

Identifier: 03HARARE768
Wikileaks: View 03HARARE768 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Harare
Created: 2003-04-17 14:54:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV ZI SADC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000768 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR CGURNEY 
PARIS FOR CNEARY 
NAIROBI FOR PFLAUMER 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR JENDAYI FRAZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ZI, SADC 
SUBJECT: TSVANGIRAI WELCOMES MULUZI INITIATIVE 
 
REF: A) HARARE 767 B) STATE 98702 C) PRETORIA 2012 
 
Classified By: political section chief Matt Harrington.  Reasons: 1.5 ( 
B) and (D). 
 
1.  Summary: In an April 17 conversation with the Ambassador, 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leader Morgan Tsvangirai 
welcomed the initiative by President Muluzi to encourage 
political dialogue in Zimbabwe and expressed hope that it 
might help forestall further mass action -- and its 
unpredictable consequences -- planned by the MDC.  He said 
Muluzi should facilitate talks between ZANU-PF and the MDC 
while leaving substantive details of potential agreements to 
the two parties.  The MDC leader enouraged the USG to make it 
clear to the Zimbabwean armed forces that we would not accept 
military intervention in favor of any one political party. 
The Ambassador once again expressed concern about reports 
that individuals are planning violence and claiming senior 
MDC endorsement of their activities.  Tsvangirai promised to 
make clear the MDC's opposition to violence internally and to 
consider issuing a statement condemning violence as a means 
of achieving political change and anyone advocating such an 
approach in the name of the MDC.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) The Ambassador met on April 17 to deliver points in 
reftel B to Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) President 
Morgan Tsvangirai. He emphasized that the USG sees the 
upcoming April 24 visit by Presidents Muluzi and Mbeki as a 
potentially constructive development that could lead to an 
interim coalition government.  He stressed our view that any 
agreement resulting from this initiative should provide for 
President Mugabe's departure; restore the rule of law; 
provide a legitimate role for the MDC and prevent domination 
by ZANU-PF in an interim government; and pave the way for 
new, free and fair elections.  The Ambassador indicated that 
we were prepared to be helpful in this effort, by offering 
incentives or maintaining international pressure.  He asked 
whether Tsvangirai agreed that an interim coalition would 
represent a useful way forward.  Tsvangirai confirmed that 
our conditions reflected MDC views on how a transition might 
proceed. 
 
Muluzi involvement "positive" 
---------------------------- 
 
3.  (C)  Tsvangirai said the Malawian High Commission in 
Harare had been in touch with him to arrange a meeting with 
President Muluzi.  He was not aware of President Mbeki's 
plans to attend, but said Mbeki's participation would be 
welcome. (Note: We later confirmed that the South African 
High Commissioner here is aware of Mbeki's planned 
participation and will head to South Africa on April 18 to 
consult on the visit.  End Note.)  Tsvangirai described the 
Muluzi initiative as a positive development which could help 
avoid looming confrontation in Zimbabwe, and said it was 
consistent with the three-phased solution long advocated by 
the MDC.  First, Mugabe's departure was a necessary first 
step which would reduce tensions between the parties and 
increase the chances for a serious negotiation.  Second, an 
interim period was essential, during which time a number of 
confidence-building measures would be implemented, laying the 
groundwork for an environment conducive to a free and fair 
election.  The last phase would be a new election held under 
international supervision. 
 
4.  (C) The Ambassador noted that Muluzi had told us he had 
some concerns about the MDC's receptiveness to his 
engagement.  If Tsvangirai considered Muluzi's involvement 
positive, it was important for him to encourage the Malawian 
president in his efforts.  Tsvangirai said he had done so via 
the Malawian High Commission.  Mugabe, he reported, was 
trying to "throw a spanner" into the Muluzi visit, dictating 
when and where the SADC heads of state could meet with 
Tsvangirai.  Tsvangirai underscored that they preferred 
 
SIPDIS 
Muluzi to be a "facilitator" rather than a "negotiator," 
finding a way to engage the two sides in direct talks but not 
focusing on substance.  Any substantive details regarding the 
way forward should be addressed by the two parties during the 
dialogue. 
 
MDC negotiating position getting stronger 
----------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C)  Tsvangirai said he hoped Muluzi could convince 
ZANU-PF to engage in serious talks, as he preferred the route 
of dialogue to a sustained nationwide mass action whose 
outcome was unpredictable.  He noted that the longer ZANU-PF 
continues its repression and the longer the economic decline 
continued, reconciliation would become increasingly hard to 
achieve.  ZANU-PF's negotiating position was weakening by the 
day, he said, while the MDC's was getting stronger.  The 
Ambassador cautioned against allowing overconfidence to 
preclude a willingness to talk to the other side, and 
Tsvangirai agreed.  Asked how the U.S. could be helpful, 
 
SIPDIS 
Tsvangirai replied that, although there was no need for a 
 
SIPDIS 
USG-led Baghdad-like intervention in Zimbabwe, after Iraq the 
USG was now better placed to exert pressure on the regime in 
Harare.  The MDC leader urged the Ambassador to make it clear 
to Zimbabwe Defense Forces Chief General Zvinavashe that the 
United States would consider unacceptable any military 
intervention in support of any one political party.  The 
Ambassador agreed to look for ways to make that point. 
 
6.  (C)  We briefed Tsvangirai on ZANU-PF spokesman Nathan 
Shamuyarira's remarks to us regarding Mugabe's willingness to 
retire (ref A).  Tsvangirai found it interesting that Mugabe 
may be prepared to leave office early, although the MDC finds 
an interim transitional arrangement more appealing than an 
immediate election. 
 
MDC Violence 
------------ 
 
7.  (C) The Ambassador revealed that we continue to hear 
reports of MDC-associated individuals planning violence, 
claiming party endorsement for their activities, and said the 
USG might be forced to distance itself from the party if such 
activities occurred.  The Government of Zimbabwe believes it 
has firm evidence of the opposition party's instigation of 
some of the violence during the mid-March stayaway.  The 
Ambassador added that four people had approached our embassy 
in Pretoria on April 16 (ref B) claiming they had 
authorization from the highest levels of the MDC to carry out 
violent attacks, and he provided Tsvangirai with their names. 
 Tsvangirai looked at their names, appeared not to recognize 
them, and undertook to look into their allegations and get 
back to us with a response.  Tsvangirai stated that he is 
planning to make remarks at an upcoming celebration of the 
party's recent parliamentary by-election victories strongly 
criticizing anyone advocating violence in the MDC's name. 
Encouraged by the Ambassador to issue a public statement with 
the same message, Tsvangirai agreed to consider this. 
 
 
SULLIVAN 

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