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| Identifier: | 95ZAGREB2493 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 95ZAGREB2493 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Zagreb |
| Created: | 1995-07-03 17:39:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | War Crimes |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 ZAGREB 002493
SIPDIS
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEU
USVIENNA ALSO FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 12356: DECL: 7/3/05
TAGS: War Crimes
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CHIEF OF STAFF ON 6/30 SAYS "NO
PRECONDITIONS" FOR NEGOTIATIONS; TUDJMAN ON 7/2
GIVES ICFY A LIST OF PRECONDITIONS
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
-------
SUMMARY
-------
2. TWO DAYS AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF OF STAFF, HRVOJE
SARINIC, TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE GOC HAD (ALMOST) "NO
PRECONDITIONS" FOR TALKS WITH THE KRAJINA SERBS, PRESIDENT
TUDJMAN PUBLICLY LAID OUT SIX CONDITIONS FOR CROATIAN
PARTICIPATION. SARINIC COMPLAINED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY'S FOCUS ON GAINING RECOGNITION OF BOSNIAN
HERZEGOVINA WAS POINTLESS, AND CREATED A "DANGEROUS"
SITUATION IN CROATIA. AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH URGED THE GOC
TO OPEN A "SECOND TRACK" OF NEGOTIATIONS: TO HOLD TALKS
WITH SERBS FROM GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED TERRITORY ON HOW TO
IMPROVE THE OVERALL STATUS OF SERBS IN CROATIA. END
SUMMARY.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 ZAGREB 02493 01 OF 03 031643Z
--------------------------------------------- -------
SARINIC: GOC WILLING TO NEGOTIATE WITH KRAJINA SERBS
--------------------------------------------- -------
3. AT LUNCH ON JUNE 30, PRESIDENTIAL CHIEF OF STAFF HRVOJE
SARINIC TOLD AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH THAT THE GOC WAS WILLING
TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE KNIN SERBS. SARINIC,
SAYING HE WAS REPEATING A STATEMENT HE MADE TO UN SRSG
AKASHI, SAID "THE ONLY PRECONDITION IS THAT THERE BE NO
PRECONDITIONS." HE NOTED IN PARTICULAR THAT SERB
PRECONDITIONS, SUCH AS A CROATIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM MOUNT
DINARA IN SECTOR SOUTH, WERE NOT CONSTRUCTIVE. NOTING
THAT THE EU AMBASSADORS HAD PRESENTED A DEMARCHE URGING
WITHDRAWAL FROM MOUNT DINARA, SARINIC SAID THE GOC OFFERED
"NO APOLOGIES" FOR THE SITUATION: FOR A LONG TIME, THE
SITUATION FOR CROATIA HAD BEEN "VERY BAD," NOW IT WAS ONLY
CROATIAN MILITARY STEPS WHICH HAD MADE THINGS "A BIT
BETTER."
4. SARINIC HEDGED THE GOC'S LACK OF PRECONDITIONS ON
NEGOTIATIONS. THE GOC "OBVIOUSLY" WAS NOT PREPARED TO
NEGOTIATE WITH "RSK PRESIDENT" MARTIC. SARINIC ALSO
CLAIMED THE GOC WAS STILL WILLING TO MEET IN GENEVA, BUT
THAT THIS "FLEXIBILITY" WOULD "NOT LAST LONG." TUDJMAN
WAS AGAINST HOLDING THE MEETING IN GENEVA, AND "SOON" THE
GOC WOULD RETURN TO ITS INSISTENCE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS
BE HELD IN CROATIA.
-------------------------------------------
TUDJMAN: BUT ONLY UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS
-------------------------------------------
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 ZAGREB 02493 01 OF 03 031643Z
5. "SOON" ARRIVED EARLIER THAN EVEN SARINIC HAD EXPECTED.
