US embassy cable - 03ABUDHABI1828

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001828 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR IRAQ TASK FORCE, NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA, 
PM FOR A/S BLOOMFIELD, ALSO PMAT 
 
SECDEF FOR USEC FEITH, ALSO PRINCIPAL D/USEC RYAN 
HENRY 
 
KUWAIT FOR HOC AND ORHA 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS AND P/E KHALILZAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL 04/15/13 
TAGS: PHUM, MARR, MOPS EAID, PREL, PGOV, IZ, TC 
SUBJECT:  TFIZ01: UAE TO DEPLOY LARGE MILITARY FIELD 
HOSPITAL TO BAGHDAD 
 
REF:  ABU DHABI 1827 
 
1.  (U) Classified by DCM Richard A. Albright for 
reasons 1.5 (B) and (D). 
 
2.  (U)  This is an action message -- please see 
paragraph five. 
 
3.  (C) UAE Chief of Staff (and de facto Defense 
Minister) Shaykh Muhammad bin Zayid (MBZ) called the 
Ambassador 4/14 to relate that the UAEG planned to 
deploy a large military field hospital to Baghdad and 
urgently sought consultations with the USG on 
modalities.  Econchief and USLO Deputy Chief met later 
that evening with UAE Armed Forces Deputy COS MG Hamad 
Al-Thani Al-Rumaithi and his senior staff to get a 
briefing on the UAE proposal.  Al-Rumaithi said the 
UAE military would have ready to deploy in about one 
week a one hundred bed field hospital, 210 military 
staff (120 medical, 90 support/security), 50 vehicles, 
associated equipment, and enough supplies for 14-25 
days.  This same capability had been deployed in 
Kosovo for 18 months and had a sustained capacity to 
treat about 250 patients per day.  The initial UAE 
concept is to ship the vehicles and supplies to Umm 
Qasr, fly the personnel to Kuwait, road march the 
forces to Umm Qasr and then proceed overland (with 
appropriate coalition escorts/clearances) to Baghdad 
for a 90-day plus total deployment. 
 
4.  (C)  Econchief welcomed the proposal and noted 
that the mission would do everything it could to 
facilitate.  He asked if the UAE would consider 
deploying to a location other than Baghdad if the need 
elsewhere in Iraq proved more compelling.  Al-Rumaithi 
demurred, saying the UAEG preferred to be in Baghdad, 
and hoped to find a suitable building (abandoned or 
for rent) which it might move into.  While the field 
hospital was capable of operating out of tents, the 
DCOS said arrangements would be simpler and more 
comfortable in a more permanent structure.  USLO 
Deputy Chief said he would pass on all the relevant 
information to the appropriate coalition authorities; 
would the UAE have any problem being under full 
coalition operational control?  Al-Rumaithi said this 
would be absolutely no problem.  As a first step, USLO 
Deputy Chief suggested that an Emirati advance team 
(advon) meet with appropriate coalition officials 
(once identified) to get a better sense of modalities 
and timing; he also suggested that UAE LNOs at Centcom 
Forward be fully briefed on the CONOPS -- the Emiratis 
said this would be done. 
 
5.  (S)  Comment and action request:  Highlighting the 
domestic and regional political significance of this 
action, UAE President Zayid has already announced 
publicly that the military hospital will be deployed 
to Iraq (see reftel).  The Emiratis clearly want to be 
in Baghdad and, given the UAE leadership investment in 
this effort, we strongly recommend active support to 
facilitate this deployment.  Welcoming and 
facilitating this Emirati contribution will send a 
strong political signal to Arab governments and 
publics about our willingness to permit them a 
significant role in Iraq humanitarian relief and 
reconstruction and will open the door to broader Arab 
contributions.  Furthermore, having 210 uniformed 
Emirati military personnel on the ground could ease 
the way for a broader UAE/GCC military role in Iraq 
stabilization. 
 
6.  (C)  Comment and action request, continued:  We 
need have no concerns with regard to the capabilities 
or competence of the Emiratis; they have done this all 
before (the same hospital and staff spent 18 grueling 
months in Kosovo where they received high marks as 
part of the UAE's broader military deployments there), 
are extremely well-equipped and professional and their 
support requirements from us will be minimal.  The 
most important step now is to make the deployment 
happen, and as quickly as possible, by lashing up 
their ADVON with the appropriate parties.  We will 
continue to coordinate closely with the HOC, ORHA and 
CENTCOM on this deployment of very real operational 
and political significance, and request that all 
involved do all they can to support and expedite. 
 
WAHBA