US embassy cable - 95BUCHAREST6434

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BUCHAREST 006434 
 
 
E.O.  12356:  DECL:  OADR 
TAGS:  PGOV, PINS, RO 
SUBJECT:  ROMANIAN PRESIDENT ION ILIESCU -- A 
POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 
 
1. CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
2. SUMMARY: THIS IS THE FIRST OF TWO CABLES FOCUSING 
ON ROMANIAN PRESIDENT ION ILIESCU, AND COVERS HIS 
POLITICAL HISTORY THROUGH THE 1992 ELECTIONS. 
SEPTEL WILL DEAL WITH HIS CURRENT POWERS AND ROLE IN 
THE ROMANIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM.  ILIESCU, WHO WAS 
BORN INTO A COMMUNIST FAMILY IN 1930, ROSE RAPIDLY 
IN THE PARTY HIERARCHY UNTIL HE BEGAN TO CRITICIZE 
THE EXCESSES OF DICTATOR NICOLAE CEAUSESCU IN THE 
EARLY 1970'S.  ILIESCU THEN EXPERIENCED A SERIES OF 
DEMOTIONS, AND BY 1984 HAD FALLEN TO THE POSITION OF 
DIRECTOR OF AN OBSCURE PUBLISHING HOUSE.  HOWEVER, 
HE HAD BECOME KNOWN AS A PARTY DISSIDENT, AND WITH 
THE RISE OF GORBACHEV, ILIESCU BEGAN ADVOCATING AN 
OPENING OF ROMANIAN SOCIETY ALONG THE LINES THEN 
BEING PURSUED IN MOSCOW.  IN THE CHAOS WHICH 
FOLLOWED THE SUDDEN FALL OF THE CEAUSESCU REGIME IN 
DECEMBER, 1989, THE INTELLECTUALS WHO WERE SEEKING 
TO ESTABLISH A NEW POLITICAL ORDER TURNED TO THE 
MORE EXPERIENCED ILIESCU FOR LEADERSHIP, AND HE 
QUICKLY BECAME THE DOMINANT FIGURE IN THE AD HOC 
NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT (NSF) GOVERNMENT. 
 
3. GIVEN THE TOTAL LACK OF ORGANIZED OPPOSITION 
GROUPS IN ROMANIA PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION, ILIESCU 
HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO KEEP THE OLD BUREAUCRACY IN 
OFFICE, BUT THIS DECISION ALIENATED THE 
INTELLECTUALS AND THE EMERGING OPPOSITION PARTIES. 
ILIESCU AND THE NSF MOVED QUICKLY TO LAY THE 
FOUNDATIONS FOR A PLURALISTIC POLITICAL SYSTEM AND 
HE WON THE PRESIDENCY HANDILY IN THE MAY, 1990 
ELECTIONS -- WHICH, ALTHOUGH SERIOUSLY FLAWED, 
REFLECTED THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE -- BUT THE 
OPPOSITION PARTIES REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE LEGITIMACY 
OF THE GOVERNMENT AND CLAIMED THAT ILIESCU WAS A 
"CRYPTO-COMMUNIST."  ILIESCU COMPOUNDED HIS PROBLEMS 
BY SUMMONING MINERS TO BUCHAREST IN JUNE, 1990, TO 
END THE OCCUPATION OF A MAJOR SQUARE BY PROTESTING 
STUDENTS.  IN SEPTEMBER, 1991, THE MINERS AGAIN CAME 
TO BUCHAREST AND FORCED THE RESIGNATION OF PRIME 
MINISTER PETRE ROMAN, WITH WHOM ILIESCU HAD EARLIER 
SPLIT DUE TO A DISPUTE ON THE PACE OF REFORM AS WELL 
AS S CLASH OF AMBITIONS.  HOWEVER, ILIESCU THEN 
APPOINTED A RESPECTED TECHNOCRAT AS PRIME MINISTER, 
WHO, WITH ILIESCU'S BACKING, ORGANIZED THE FREE AND 
FAIR ELECTION OF SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1992.  ILIESCU 
AGAIN WON THE PRESIDENCY BY A WIDE MARGIN, HAVING 
CAMPAIGNED ON A PLATFORM OF GRADUAL REFORM AND A 
STRONG SOCIAL SAFETY NET TO EASE THE PAIN OF THE 
TRANSITION TO THE MARKET. 
 