ON JULY 2, PRESIDENT TUDJMAN TOLD ICFY CO-CHAIRMEN BILDT
AND STOLTENBERG THAT CROATIA WOULD SEEK PRECONDITIONS TO
ANY NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE KNIN SERBS. UNDER THE HEADLINE
"THREE PRECONDITIONS FOR TALKS" THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED
DAILY "VJESNIK" REPORTED SIX (BY OUR COUNT) CONDITIONS: 1)
THAT MILAN MARTIC NOT PARTICIPATE, AS HE WAS A "WAR
CRIMINAL" WHO ORDERED THE MAY 2-3 SHELLING OF ZAGREB; 2)
THAT THE TALKS BE HELD "ON THE TERRITORY OF CROATIA;" 3)
THAT ANY POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS WHICH MIGHT TAKE PLACE
MUST "SUBMIT TO THE SPIRIT OF THE CROATIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
ACT ON MINORITIES AND ETHNIC COMMUNITIES;" 4) THE RIJEKA-
SISAK OIL PIPELINE BE REOPENED, AS AGREED IN THE DECEMBER
1994 ECONOMIC AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AGREEMENT
(ECBMA); 5) THE EU ASSIST IN OPENING OF THE ZAGREB-KNIN-
SPLIT RAILWAY; AND 6) THE UNCRO MANDATE BE IMPLEMENTED "A
S
ENVISAGED IN THE UN RESOLUTIONS." (NOTE: THE PRESS
RELEASE FROM TUDJMAN'S OFFICE SOUGHT TO PORTRAY ONLY THE
LATTER THREE DEMANDS AS GOC "PRECONDITIONS." END NOTE.)
CONFIDENTIAL
NNNNPTQ4973
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4973
PAGE 01 ZAGREB 02493 02 OF 03 031643Z
ACTION EUR-01
INFO LOG-00 AID-00 CIAE-00 SMEC-00 OASY-00 SRPP-00 FBIE-00
H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-08 L-01 ADS-00 M-00
NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-00 PRS-01 P-01
SCT-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00
PMB-00 PRMC-01 DRL-09 G-00 /027W
------------------D5EAEB 031643Z /38
O 031739Z JUL 95
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6286
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
NATO EU COLLECTIVE
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA
JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-5PMA/J21//
SECDEF WASHDC//ISA/ISP//
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//DO/LG/XOX/IN/POLAD//
DIA WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//J3/J4/J5/POLAD//
AMCONSUL MUNICH
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//CA/POLAD//
COMSIXTHFLT //N2//
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ3/ECJ4/ECJ5/ECPOLAD//
USLO SKOPJE
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ZAGREB 02493 02 OF 03 031643Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 ZAGREB 002493
SIPDIS
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEU
USVIENNA ALSO FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 12356: DECL: 7/3/05
TAGS: PREL PGOV HR UN
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CHIEF OF STAFF ON 6/30 SAYS "NO
PRECONDITIONS" FOR NEGOTIATIONS; TUDJMAN ON 7/2
GIVES ICFY A LIST OF PRECONDITIONS
6. COMMENT: TUDJMAN'S CONDITIONS, IF HELD TO STRICTLY,
MEAN WEEKS MORE OF PRE-NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE ANY REAL TALKS
CAN GET UNDER WAY. THE PRESS ACCOUNT REPORTED THAT
TUDJMAN AND THE ICFY CO-CHAIRMEN "AGREED TO ARRANGE
INTRODUCTORY TALKS IN GENEVA TO DECIDE THE AGENDA AND THE
TERMS OF FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CROATIAN SERBS. THE
ICFY CO-CHAIRMEN WENT TO KNIN ON JULY 3. END COMMENT.
