US embassy cable - 03ABUDHABI1813

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 001813 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/RA and DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/13 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, TC 
SUBJECT:  MFA MINSTATE HAMDAN BIN ZAYID ON 
DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE UAE: SOONER 
BETTER THAN LATER 
 
REF:  DUBAI 1318 
 
1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba 
for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D). 
 
2. (C) During a 4/13 meeting, the Ambassador asked 
for MFA Minstate Hamdan bin Zayid's opinion on 
Dubai's recent decision to establish elected 
district councils.  Hamdan briefed that de facto 
Dubai Ruler Shaykh Muhammad bin Rashid Al-Maktoum 
(MbR) had not consulted with the Abu Dhabi 
leadership and hinted the decision had come as a 
complete surprise.  Furthermore, Hamdan sniffed, 
Abu Dhabi had not had time to folow-up the matter 
with Dubai, as the leadership was far too busy 
following events in Iraq.  (Note:  President Zayid 
recently had a meeting with MBR, and the Dubai 
rumor mill has it that Zayid asked MbR for an 
explanation.  End Note.) 
 
3. (C) Hamdan told the Ambassador that he was among 
those favoring an early move to democratization in 
the UAE, consonant with the country's traditional 
cultural, religious and social norms.  As he put 
it, "better we do it our way rather than waiting 
for the Americans to pressure us later into doing 
it their way."  It would be a nice legacy for 
Shaykh Zayid, in Hamdan's view, and with Zayid's 
imprimatur, the move to democratization would be 
more widely accepted.  (Note:  The implication 
being that Zayid's successor, Abu Dhabi Crown 
Prince Khalifa, may encounter greater resistance 
from conservatives.  End Note.)  Lending some 
urgency to the matter is the fact that all of the 
other states in the region, even the Saudis, are 
opening up politically, Hamdan noted. 
 
4. (C) The situation in the UAE, Hamdan explained, 
is different than in other Gulf states and 
therefore the leadership needs to proceed somewhat 
cautiously.  For instance, the population 
distribution (Emiratis comprise only 20 percent of 
the overall population) and the fact that fifty 
percent of Emirati nationals are naturalized 
citizens must be taken into consideration.  The UAE 
wants to avoid the pitfalls of others in the 
region, namely Kuwait, where until recently, 
naturalized citizens could not vote.  In addition, 
Hamdan believes the UAE should start small, i.e. 
elected local bodies, rather than immediately 
moving to an elected federal parliament.  In his 
opinion, the Oman model is worthy of emulation. 
 
5. (C) COMMENT:  Reading between the lines, Dubai's 
announcement came as a bombshell to Abu Dhabi. 
Once again, the upstart Al-Maktoum have scooped the 
more staid, conservative Al-Nahyan, in a move which 
sends a dual message.  One is that Dubai, Inc. is 
exercising its right to run its own affairs, 
without the prior approval of Abu Dhabi.  We note 
that Sharjah did the same when it decided to 
appoint women to its consultative council two years 
ago.  The second message is intended for a much 
wider local, regional and international audience 
and is part of Dubai's effort to project an image 
of a progressive, forward leaning city-state led by 
a dynamic family.  Dubai's leadership is intensely 
aware that its continued prosperity depends on 
attracting foreign investment, and it realizes that 
some measure of political openness is viewed as 
desirable by major investors, especially when other 
regional competitors (Bahrain and Qatar) are 
implementing more progressive political systems. 
We also note that it is not unusual for the press 
savvy Dubyyans to make a dramatic announcement -- 
utterly devoid of substance -- the details of which 
will be filled in at a later date.  Stay tuned. 
END COMMENT. 
 
6. (U) This cable was coordinated with Amconsul 
Dubai. 
 
WAHBA