4. GIVEN ILIESCU'S POLITICAL HISTORY AND OUR CLOSE 
OBSERVATION OF HIM OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS, WE HAVE 
NO DIFFICULTY IN BELIEVING THAT HE IS COMMITTED TO 
THE DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM WHICH HE PLAYED A 
LARGE PART IN ESTABLISHING.  HOWEVER, ILIESCU IS 
CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPACT OF RAPID MOVEMENT TOWARD 
PRIVATIZATION ON ROMANIA'S WORKERS -- NOT 
SURPRISINGLY, IN VIEW OF HIS BACKGROUND.  HE TOLD 
AMBASSADOR MOSES RECENTLY THAT THE 1990 STUDENT 
PROTESTORS IN BUCHAREST WERE REALLY PAWNS OF THE 
REESTABLISHED HISTORIC PARTIES, WHICH WERE USING 
THEM IN AN EFFORT TO RESTORE THE PRE-WWII SOCIAL 
ORDER WITH ITS ENORMOUS DISPARITIES OF WEALTH. 
WHETHER THERE IS ANY TRUTH TO THIS INTERPRETATION OR 
NOT, IT IS INDICATIVE OF ILIESCU'S VIEWS.  ON 
ECONOMIC MATTERS, HE IS PRO-REFORM BUT WANTS TO 
PROTECT THE WORKERS.  THIS IS BOTH IDEOLOGICAL AND 
REFLECTIVE OF THE FACT THAT HIS POLITICAL BASE AND 
THAT OF HIS PARTY (PDSR) LIES WITH THE ROMANIAN 
WORKERS EMPLOYED FOR THE LAST FOUR DECADES BY STATE- 
OWNED BUSINESSES.  AS HE PUT IT IN THE 1992 
CAMPAIGN, HIS GOAL IS A "SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY" -- 
AN ECONOMY WITH PRIVATE PROPERTY AND FREE 
ENTERPRISE, BUT ONE IN WHICH STATE REGULATION IS 
USED TO PREVENT THE EXTREME INEQUALITIES AND MASSIVE 
POVERTY WHICH CHARACTERIZED THE PRE-WAR ORDER. 
SINCE 1992, ILIESCU HAS GIVEN MORE SUPPORT TO 
REFORMS, INCLUDING AUSTERITY MEASURES, THAN SUCH 
CAMPAIGN RHETORIC WOULD HAVE LED ONE TO EXPECT 
(SEPTEL), BUT IN OUR VIEW HE WILL NEVER BE PREPARED 
TO GO FURTHER TOWARD AN UNREGULATED MARKET THAN A 
TRADITIONAL EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRAT.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
5. FROM COMMUNIST ORTHODOXY TO DISSIDENCE 
----------------------------------------- 
 
ILIESCU CAME FROM A WORKING CLASS COMMUNIST 
BACKGROUND AND ROSE RAPIDLY THROUGH THE PARTY RANKS 
UNTIL HIS 1971 BREAK WITH CEAUSESCU.  ILIESCU'S 
FATHER, A RAILWAY WORKER, WAS ONE OF THE FEW ETHNIC 
ROMANIAN ACTIVISTS IN THE TINY PRE-WWII ROMANIAN 
COMMUNIST PARTY (RCP).  ILIESCU HIMSELF JOINED THE 
COMMUNIST YOUTH ORGANIZATION IN 1944 AT THE AGE OF 
14 AND, AFTER OBTAINING HYDROENGINEERING DEGREES 
FROM THE BUCHAREST POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND THE 
MOSCOW ENERGY INSTITUTE, HELD POSITIONS ON THE YOUTH 
ORGANIZATION'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE.  IN 1965 HE BECAME 
AN ALTERNATE MEMBER OF THE RCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND 
IN 1967 HE WAS MADE A FULL MEMBER, AS WELL AS BEING 
APPOINTED MINISTER OF YOUTH AFFAIRS.  IN 1969 HE WAS 
NAMED AN ALTERNATE MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S 
POWERFUL POLITICAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (POLITBURO). 
 