-----------------
PRESSURE BELGRADE
-----------------
7. SARINIC NOTED THAT IT WAS HARD TO BE SURE WHO AMONG THE
KRAJINA SERBS STILL HAD AUTHORITY, AND URGED THAT MORE
PRESSURE BE PLACED ON MILOSEVIC. SARINIC CLAIMED THAT
MILOSEVIC HAD "GOOD RELATIONS" WITH "RSK PRIME MINISTER-
DESIGNATE" MILAN BABIC, AND HAD IN FACT ENGINEERED
BORISLAV MIKELIC'S OUSTER WHEN MIKELIC BECAME INEFFECTIVE.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 ZAGREB 02493 02 OF 03 031643Z
(COMMENT: SARINIC OFFERED NO EVIDENCE FOR THIS CLAIM. END
COMMENT.) WHEN THE AMBASSADOR ASKED IF THE GOC WAS
PREPARED TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION, PRESUMABLY AT THE END OF
THE CURRENT UN MANDATE, SARINIC GAVE A SOMEWHAT DESULTORY
"YEAH" BUT THEN NOTED THAT SEVERAL MONTHS STILL REMAINED
AND EXCLAIMED, "MAKE SOMETHING HAPPEN!"
------------------------
BUT DON'T IGNORE CROATIA
------------------------
8. BUT THE CURRENT APPROACH WAS "DANGEROUS," SARINIC SAID,
BECAUSE CROATIA WAS AGAIN ON THE BACK BURNER FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. COMMENTING ON THE EU'S CANNES
STATEMENT, SARINIC ARGUED THAT RECOGNITION OF CROATIA AND
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA BY THE "FRY" SHOULD BE A PACKAGE. THE
U.S. HAD SEEMED TO BELIEVE THIS, SARINIC SAID, "BUT THEN
MR. FRASURE MADE HIS TRIPS TO BELGRADE." RECOGNITION OF
B-H BY MILOSEVIC "WILL CHANGE NOTHING," WHEREAS
RECOGNITION OF CROATIA COULD ACTUALLY PAY REAL DIVIDENDS.
THE AMBASSADOR TOLD SARINIC THAT THE SANCTIONS PACKAGE
PRESENTED TO MILOSEVIC STILL SOMETHING IN RESERVE LINKED
TO RECOGNITION OF CROATIA. BUT SARINIC AGAIN NOTED THAT
CROATIA HAD SUNK INTO "THE SECOND LINE" AGAIN, AND
COMMENTED THAT MANY IN THE GOC DREW THE LESSON THAT "WE
ONLY SEE POLITICAL ATTENTION WHEN THERE ARE HOSTILITIES."
--------------------------------------------- -----------
PUSHING FOR A "SECOND TRACK": TALK TO YOUR "LOYAL" SERBS
--------------------------------------------- -----------
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 ZAGREB 02493 02 OF 03 031643Z
9. OBSERVING THAT WE HAD NO REAL CAUSE FOR OPTIMISM OVER
THE PROSPECTS FOR ZAGREB-KNIN TALKS, THE AMBASSADOR URGED
SARINIC TO PURSUE A "SECOND TRACK" OF DISCUSSIONS: WITH
THE SERBIAN COMMUNITY ON CROATIAN GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED
TERRITORY. THIS INCLUDED SERBS WHO HAD STAYED IN CITIES
SUCH AS ZAGREB OR RIJEKA THROUGHOUT THE WAR, BUT ALSO
THOSE SERBS WHO REMAINED IN, OR RETURNED TO, THEIR HOMES
IN WESTERN SLAVONIA (SECTOR WEST). MANY STEPS COULD BE
TAKEN SUCH AS: REBUILDING SERB AS WELL AS CROAT HOMES
DAMAGED DURING THE WAR, TAKING STEPS AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION, GIVING THE SERBS MORE OF A VOICE IN
CURRICULUM DECISIONS, AND PUNISHING ANY CROATIANS WHO MAY
HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES AGAINST SERBS IN THE AFTERMATH OF
OPERATION "FLASH." BUT THIS WERE JUST SOME IDEAS, PERHAPS
EVEN MORE IMPORTANT WOULD BE TO BEGAN A PUBLIC, AND
OFFICIAL, DIALOGUE WITH SERB COMMUNITY LEADERS, SO THAT
THEY FELT THEY HAD AN INFLUENCE ON THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY
THE GOC. RIGHT NOW, THE AMBASSADOR NOTED, THE SERBS OF
CROATIA FEEL SHUT OUT FROM DECISION-MAKING, EVEN ON THE
ISSUES OF GREATEST CONSEQUENCE TO THEM. THE AMBASSADOR
