US embassy cable - 03ABUDHABI1826

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 001826 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/NGA AND NEA/ARP 
 
STATE ALSO FOR PRM/ANE 
 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD AMBASSADOR LITT 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/13 
TAGS: EAID, EFIN, PREL, ECON, PGOV, IZ, TC 
SUBJECT: UAE SIGNS UP FOR CORE GROUP ON IRAQ 
STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
 
REF:  A) ABU DHABI 1667, B) STATE 80809, 
      C) ABU DHABI 1508 
 
1.  (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MARCELLE M. WAHBA 
FOR REASONS 1.5 (B,D). 
 
2.  (S)  MFA Minstate Hamdan bin Zayid told the 
Ambassador 4/16 that the Cabinet had approved UAE 
participation in the "core group" for Iraq 
stabilization and reconstruction outlined ref b. 
Shaykh Hamdan noted that the UAE -- with a modern, 
diversified economy -- sees itself as a good role 
model for Iraq and hopes to be able to play a 
significant role in Iraq reconstruction.  To that 
end, the UAEG has established, under Hamdan's 
authority, an interagency committee (comprising the 
agencies responsible for energy, transportation, 
commerce, telecommunications, electricity and 
agriculture) to promote UAE involvement in the 
rebuilding of Iraq.  The MFA Minstate added that 
the UAE hopes it will be considered a "preferred 
partner" in those activities, since the Emirates 
has solid expertise to offer and may carry less 
political baggage with the Iraqis than other Arab 
states.  Shaykh Hamdan requested more information 
regarding the role of the "core group" and what 
precisely will be expected of the UAEG. 
 
3.  (S)  Comment:  It appears the Emiratis may see 
participation in the core group through the lens of 
burnishing their own credentials as a "preferred 
partner" for Iraq reconstruction -- with the 
attendant contracts and associated business 
activity it is hoped such status will bring.  We 
would note that the UAE has never demanded any 
explicit quid pro quo for its support for Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, but there is clearly an unstated 
assumption on their part that we will look 
favorably upon them as contracts are awarded. 
Given their sustained support for the coalition 
effort, and their world-class expertise 
(particularly in the telecommunications, civil 
aviation, petroleum sectors and shipping), we hope 
that opportunities will present themselves for the 
Emiratis to play the sort of role that they desire. 
Their influence on an emergent Iraqi government can 
only be positive. 
 
Wahba