6. DESPITE HIS ORTHODOX COMMUNIST BACKGROUND AND 
RAPID RISE IN THE PARTY HIERARCHY, ILIESCU BEGAN TO 
CRITICIZE CEAUSESCU'S GROWING CULT OF PERSONALITY, 
NEPOTISM, AND EXTREME ECONOMIC CENTRALIZATION 
POLICIES.  AS A RESULT, AND PROBABLY ALSO BECAUSE HE 
WAS VIEWED IN SOME QUARTERS AS A POSSIBLE EVENTUAL 
SUCCESSOR TO CEAUSESCU, HE WAS DISMISSED FROM THE 
YOUTH MINISTRY IN 1971 AND DEMOTED TO THE POSITION 
OF SECRETARY OF THE TIMIS COUNTY RCP.  IN 1974, 
ILIESCU OBTAINED THE MORE IMPORTANT POSITION OF 
FIRST SECRETARY OF THE IASI COUNTY RCP, BUT HIS 
OUTSPOKENNESS AND LOCAL POPULARITY AGAIN LED TO 
DEMOTION IN 1978, THIS TIME TO THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF 
THE WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL.  HE ALSO LOST HIS 
POLITICAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE POSITION THAT YEAR. 
NEVERTHELESS, ILIESCU CONTINUED TO TAKE A CRITICAL 
STANCE TOWARD THE CEAUSESCU REGIME, AND IN 1984 HE 
LOST BOTH HIS RCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE SEAT AND EVEN 
HIS WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL POSITION.  FROM 1984 TO 
THE DECEMBER 1989 REVOLUTION, ILIESCU SERVED IN 
OBSCURITY AS THE DIRECTOR OF A TECHNICAL PUBLISHING 
HOUSE, BUT DURING THIS PERIOD HE BEGAN ADVOCATING AN 
OPENING OF ROMANIAN SOCIETY ALONG THE LINES BEING 
PURSUED BY GORBACHEV IN THE THEN USSR. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
7. ILIESCU STEPS INTO THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY 
   LEADERSHIP VACUUM 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
DESPITE HIS YEARS IN THE POLITICAL WILDERNESS, 
ILIESCU WAS WELL-KNOWN AND POPULAR AMONG POLITICALLY 
ATTUNED ROMANIANS ON THE EVE OF THE 1989 REVOLUTION. 
SINCE THERE WERE NO DISSIDENT GROUPS IN ROMANIA 
READY AND WAITING TO TAKE POWER FOLLOWING THE SUDDEN 
FALL OF CEAUSESCU, THE ISSUE OF WHO WOULD NOW RUN 
THE COUNTRY FELL BY DEFAULT INTO THE HANDS OF THOSE 
CITIZENS OF BUCHAREST -- PRIMARILY INTELLECTUALS -- 
WHO HAD GATHERED SPONTANEOUSLY AT VARIOUS SITES TO 
DISCUSS THE CHAOTIC SITUATION CREATED BY THE 
COLLAPSE OF THE DICTATORSHIP.  MANY OF THEM TURNED 
TO THE POLITICALLY MORE EXPERIENCED ILIESCU FOR 
LEADERSHIP BECAUSE HE HAD ANTI-CEAUSESCU CREDENTIALS 
AND SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND HOW ORDER COULD BE RESTORED 
QUICKLY.  ILIESCU ALMOST IMMEDIATELY EMERGED AS THE 
DOMINANT FIGURE IN THE AD HOC NATIONAL SALVATION 
FRONT (NSF) GOVERNMENT. 
 