ALSO NOTED THAT PUBLIC STEPS TO IMPROVE AND SECURE THE
CONFIDENTIAL
NNNNPTQ4974
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4974
PAGE 01 ZAGREB 02493 03 OF 03 031644Z
ACTION EUR-01
INFO LOG-00 AID-00 CIAE-00 SMEC-00 OASY-00 SRPP-00 FBIE-00
H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-08 L-01 ADS-00 M-00
NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-00 PRS-01 P-01
SCT-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00
PMB-00 PRMC-01 DRL-09 G-00 /027W
------------------D5EAF6 031644Z /38
O 031739Z JUL 95
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6287
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
NATO EU COLLECTIVE
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA
JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-5PMA/J21//
SECDEF WASHDC//ISA/ISP//
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//DO/LG/XOX/IN/POLAD//
DIA WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//J3/J4/J5/POLAD//
AMCONSUL MUNICH
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//CA/POLAD//
COMSIXTHFLT //N2//
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ3/ECJ4/ECJ5/ECPOLAD//
USLO SKOPJE
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ZAGREB 02493 03 OF 03 031644Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 ZAGREB 002493
SIPDIS
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEU
USVIENNA ALSO FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 12356: DECL: 7/3/05
TAGS: PREL PGOV HR UN
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CHIEF OF STAFF ON 6/30 SAYS "NO
PRECONDITIONS" FOR NEGOTIATIONS; TUDJMAN ON 7/2
GIVES ICFY A LIST OF PRECONDITIONS
STATUS OF ETHNIC SERB CITIZENS COULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT
IMPACT WITH THE POPULATION OF THE "RSK" IN TERMS OF
REDUCING SUPPORT FOR THE REBEL REGIME, AND WOULD ALMOST
CERTAINLY HAVE A POSITIVE IMPACT ON CROATIA'S RELATIONS
WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.
10. SARINIC'S REACTION WAS COOL, BUT NOT NEGATIVE. NO ONE
FROM THE SERB COMMUNITY HAD APPROACHED HIM WITH A FORMAL
REQUEST FOR A MEETI
NG. IF HE RECEIVED ONE, HE WOULD
"CATALYZE" IT, AND PERHAPS EVEN PARTICIPATE HIMSELF.
SARINIC ARGUED THAT THE GOC HAD "TRIED ITS BEST" TO SHOW
SERBS IN WESTERN SLAVONIA THAT LIFE IN CROATIA WAS
POSSIBLE, AND REPEATED THAT THE GOC WAS READY TO RECEIVE
ALL SERBS WHO WANTED TO RETURN. THE GOC HAD PROBLEMS,
HOWEVER, WITH "LOCAL PEOPLE" WHO RESIST THE GOC'S
DECISIONS. ACCORDING TO SARINIC, "DECISIONS TAKEN AT THE
HIGHEST LEVEL ARE NOT IMPLEMENTED LOCALLY. IT IS NOT
EASY."
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 ZAGREB 02493 03 OF 03 031644Z
11. COMMENT: THE REALITY OF RESISTANCE AMONG MANY (BUT
NOT ALL) OF THE DISPLACED PERSONS, WAR VETERANS, AND EVEN
AVERAGE CROATIANS FOR FULL PROTECTION OF THE HUMAN AND
CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE SERB COMMUNITY IS PRECISELY WHY THE
GOC MUST TAKE AN ACTIVIST APPROACH ON THE ISSUE. WE PLAN
TO CONTINUE TO PUSH THE GOC TO BEGIN A PROCESS OF DIALOGUE
(UNDER MODIFIED Z-4 AUSPICES) WITH THE "LOYAL" SERB
COMMUNITY AS A "SECOND TRACK" WHICH CAN BE FOLLOWED IN
PARALLEL TO, BUT INDEPENDENT OF, THE NORMAL Z-4
NEGOTIATIONS WITH KNIN.
GALBRAITH
CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
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