8. COMMENT: OTHER INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 1989 
REVOLUTION HAVE IT THAT ILIESCU AND LIKE-MINDED 
PARTY DISSIDENTS HAD EITHER BEEN PLOTTING A COUP AND 
USED THE REVOLUTION AS A COVER TO STAGE IT, OR 
STEPPED IN AND "STOLE" THE REVOLUTION AS IT WAS 
OCCURRING.  WE FIND THE FIRST INTERPRETATION TOO 
PARANOID TO BE ACCEPTABLE WITHOUT OVERWHELMING 
PROOF.  AS FOR THE SECOND, SINCE THE REVOLUTION WAS 
NOT LED BY AN ESTABLISHED ANTI-COMMUNIST GROUP SUCH 
AS SOLIDARITY, BUT BROKE OUT SPONTANEOUSLY, WHO IS 
ILIESCU SUPPOSED TO HAVE STOLEN IT FROM?  END 
COMMENT. 
 
---------------- 
9. TWO BAD YEARS 
---------------- 
 
DUE TO THE LACK OF ORGANIZED ANTI-COMMUNIST 
OPPOSITION FORCES PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION, ILIESCU 
HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO KEEP THE OLD POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACY IN OFFICE, EXCEPT AT THE VERY 
HIGHEST LEVELS.  HOWEVER, GIVEN HIS OWN BACKGROUND, 
HE PROBABLY FELT NO DESIRE TO PURGE THOSE OFFICIALS 
WHO WERE READY AND ABLE TO ADJUST TO A NEW POLITICAL 
SYSTEM.  (NOTE: A POINT OF VIEW MORE ACCEPTABLE NOW 
THAT FORMER COMMUNISTS HOLD POWER THROUGHOUT MUCH OF 
THE REGION.  END NOTE.)  MANY OF THE INTELLECTUALS 
WHO HAD INITIALLY SUPPORTED ILIESCU TURNED AGAINST 
HIM BECAUSE OF HIS FAILURE TO PURGE THE BUREAUCRACY 
AND HIS LATER DECISION TO TURN THE NSF INTO A PARTY 
-- ONE WHICH THE BUREAUCRATS HE HAD RETAINED IN 
OFFICE NATURALLY SUPPORTED.  GIVEN ILIESCU'S OWN 
COMMUNIST PAST, IT WAS EASY FOR THE INTELLECTUALS 
AND THE EMERGING OPPOSITION PARTIES TO DISPUTE THE 
VERY LEGITIMACY OF THE PROVISIONAL NSF GOVERNMENT -- 
A TACTIC WHOSE CONTINUED USE STILL EMBITTERS 
ROMANIAN POLITICS TODAY. 
 
10. ILIESCU AND THE NSF QUICKLY MOVED TO ESTABLISH 
CIVIL LIBERTIES AND A PLURALISTIC POLITICAL SYSTEM. 
HOWEVER, THE MAY 1990 ELECTIONS, IN WHICH ILIESCU 
WAS ELECTED PRESIDENT WITH 85& OF THE VOTE, WERE 
SERIOUSLY FLAWED.  THE NSF HAD CONSIDERABLE 
ADVANTAGES IN TERMS OF CONTROL OF AND/OR ACCESS TO 
THE MEDIA, FUNDS, AND OTHER RESOURCES BASIC TO AN 
ELECTION CAMPAIGN.  WORSE, NSF SUPPORTERS 
INTIMIDATED AND HARASSED OPPOSITION CANDIDATES IN 
THE RURAL AREAS.  ALTHOUGH ILIESCU AND THE NSF WOULD 
HAVE WON IN ANY CASE, THE NATURE OF THE CAMPAIGN 
ALLOWED THE OPPOSITION TO CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF 
THE RESULTS, AND THEY CONTINUED TO ASSERT THAT THE 
GOVERNMENT WAS ILLEGITIMATE AND ILIESCU A "CRYPTO- 
COMMUNIST." 
 
11. ILIESCU THEN COMPOUNDED HIS PROBLEMS BY MAKING 
THE WORST MISTAKE OF HIS POST-REVOLUTION CAREER -- 
CALLING MINERS INTO BUCHAREST IN JUNE, 1990, TO 
BREAK UP A MONTHS LONG OCCUPATION OF A CENTRAL 
SQUARE BY STUDENT PROTESTORS.  (NOTE: ILIESCU HAS 
CLAIMED, NOT VERY CONVINCINGLY, THAT HE DID NOT CALL 
IN THE MINERS AND THAT THEIR ARRIVAL IN BUCHAREST 
RESULTED FROM THEIR OWN PATRIOTIC INITIATIVE.  END 
NOTE.)  THE MINERS NOT ONLY USED VIOLENCE AGAINST 
THE STUDENTS, BUT ATTACKED THE OFFICES OF OPPOSITION 
PARTIES AS WELL.  ILIESCU'S IMAGE ABROAD SANK STILL 
FURTHER WHEN HE SPLIT WITH HIS NSF PRIME MINISTER, 
PETRE ROMAN, ON THE GROUND THAT ROMAN WAS MOVING TOO 
QUICKLY ON ECONOMIC REFORM, BUT ALSO DUE TO CLASHING 
AMBITIONS AND SHARPLY CONTRASTING PERSONAL STYLES. 
AFTER SEVERAL MONTHS OF DISSENSION WITHIN THE NSF, 
THE MINERS CAME TO BUCHAREST AGAIN IN SEPTEMBER OF 
1991 TO DEMAND ROMAN'S OUSTER.  THIS TIME, HOWEVER, 
IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THEY HAD BEEN SUMMONED OR 
HAD COME OF THEIR OWN VOLITION DUE TO A DROP IN 
THEIR REAL INCOME WHICH THEY ATTRIBUTED TO ROMAN'S 
POLICIES.  WHATEVER THEIR ORIGINAL PURPOSE, ON 
ARRIVAL IN THE CAPITAL SOME OF THE MINERS BEGAN 
CALLING FOR ILIESCU'S DEPARTURE AS WELL AS ROMAN'S, 
AND MARCHED ON HIS OFFICE AT COTROCENI PALACE. 
ILIESCU RESPONDED BY OBTAINING ROMAN'S RESIGNATION, 
WHICH DEFUSED THE SITUATION AND ENABLED HIM TO GET 
THE MINERS TO LEAVE BUCHAREST PEACEFULLY.  SHORTLY 
THEREAFTER THE NSF BROKE UP, AND ROMAN AND THE YOUNG 
TECHNOCRATS WHO SUPPORTED HIM FORMED THEIR OWN PARTY 
WHILE THE BUREAUCRATS REMAINED WITH ILIESCU. 
 
12. COMMENT: ILIESCU HAS TOLD US THAT THE STUDENTS 
PROTESTS OF SPRING 1990 WERE INSPIRED BY THE NEWLY 
REESTABLISHED HISTORICAL PARTIES -- THE NATIONAL 
PEASANT PARTY (PNTCD) AND THE NATIONAL LIBERAL PARTY 
(PNL).  THESE PARTIES, HE ARGUED, WERE ATTEMPTING TO 
USE THE STUDENTS TO "STEAL" THE 1989 REVOLUTION FOR 
THEIR OWN PURPOSES: REVERSAL OF THE TREND TOWARD 
EGALITARIANISM WHICH CAME WITH POST-WWII COMMUNIST 
RULE AND THE RESTORATION OF THE PRE-WWII SOCIAL 
ORDER, AN ORDER MARKED IN ILIESCU'S VIEW (AND IN 
FACT) BY ENORMOUS DISPARITIES OF WEALTH AND MASSIVE 
POVERTY.  ALTHOUGH MORE PRO-REFORM THAN MANY OTHER 
OFFICIALS OF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING PM 
VACAROIU, ILIESCU FAVORS A PARTIAL GRATIS 
DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP IN PRIVATIZED ENTERPRISES 
TO THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE, AS EVIDENCED BY THE RECENTLY 
ENACTED MASS PRIVATIZATION LAW WHICH PROVIDES THAT 
ALL CITIZENS WILL RECEIVE OWNERSHIP CERTIFICATES OF 
EQUAL VALUE TO EXCHANGE FOR STOCK IN THE ENTERPRISES 
TO BE TO BE PRIVATIZED.  ILIESCU IS ALSO ANXIOUS TO 
AVERT, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE MASSIVE 
UNEMPLOYMENT WHICH COULD FOLLOW FROM PRIVATIZATION 
AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING.  IT IS ILIESCU'S OWN 
LABOR CONSTITUENCY -- WHICH ENJOYED JOB SECURITY, IF 
LITTLE ELSE, DURING THE COMMUNIST REGIME -- WHICH 
WOULD BE MOST NEGATIVELY EFFECTED, AND HE IS 
NATURALLY RELUCTANT TO RISK ALIENATING IT BY TAKING 
THE LEAD IN FORCING RADICAL RESTRUCTURING.  ILIESCU 
MAY HAVE ANTICIPATED THAT THE HISTORICAL PARTIES -- 
WHOSE CONSTITUENCIES HAVE THE MOST TO GAIN FROM 
PRIVATIZATION -- WOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN PERSUADING 
ROMANIANS TO ACCEPT THE TEMPORARY PAIN WHICH 
RESTRUCTURING ENTAILS; BUT UNFORTUNATELY THEY HAVE 
NOT EVEN SUPPORTED THE GOR'S OWN MOVES IN THE 
DIRECTION OF REFORM, PREFERRING TO CRITICIZE THEM 
FOR THE SAKE OF POLITICAL ADVANTAGE.  NEVERTHELESS, 
ILIESCU HIMSELF IS UNWILLING TO PUSH FOR RAPID 
RESTRUCTURING IF THE PRICE IS UNEMPLOYMENT FOR THE 
MANY AND MASSIVE AGGREGATIONS OF WEALTH FOR A FEW. 
 
13.  COMMENT CONTINUED: AS ILIESCU PUT IT DURING THE 
1992 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN -- AND HE HAS NOT 
DEVIATED SINCE -- HIS GOAL IS "A SOCIAL MARKET 
ECONOMY," NOT "SAVAGE CAPITALISM."  IN OTHER WORDS, 
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND FREE ENTERPRISE ARE FINE SO 
LONG AS STATE REGULATION PREVENTS THE CREATION OF 
ENORMOUS INCOME AND CLASS DISPARITIES.  THUS, WHILE 
ILIESCU FULLY SUPPORTED THE POST-REVOLUTION SALE OF 
STATE-OWNED APARTMENTS TO THEIR TENANTS AT BARGAIN 
PRICES -- A MOVE WHICH CREATED HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS 
OF HOME OWNERS AT A STROKE -- HE HAS JUST AS 
VEHEMENTLY OPPOSED THE PHYSICAL RETURN OF 
NATIONALIZED DWELLINGS TO THEIR FORMER OWNERS, WHOM 
HE PROBABLY CONSIDERS, BUT HAS NOT PUBLICLY 
DESCRIBED, AS PRE-WAR "ARISTOCRATS".  ILIESCU'S 
VETOES OF ATTEMPTS BY EX-KING MICHAEL TO TRAVEL TO 
ROMANIA UNTIL HE FORMALLY RENOUNCES THE THRONE AND 
PLEDGES NOT TO USE A VISIT TO INCITE PRO-MONARCHIST 
DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE ALSO NO DOUBT BEEN INSPIRED IN 
LARGE MEASURE BY HIS AVERSION TO THE POLITICAL AND 
SOCIAL ORDER OF PRE-WAR ROMANIA.  IN ANY CASE, 
HOWEVER, THERE IS LITTLE POPULAR SUPPORT FOR 
RESTORING THE MONARCHY (NO MORE THAN 20& HAVE EVER 
FAVORED IT, ACCORDING TO PUBLIC OPINION POLLS) AND 
EVEN THE PNTCD IS NOW DOWNPLAYING ITS TRADITIONAL 
MONARCHISM.  END COMMENT. 
 
------------------------ 
14. THE TURN OF THE TIDE 
------------------------ 
 
FOLLOWING THE FALL OF THE ROMAN GOVERNMENT, ILIESCU 
IMMEDIATELY TOOK THE FIRST IN A SERIES OF STEPS 
WHICH REESTABLISHED HIS CREDENTIALS AS A POLITICAL 
DEMOCRAT AND AN ADVOCATE, HOWEVER CAUTIOUS, OF 
ECONOMIC REFORM. HE APPOINTED TEODOR STOLOJAN, A 
WELL-RESPECTED ECONOMIST WITHOUT PARTY AFFILIATION, 
AS PRIME MINISTER.  STOLOJAN, WITH ILIESCU'S 
SUPPORT, DEFINED HIS PRIMARY TASK AS ORGANIZING FREE 
AND FAIR LOCAL AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS WITHIN A YEAR, 
AFTER WHICH HE WOULD RESIGN.  DURING THE RUN-UP TO 
THE FALL 1992 ELECTIONS, ILIESCU AND HIS PARTY -- 
SHORTLY TO BE RENAMED THE PARTY OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
(PDSR) -- CAMPAIGNED ON A PLATFORM OF GRADUAL 
ECONOMIC REFORM AND A STRONG SOCIAL SAFETY NET TO 
MINIMIZE THE PAIN OF THE TRANSITION TO THE MARKET. 
THE PDSR WON 27& OF THE VOTE IN THE ELECTIONS -- 
WHICH ALL INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS CONSIDERED FAIR 
AND FREE --  WHICH GAVE IT A PLURALITY.  ILIESCU DID 
FAR BETTER THAN HIS PARTY.  RUNNING AGAINST FIVE 
OTHER CANDIDATES, HE WON 47& OF THE VOTE IN THE 
FIRST ROUND OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.  IN THE 
SECOND ROUND, RUNNING ONLY AGAINST THE STRONGEST 
OPPOSITION CANDIDATE, ILIESCU TOOK 61& OF THE VOTE. 
 
15. COMMENT: MOST ANALYSTS HERE ATTRIBUTE ILIESCU'S 
1992 VICTORY TO HIS COMBINATION OF DIGNITY, WHICH 
ROMANIANS EXPECT OF A PRESIDENT, AND A "COMMON MAN" 
APPROACH -- ONE OF ILIESCU'S MOST EFFECTIVE CAMPAIGN 
SLOGANS WAS "FROM US, FOR US."  IN OUR VIEW, ILIESCU 
DOES CONSIDER HIMSELF TO BE, IF NOT A COMMON MAN, 
THEN AT LEAST THE COMMON MAN'S DEFENDER.  THIS 
ATTITUDE IS A NATURAL OUTGROWTH OF HIS COMMITMENT TO 
EGALITARIANISM AND HATRED OF THE PRE-WAR SOCIAL 
ORDER, AND HAS BEEN REFLECTED NOT ONLY IN HIS 
POSITION ON SUCH ISSUES AS NATIONALIZED HOUSING, BUT 
IN HIS REPEATED -- BUT UNHEEDED -- DEMANDS THAT THE 
MP'S OF HIS OWN PARTY EITHER RESIGN FROM LUCRATIVE 
ECONOMIC POSITIONS ON THE BOARDS OF STATE 
ENTERPRISES OR LEAVE PARLIAMENT,  AS WELL AS IN HIS 
DENUNCIATIONS OF CORRUPTION IN GENERAL.  IT IS 
SIGNIFICANT THAT ILIESCU IS ONE OF THE FEW POLITICAL 
LEADERS HERE WHO HAS NOT BEEN SUBJECTED TO CONSTANT 
-- AND IN MANY CASES, WELL-GROUNDED -- ACCUSATIONS 
OF CORRUPTION.  IN FACT, SOME OPPOSITION LEADERS 
CRITICIZED ILIESCU'S STATED DESIRE TO "DIE A POOR 
MAN" NOT ON GROUNDS OF HYPOCRISY, BUT OF 
"STUPIDITY." 
 
16. COMMENT CONTINUED: HOWEVER, ILIESCU IS NOW 
CAUGHT IN A POLITICAL VICE BETWEEN HIS PRO-REFORM, 
PRO-WESTERN POLICIES AND HIS POLITICAL BASE, WHICH 
IS FIRMLY GROUNDED IN A CONSTITUENCY THAT FEARS 
RAPID CHANGE, BEING THE LEAST ABLE TO COPE WITH A 
FREE MARKET AND FULL LABOR MOBILITY.  CONTROLLING 
INFLATION AND RAISING REAL WAGES, EVEN MINIMALLY, 
HAVE HELPED, BUT IN THE LONG-RUN HIS PRO-REFORM 
POLICIES WILL UNDERMINE HIM AND HIS PARTY IN 
ROMANIA.  ILIESCU WILL CONTINUE TO BE PORTRAYED BY 
THE OPPOSITION AS A CRYPTO-COMMUNIST MASQUERADING IN 
WESTERN GARB.  BUT WHILE THE LEADERSHIP OF THE 
HISTORIC PARTIES (PEASANT AND LIBERAL) TALK REFORM, 
THEY VOTED AGAINST THE IMF AGREEMENT AND THE MASS 
PRIVATIZATION LAW TO DENY THE GOVERNMENT THE 
LEGITIMACY THAT THEIR CONCURRENCE WOULD HAVE 
BROUGHT.  ILIESCU IS ATTEMPTING TO SURVIVE ON THE 
HORNS OF THIS DILEMMA BY PROTECTING THE WORKER AT 
THE SAME TIME THAT ROMANIA PRIVATIZES, PRIMARILY BY 
MEANS OF MANAGEMENT-EMPLOYEE BUY-OUTS (MEBO'S), 
WHICH CONTINUE TO BE PERMITTED UNDER THE MASS 
PRIVATIZATION LAW, COMBINED WITH THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
OWNERSHIP CERTIFICATES TO THE PUBLIC.  THIS POLICY 
MAY HAVE SHORT-TERM POLITICAL BENEFITS BUT LONG-TERM 
NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR A COUNTRY THAT WILL SOON 
HAVE MORE THAN 3000 FORMER STATE-OWNED BUSINESSES 
OWNED AND OPERATED BY MANAGEMENT -- AND/OR MILLIONS 
OF NEW SMALL SHAREHOLDERS -- AND PRESENT EMPLOYEES, 
WITH CONFLICTING SHORT AND LONG-TERM INTERESTS. 
 
17. COMMENT CONTINUED: ILIESCU'S "COMMON MAN" 
ORIENTATION IS ALSO REFLECTED IN HIS PRIVATE LIFE. 
HE AND HIS WIFE ELENA, WHO HAS AN ENGINEERING 
DEGREE, ARE CHILDLESS AND LIVE MODESTLY IN AN 
APARTMENT BUILDING WHICH CONTAINS FOUR OTHER UNITS. 
THEY NEVER APPEAR ON THE BUCHAREST NIGHT LIFE 
CIRCUIT AND ELENA IS VERY RARELY SEEN IN PUBLIC AT 
ALL, NOR DOES SHE ACCOMPANY HER HUSBAND ON HIS 
OFFICIAL TRIPS ABROAD.  ILIESCU HAS LEARNED TO SPEAK 
ENGLISH QUITE WELL SINCE THE 1989 REVOLUTION, AND 
ALSO SPEAKS RUSSIAN, FRENCH, AND SOME SPANISH. 
ELENA ILIESCU DOES NOT SPEAK ENGLISH.  HOWEVER, SHE 
IS REPORTED TO HAVE INTELLECTUAL INTERESTS AND TO BE 
A READER OF AMERICAN FICTION.  ILIESCU, WHO 
RECOVERED RAPIDLY FROM GALL BLADDER SURGERY LAST 
SUMMER, APPEARS TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH.  HIS WIFE, 
HOWEVER, REPORTEDLY HAS A SERIOUS MEDICAL PROBLEM -- 
PERHAPS CANCER.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
EINIK